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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, : 
v. : 
HEATHER JO RODRIGUEZ, : Case No. 20040566-SC 
Defendant/Respondent. : Respondent is not incarcerated. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court granted the State's Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Utah Court of 
Appeals in State v. Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198, 93 P.3d 854, cert, granted, 100 P.3d 
220 (Utah 2004). See Order dated October 18, 2004; Addendum A. The court of 
appeals' opinion in Rodriguez is attached hereto as Addendum B. Jurisdiction is 
conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: "Whether the dissipation of alcohol in the blood, without more, created an 
exigent circumstance justifying the warrantless extraction of a blood sample from 
respondent." Order dated October 18, 2004. 
Standard of Review: On certiorari, this Court reviews "'the decision of the court 
of appeals and not that of the district court.'" State v. Hansen. 2002 UT I25,1f25, 63 P.3d 
650 (citation omitted). This Court reviews "'the decision of the court of appeals for 
correctness.'" LI (citation omitted). The court of appeals applied the following standard 
of review: "When reviewing a trial court's determination that exigent circumstances 
justified a warrantless intrusion, we defer to the court's factual findings, but examine its 
ultimate legal conclusion for correctness." Rodriguez. 2004 UT App 198 at \l (citing 
CitvofOremv.Henrie. 868 P.2d 1384, 1386 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)). 
In State v. Brake. 2004 UT 95, 103 P.3d 699, this Court "announced [its] 
intention to review for correctness mixed questions of law and fact in search and seizure 
cases and to undertake this task based on a totality of the circumstances." Brigham City 
v. Stuart. 2005 UT 13,18, 519 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (citing Brake, 2004 UT 95 at Tfl5). "In 
Brake, [this Court] cited a desire to develop uniform search and seizure standards to aid 
law enforcement officers as the reason for adopting a less deferential standard when 
reviewing whether a particular set of facts surrounding a warrantless search or seizure 
offended constitutional protections. IdL. (citing Brake. 2004 UT 95 at ^14). In Stuart, this 
Court applied the correctness standard, even though the court of appeals issued its 
opinion in that case before this Court "modified the standard of review in Brake ." Id. 
Similarly, this Court should apply the correctness standard of review to determine the 
constitutionality of the blood draw in this case. Id. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. AND RULES 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution is determinative of the 
issues on appeal. It reads: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
2 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. Const, amend. IV. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Heather Jo Rodriguez (Rodriguez) was charged with one count of automobile 
homicide, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207(1 )(a) (1999). 
Rodriguez. 2004 UT App 198 at T}6; R- 3-4. "Rodriguez filed a motion to suppress any 
evidence derived from the warrantless blood draw, which the trial court initially 
granted." Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198 at Tf6; R. 72; 210. "However, after the State 
petitioned for relief from the judgment, the trial court reconsidered and denied the 
motion." Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198 at | 6 ; R. 206; 307; see. Addendum C. 
"Rodriguez subsequently entered into an agreement with the State, pleading guilty to the 
charge, but reserving her right to appeal the trial court's denial of her motion to 
suppress." Rodriguez. 2004 UT App 198 at j^6; R. 566:1-2. On December 2, 2002, the 
trial court sentenced Rodriguez to "an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in 
the Utah State Prison." R. 484. Rodriguez appealed the trial court's "denial of her 
motion to suppress evidence and her subsequent conviction through a conditional guilty 
plea." Rodriguez. 2004 UT App 198 at Tfl; R. 508-09. 
On appeal, Rodriguez argued "the State's decision to obtain forcibly a blood 
sample from her" violated the Fourth Amendment because it "was unsupported by either 
3 
probable cause or exigent circumstances." Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198 at ^|8. In 
regard to exigent circumstances, Rodriguez argued "the trial court erred in failing to 
examine the totality of the circumstances of this case before deciding that the drawing of 
her blood was justified by exigent circumstances." Id. at ^|10. In response, the State 
argued exigency existed because "the evanescence of blood-alcohol evidence coupled 
with delays inherent in investigating an alcohol-related traffic accident constitutes 
exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment.'" IJL (citations omitted). 
The court of appeals did "not address the issue of probable cause" because it 
found "the exigency question to be dispositive." Id. at f 9. Citing Utah's long tradition 
of using the totality of the circumstances test to determine exigency and the United States 
Supreme Court's use of the totality of the circumstances test in Schmerber v. California. 
384 U.S. 757 (1966), to decide whether exigent circumstances existed to draw the 
defendant's blood following a traffic accident, the court of appeals concluded: 
exigent circumstances will be found, where the situation 
involves blood-alcohol evidence, only when the "totality of 
the circumstances," [Henrie, 868 P.2d at 1388], supports a 
finding that the officer "was confronted with an emergency, 
in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the 
circumstances, threatened "the destruction of evidence." 
Moreover, the mere fact that blood-alcohol evidence is 
evanescent, although important to the equation, is insufficient 
to create exigent circumstances by itself. 
Rodriguez, 2004 UT app 198 at 1fl4. 
The court of appeals then applied the totality of the circumstances test to 
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Rodriguez's case and concluded the State did not show exigent circumstances justified 
the warrantless blood draw. Id. at f 15. Specifically, the court of appeals noted that the 
trial court found exigency based on "the dissipation rate of alcohol in the blood." IdL at 
1J17. "However, the trial court left open the question of time," such as: 
the proximity of the nearest magistrate; the alternatives 
explored and discarded by the officers; the estimated delay 
the officers faced in seeking a warrant; the impact that the 
delay could have had on obtaining viable evidence; and the 
point of time in the accident investigation when the decision 
was made to extract Rodriguez's blood. 
Rodriguez. 2004 UT app 198 at [^17. The trial court's failure to consider "the question of 
time" proved "fatal to its determination that exigent circumstances existed." Id, "It is 
clear from the record that the decision to extract Rodriguez's blood was made soon after 
the accident occurred, at a time 'when courts are open and search warrants can be readily 
requested' either in person or by telephone." Id. at f^ 19 (citation omitted). Regardless, 
"[n]either officer made any efforts to procure a warrant, or even inquire about the 
availability of a magistrate, prior to performing the blood draw on Rodriguez." Id. 
"Rather, both officers seemingly proceeded with the understanding that a warrant was 
not necessary to extract Rodriguez's blood." Id. Thus, because "the State has shown 
only that the warrantless blood draw occurred pursuant to routine procedure" and 
exigency, by definition, "is the opposite of routine," the court of appeals reversed and 
remanded Rodriguez's case, "instructing the trial court to suppress all evidence derived 
from the warrantless blood draw." Id_atTf22. 
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The State filed a petition for a writ of certiorari asking this Court to address one 
issue: Did the court of appeals err by refusing to hold that "the evanescence of blood 
alcohol evidence alone creates an exigency that, coupled with probable cause, justifies a 
warrantless blood draw?" Cert. Pet. at 1. The State did not ask this Court to address the 
separate issue: if the court of appeals correctly held the totality of the circumstances test 
was required, then did the court of appeals correctly apply the totality of the 
circumstances test to Rodriguez's case? h i at 1, 5-10. Based on the State's petition, this 
Court granted a writ of certiorari to decide one issue: "Whether the dissipation of alcohol 
in the blood, without more, created an exigent circumstance justifying the warrantless 
extraction of a blood sample from respondent." Order dated October 18, 2004. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
"On the afternoon of May 9, 2001, [] Rodriguez was driving southbound on Main 
Street, in Salt Lake City, accompanied by her friend, Terry Stewart." Rodriguez, 2004 
UT App 198 at [^2. "Between 4:45 and 4:50 pm, soon after she passed through the 
controlled intersection of 17th South and Main Street, Rodriguez abruptly turned left into 
oncoming traffic, directly in front of a school bus." IcL_; R. 559:13, 35; 560:3, 8. The 
"bus struck the passenger side of Rodriguez's car, throwing the car off of the road and 
onto a nearby yard." Rodriguez. 2004 UT App 198 at Tf2; R. 559:16, 40. "The bus driver 
immediately reported the accident," and "[paramedics arrived on the scene at 4:50 pm." 
Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198 at ^2. "After removing Rodriguez from the vehicle, the 
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paramedics determined that she was in critical condition and quickly moved her to an 
ambulance, which transported her to LDS Hospital." IcL; R. 560:5. "The paramedics 
then noted that Stewart had severe head injuries and determined that she was near death 
and likely to die." Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198 at ^2. "They moved her to an 
ambulance for transport to the University Hospital." IcL "At about that point, the first of 
the responding Salt Lake City police officers arrived on the scene." IcL_; R- 560:3-4. 
"As the officers began to examine the scene and look for possible witnesses they 
were approached by someone who appeared to be a paramedic." Rodriguez. 2004 UT 
App 198 at Tf3; R. 560:4-6. "That person told the officers that the occupants of 
Rodriguez's car smelled of alcohol." IcL "When the officers looked in Rodriguez's car, 
they found a purse, which turned out to be Stewart's." Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198 at 
Tf3; R. 560:7. "In the purse the officers found an open, partially empty bottle of vodka." 
Id. "Soon thereafter, the supervising officer arrived." Rodriguez. 2004 UT App 198 at 
P ; R. 560:12-17. "He was informed of the circumstances surrounding the accident, the 
apparent paramedic's observations, and the partially empty bottle of vodka found in the 
car." Id "He immediately requested that dispatch send an officer to obtain a blood 
sample from Rodriguez." IcL 
"At 5:10 pm-no more than twenty-five minutes after the accident occurred-
dispatch instructed officer Nate Swensen to locate the driver and 'witness a blood 
draw.'" Rodriguez. 2004 UT App 198 at f4; R. 560:19-21, 50. "Swensen first drove to 
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the University Hospital, where "he learned that the driver had been taken to LDS 
Hospital and that Stewart, the passenger, was expected to die." IcL "He then drove to 
LDS Hospital." Id. "Although he did not know Rodriguez's name at the time, when 
Swensen entered the emergency room he asked the staff to direct him to the 'patient that 
was brought in from the traffic accident.'" Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198 at ^4; R. 
559:73-74. "The staff directed him to the CT room where Swensen found Rodriguez 
lying on a CT table, waiting for a CT scan." Rodriguez. 2004 UT App 198 at Tf4; R. 
560:21-23, 51-52. "He noticed that she was being very uncooperative with the medical 
staff, "her breath had a heavy odor of alcohol," "her eyes were red," and "her speech was 
slurred." Id. "In general, Swensen described Rodriguez as'uncooperative,' 'very angry,' 
and 'belligerent.'" Id Rodriguez "indicated a desire to leave" but the hospital staff 
prevented her because "she was hooked up to their equipment." R. 560:57. 
"Upon locating Rodriguez, Swensen asked her some questions, but found her to 
be uncooperative." Rodriguez. 2004 UT App 198 at %5; R. 560:21-23, 51-52. "He then 
waited between twenty and twenty-five minutes for the blood draw technician to arrive." 
Id. Swensen testified he "just st[ood] there waiting" for "twenty to twenty-five minutes." 
R. 560:53. "When the technician arrived, Swensen informed Rodriguez that they 'were 
going to draw blood from her just as we do in accidents.'" Rodriguez. 2004 UT App 198 
at f 5; R. 560:24, 54. Swensen testified he did not have any reason to suspect a crime had 
been committed, but knew only that he "was to witness a blood draw because of the 
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traffic accident." R. 560:56. "The technician drew blood from an IV line that had been 
inserted into Rodriguez's arm upon her arrival. The vials containing the blood were then 
labeled, stored, and the blood was eventually tested. The test revealed that, at the time of 
the blood draw, Rodriguez's blood-alcohol level was .39." Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198 
at ^5; R. 560:24-27. "Stewart died and Rodriguez was charged with one count of 
automobile homicide." Rodriguez. 2004 UT App 198 at 1J6; R. 3-4; 73; 97; 559:121. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right 
against unreasonable searches and seizures. In Schmerber, the United States Supreme 
Court held warrantless blood draws violate the Fourth Amendment unless they fall under 
an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. The exception at issue in 
this case is exigency. A warrantless blood draw satisfies the exigency exception only if 
exigent circumstances and probable cause justify the warrantless bodily intrusion, and the 
method chosen is a reasonable one, performed in a reasonable manner. The court of 
appeals held the warrantless blood draw in this case violated the Fourth Amendment 
because it was not justified by exigent circumstances. This Court should affirm because 
the dissipation of alcohol in the blood, without more, did not create an exigent 
circumstance justifying the warrantless extraction of a blood sample from Rodriguez. 
Exigent circumstances are those that would cause a reasonable person to believe 
immediate entry was necessary to prevent physical harm to the officers or other persons, 
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or the destruction of relevant evidence. Exigency is determined by looking at the totality 
of the circumstances because it depends on the unique facts of the individual case. Thus, 
both the Supreme Court and this Court have declined to create per se rules of exigency. 
Although neither this Court nor the Supreme Court have directly addressed the issue of 
per se rules of exigency in the area of DUI investigations, the Supreme Court's holding 
in Schmerber indicates a per se rule of exigency in DUI cases would violate the Fourth 
Amendment. In light of this Court's and the Supreme Court's case law, the court of 
appeals correctly declined to hold that the dissipation of alcohol in the blood, without 
more, created an exigent circumstance justifying the warrantless blood draw in this case. 
Moreover, in its opening brief, the State asks this Court to consider the separate 
issue of whether the court of appeals correctly concluded the totality of the circumstances 
test was not met in this case. This Court should decline to review this issue because the 
State did not ask this Court to review this issue in its petition and this Court did not grant 
a writ of certiorari on this issue. Regardless, this Court should affirm because the court 
of appeals correctly applied the totality of the circumstances test to this case. 
Finally, when deciding this case, this Court should not consider the amicus brief 
because it inappropriately enlarges the issue before this Court and relies on factual 
information that was not presented to the trial court for factual findings and is not in the 
record. Regardless, this Court should affirm the court of appeals' decision because, even 
considering amici's information, the dissipation of alcohol from the blood alone did not 
10 
create exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless extraction of Rodriguez's blood. 
ARGUMENT 
THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM BECAUSE THE DISSIPATION OF 
ALCOHOL IN THE BLOOD, WITHOUT MORE, DID NOT CREATE AN 
EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCE JUSTIFYING THE WARRANTLESS 
EXTRACTION OF A BLOOD SAMPLE FROM RODRIGUEZ 
"The right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures is one of the most 
cherished rights guaranteed by the Utah and United States Constitutions." Stuart, 2005 
UT 13 at Tf 15 (citation omitted). The Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. Const, amend. IV. "A 'cardinal principle' derived by this language is that 
warrantless searches '"are perse unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment."'" Stuart, 
2005 UT 13 at^|15 (quoting Mincev v. Arizona. 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) (quoting Katz 
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). This principle is "zealously guarded" in a 
person's home and, by extension, in a person's body. l±_; see Schmerben 384 U.S. at 
770 ("Search warrants are ordinarily required for searches of dwellings, and, absent an 
emergency, no less could be required where intrusions into the human body are 
concerned."). "The importance of informed, detached and deliberate determinations of 
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the issue of whether or not to invade another's body in search of evidence of guilt is 
indisputable and great." Schmerber. 384 U.S. at 770. In fact, a person's body, like a 
person's home, is "one of four domains expressly granted the security promised by the 
Fourth Amendment." Stuart. 2005 UT 13 at 1fl5; see Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767 (noting 
Fourth Amendment "expressly provides that 'the right of the people to be secure in their 
persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated'" (emphasis 
in original) (quoting U.S. Const. Amend. IV)). Thus, blood draws "plainly involve[] the 
broadly conceived reach of a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment." kL 
The human body "may, however, be subject to intrusion in exceptional 
circumstances where 'the needs of law enforcement [are] so compelling that the 
warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.'" Stuart, 
2005 UT 13 at 1J16 (quoting Mincev, 437 U.S. at 394). These exceptions are "'jealously 
and carefully drawn.'" State v. Ashe. 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987) (citation 
omitted); see Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (noting presumption is "subject only to a few 
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions"). One such exception is "the 
presence of probable cause and exigent circumstances." Stuart, 2005 UT 13 at^l6 
(citing Ashe. 745 P.2d at 1258-59). Under this exception, a warrantless blood draw 
violates the Fourth Amendment unless: "(1) there are exigent circumstances that justify 
the warrantless bodily intrusion; (2) there is a clear indication tha t . . . evidence [of a 
crime] will be found; and (3) the method chosen is a reasonable one, performed in a 
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reasonable manner." State v. Palmer. 803 P.2d 1249, 1252 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citing 
Schmerber. 384 U.S. at 768-72), cert, denied. 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991. 
In this case, the court of appeals did "not address the issue of probable cause" 
because it found the "exigency question to be dispositive." Rodriguez. 2004 UT App 
198 at Tf9. It then rejected the State's argument that it should adopt a per se rule of 
exigency in DUI cases and reversed because the State had not shown, under the totality 
of the circumstances, that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless blood draw. L±_ 
at ffl[17-22. Instead, the State had "shown only that the warrantless blood draw occurred 
pursuant to routine procedure followed by the Salt Lake City Police Department." Id. at 
[^22. This Court granted a writ of certiorari to review one aspect of the court of appeals' 
decision: "Whether the dissipation of alcohol in the blood, without more, created an 
exigent circumstance justifying the warrantless extraction of a blood sample from 
respondent." Order dated October 18, 2004. 
This Court should affirm the court of appeals' decision because the dissipation of 
alcohol in the blood, without more, did not create an exigent circumstance justifying the 
warrantless extraction of a blood sample from Rodriguez. See Section A. This Court 
should then remand without addressing the court of appeals' application of the totality of 
the circumstances test to the facts of Rodriguez's case because this question is not part of 
the issue on certiorari review. See Section B. Regardless, if this Court reviews the court 
of appeals' application of the totality of the circumstances test, it should affirm because 
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the court of appeals applied the test correctly. See id Finally, this Court should 
disregard the amicus brief filed in this case. See. Section C. Nevertheless, if this Court 
considers the amicus brief, it should affirm because the amicus brief presents no 
argument that justifies creating a per se rule of exigency in DUI cases. See id. 
A. This Court Should Affirm Because the Dissipation of Alcohol In the Blood, 
Without More, Did Not Create an Exigent Circumstance Justifying the 
Warrantless Extraction of a Blood Sample From Rodriguez, 
Exigent circumstances are "'those "that would cause a reasonable person to 
believe that [immediate] entry . . . was necessary to prevent physical harm to the officers 
or other persons, the destruction of relevant evidence, the escape of the suspect, or some 
other consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts."'" Stuart, 
2005 UT 13 at 1fl8 (quoting State v. Beavers. 859 P.2d 9, 18 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)); s_ee_ 
State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 460, 469-70 (Utah 1990) ("Warrantless searches will be 
permitted only where they satisfy their traditional justification, namely to protect the 
safety of police or the public or to prevent the destruction of evidence."); Black's Law 
Dictionary (7th Ed. 1999), 236, 595 ("Exigent circumstances are those "that demand[] 
unusual or immediate action and that may allow people to circumvent usual procedures"). 
"There is . . . no absolute test for determining whether exigent circumstances are 
present because such a determination ultimately depends on the unique facts of each 
case.'" Stuart. 2005 UT 13 at^|52 (Durrant, J. concurring) (citations omitted). In other 
words, "[ejxigency does not evolve from one individual fact. Instead, there is often a 
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mosaic of evidence, no single part of which is itself sufficient.11 Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1258. 
Thus, this Court has repeatedly said its task "is to review the totality of the facts and 
circumstances of the particular case to determine if the finding of exigency was proper." 
Id.; see Stuart, 2005 UT 13 at [^37 ("Our task is to pass judgment on whether the 
intrusion was reasonable taking into account all the circumstances." (citing Pennsylvania 
v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977) (citing Terrv v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968))). 
In Mimms, the United States Supreme Court explained that "[t]he touchstone of 
our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is [and] always [has been] the reasonableness 
in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal 
security." Mimms, 434 U.S. at 108-09 (internal quotation omitted). In keeping with this 
pronouncement, the Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to allow per se rules to 
replace the totality of the circumstances test. For example, in Mincey, "the United States 
Supreme Court struck down Arizona's murder scene exception-a per se rule permitting 
warrantless searches whenever a homicide is committed." Stuart, 2005 UT 13 at Tf42 
(citing Mincey, 437 U.S. at 395). The Supreme Court concluded that "a warrantless 
search . . . [was] not constitutionally permissible simply because a homicide had recently 
occurred." IdL Similarly, in Pavton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), the Supreme 
Court reviewed the constitutionality of state statutes "that authorize police officers to 
enter a private residence without a warrant and with force, if necessary, to make a routine 
felony arrest." Pavton, 445 U.S. at 574. The Supreme Court declared these statutes 
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unconstitutional because n[a]bsent exigent circumstances/' a home's "threshold may not 
reasonably be crossed without a warrant." IcL at 590; see Stuart, 2005 UT 13 at ^ [42. 
In United States v. Banks. 540 U.S. 31 (2003), the Supreme Court explained its 
refusal to create per se rules of exigency. Addressing reasonableness in the execution of 
search warrants, the Supreme Court said it has "fleshed out" the Fourth Amendment 
"case by case, largely avoiding categories and protocols for searches." IcL at 36. 
Instead, we have treated reasonableness as a function of the 
facts of cases so various that no template is likely to produce 
sounder results than examining the totality of circumstances 
in a given case; it is too hard to invent categories without 
giving short shrift to details that turn out to be important in a 
given instance, and without inflating marginal ones. 
IcL (citing Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) ("[W]e have consistently eschewed 
bright-line rules, instead emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness 
inquiry."); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963) (holding reasonableness not 
susceptible to Procrustean application); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States , 282 U.S. 
344, 357 (1931) (holding there is no formula for determining reasonableness; instead 
review each case on its own facts and circumstances)). 
Following the Supreme Court's lead, this Court has also refused to allow per se 
rules of exigency to replace the totality of the circumstances test. See Stuart, 2005 UT 13 
at ^[37-44; Larocco, 794 P.2d at 470 (noting "this court has consistently agreed with the 
view taken by the United States Supreme Court . . . that '[warrantless searches and 
seizures are per se unreasonable unless exigent circumstances require action before a 
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warrant can be obtained'" (citations omitted)). In Stuart, officers conducted a 
warrantless home entry "after witnessing four adults attempt to restrain a juvenile, the 
juvenile break a hand free and strike an adult in the face, and the adults struggle to regain 
control of the juvenile." Stuart, 2005 UT 13 at ^[34. On certiorari, this Court declined to 
"replace the reasonableness requirement" of exigency "with a per se rule concerning 
domestic violence that disregards other factors in the totality of the circumstances." I(L_ at 
TJ44. Although this Court acknowledged the "unquestioned evils of domestic violence," 
it refused to: 
signal [its] approval for any categorical extension of the 
exigent circumstances which would permit a warrantless 
entry into a home, even where to do so may prove beneficial 
in controlling the scourge of domestic violence, because a 
categorical extension would unduly threaten the special 
protection the Fourth Amendment bestows on people in their 
homes. 
Id. at 40. By rejecting "a rule that would grant a suspicion of domestic violence the 
status of a per se exigent circumstance," this Court did "not render considerations of 
domestic violence irrelevant." Id. at ^44. Rather, it merely recognized that permitting 
domestic violence to "sweep aside other relevant considerations" would be "unwise." Id. 
Thus, even in instances of domestic violence, police are 
required to assess the situation and conform their actions to a 
standard of reasonableness, entering only when an exigency 
is present. See rState v. Comer, 2002 UT App 219,^27 n.l 1, 
51 P.3d 55] (the police "can effectively address the volatility 
of domestic disputes through the existing exigent 
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement" 
(emphasis added)); see also United States v. Davis, 290 F.3d 
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1239, 1244 (10th Cir. 2002) ("We hold an officer's 
warrantless entry of a residence during a domestic call is not 
exempt from the requirement of demonstrating exigent 
circumstances."); State v. FrankeL 847 A.2d 561 (NJ. 2004) 
(rejectingper se rule permitting warrantless entry on basis of 
a 911 hang-up call); Commonwealth v. Kiser, 724 N.E.2d 
348, 351 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000) (loud party is "not the sort of 
riotous behavior that justified entry under the statute" which 
was intended to permit entry for breach of peace). 
Stuart, 2005 UT 13 at ftf. 
Neither this Court nor the Supreme Court have directly addressed the issue of per 
se rules of exigency in the area of DUI investigations. The Supreme Court's holding in 
Schmerben however, especially in light of its universal rejection of per se rules of 
exigency, indicates a per se rule of exigency in DUI cases would violate the Fourth 
Amendment. See Schmerber. 384 U.S. at 770-72. In Schmerber. the defendant was in 
an accident and transported to the hospital where his blood was drawn to determine his 
blood alcohol level. Id. at 758-59. In reviewing the case for exigency, the Supreme 
Court said, "We are told that the percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish 
shortly after drinking stops." IdL at 770. The Supreme Court, however, did not stop its 
analysis there and conclude that the diminution of blood alcohol level alone constituted 
exigent circumstances. Id Instead, the Supreme Court proceeded to review the totality 
of the circumstances. Id at 770-72. It is important to note that the Supreme Court issued 
Schmerber before federal law permitted telephonic warrants. See. United States v. 
Turner, 558 F.2d 46, 51-52 (2d Cir. 1977) (explaining the amendment to rule 41(c) of the 
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Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that authorized telephonic search warrants did not 
become effective until August 1, 1977). Thus, the Supreme Court applied the totality of 
the circumstances test with the understanding that the investigating officers would have 
had to travel to the courthouse to obtain a warrant. Id. With this in mind, the Supreme 
Court held exigent circumstances existed because the "special facts" of the case showed 
the time "taken to bring the accused to a hospital and to investigate the scene," left "no 
time to seek out a magistrate and secure a warrant." Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-72. In 
conclusion, because the "integrity of an individual's person is a cherished value of our 
society," the Supreme Court held that Schmerber is "stringently limited" to the "facts of 
the [Schmerber] record" and "in no way indicates that it permits more substantial 
intrusions, or intrusions under other conditions." Id. at 772. 
Courts interpreting Schmerber, when asked to rule on exigency directly, have 
applied the traditional totality of the circumstances test. See. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 
U.S. 740, 753 (1984) (holding possible destruction of blood evidence did not create 
exigency where "gravity of the underlying offense" was minimal); United States v. Berry, 
866 F.2d 887, 891 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding exigent circumstances existed "in this case" 
because there was "no time reasonably to expect the officer to obtain a warrant"); State v. 
Flannigan, 978 P.2d 127, 131 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998) (distinguishing case from Schmerber 
because "record does not suggest that the police reasonably believed that evidence of 
[defendant's] drug consumption would disappear from his system before they could 
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obtain a warrant"); People v. Milhollin. 751 P.2d 43, 49 (Colo. 1988) (holding exigency 
existed because ongoing investigation involved "same facts and concerns" as 
Schmerber); State v. Dolan. 940 P.2d 436, 440 (Mont. 1997) (holding exigency requires 
officer to be "'confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a 
warrant, under the circumstances, threaten[s] the destruction of evidence5" (citation 
omitted)); Henne, 868 P.2d at 1393 (holding warrantless home entry to investigate DUI 
was lawful because, among other reasons, officers "engaged in a continuous and ongoing 
search for defendant" between accident and blood draw). 
In this case, the court of appeals correctly declined to hold that the dissipation of 
alcohol in the blood, without more, created an exigent circumstance justifying the 
warrantless blood draw. Although the court of appeals issued Rodriguez before this 
Court issued its strong rejection of per se rules of exigency in Stuart, the court of appeals 
declined to adopt a per se rule of exigency in DUI cases for reasoning similar to Stuart's. 
First, the court of appeals acknowledged Utah's long tradition of applying the totality of 
the circumstances test to determine whether exigent circumstances existed. Rodriguez, 
2004 UT App 198 at Tfl5 (citations omitted); see. Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1258 (holding 
exigency evolves from "mosaic of evidence, no single part of which is itself sufficient"). 
Second, it explained that a per se rule of exigency would be improper because "exigency 
is the opposite of routine." Id. at ^20; see Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (noting presumption 
against warrantless searches is "subject only to a few specifically established and well-
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delineated exceptions11); Larocco. 794 P.2d at 470 ("Warrantless searches are per se 
unreasonable."). Rather, the totality of the circumstances test is necessary because a 
"reasonable belief that an emergency is at hand is always required if warrantless action is 
to be justified on the basis of exigent circumstances." Id_; see Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1258 
("Our task is to review the totality of the facts and circumstances of the particular case to 
determine if the finding of exigency was proper."). 
Third, the court of appeals looked to the Supreme Court and concluded that the 
"plain language of Schmerber demands: a totality of the circumstances approach with the 
understanding that blood-alcohol evidence is evanescent." Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198 
at TJ13 n.2. The court of appeals reached this conclusion by noting the Supreme Court 
acknowledged "'the percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly after 
drinking stops,5" but only found exigency after looking at the remaining circumstances 
and concluding: "'Particularly in a case such as this, where time had to be taken to bring 
the accused to a hospital and to investigate the scene of the accident, there was no time to 
seek out a magistrate and secure a warrant.'" IcL at [^12 (alteration omitted) (quoting 
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-71). "Moreover, the Court's language—highlighting the 
potential difficulties California police officers faced in contacting a magistrate at that 
time—suggests that other factors important to the analysis are magistrate availability and 
local warrant procedures." IcL at f 13 (citing Flannigan, 978 P.2d at 131 (concluding that 
under Schmerber "the evanescent quality of alcohol and drugs in a person's body creates 
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an exigency only if the evidence might disappear before the police can obtain a 
warrant")). Thus Just as the Supreme Court carefully looked at the circumstances of 
Schmerber and limited its holding to those circumstances, the court of appeals carefully 
looked at the circumstances of Rodriguez's case to determine exigency. Id^ 
In interpreting Schmerber, the court of appeals acknowledged that "later 
statements by the United States Supreme Court concerning Schmerber [], suggest that the 
evanescent nature of blood-alcohol may be sufficient, in and of itself, to justify a 
warrantless blood draw." Rodriguez. 2004 UT App 198 at ^13 n.2 (citing Skinner v. 
Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n. 489 U.S. 602, 623 (1989); South Dakota v. Neville. 
459 U.S. 553 (1983)). As noted by the court of appeals, however, these cases are 
irrelevant because they "do not directly address the question" in Rodriguez. Id. First, in 
Skinner, the Supreme Court considered whether civil "regulations that mandate blood 
and urine tests of [railroad] employees" violate the Fourth Amendment. Skinner, 489 
U.S. at 606. In holding the Government was not required to obtain a warrant before 
these tests, the Supreme Court noted that "alcohol and other drugs are eliminated from 
the blood stream at a constant rate." Id. at 623. The Supreme Court, however, also 
considered the fact that the Government's interest was in "ensuring the safety of the 
traveling public and of the employees" rather than in "prosecution"; this nonprosecutorial 
interest presented "'special needs' beyond normal law enforcement"; a warrant would be 
useless "in light of the standardized nature of the tests and the minimal discretion vested 
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in those charged with administering the program"; and "[ijmposing unwieldy warrant 
procedures . . . upon supervisors, who would otherwise have no reason to be familiar 
with such procedures, is simply unreasonable." Id. at 620-24. Second, in Neville, the 
Supreme Court held that admitting a defendant's refusal to take a blood test did not 
violate his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. See. Neville, 459 U.S. at 
559-64. In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court did not directly address 
exigency or the evanescence of blood alcohol evidence. See. id. 
Thus, as this Court concluded in Stuart, the court of appeals concluded: 
exigent circumstances will be found, where the situation 
involves blood-alcohol evidence, only when the "totality of 
the circumstances," [Henrie, 868 P.2d at 1388], supports a 
finding that the officer "was confronted with an emergency, 
in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the 
circumstances, threatened 'the destruction of evidence.9" 
Schmerber. 384 U.S. at 770, 86 S. Ct. at 1835 (citation 
omitted). 
Rodriguez. 2004 UT App 198 at f 14. 
Contrary to the State's argument, this conclusion did not mean the court of 
appeals disregarded the evanescence of blood-alcohol evidence as a factor for 
determining exigency. Pet. Br. at 16. Rather, as this Court did in Stuart, the court of 
appeals treated the "fact that blood-alcohol evidence is evanescent" as "important to the 
equation," but concluded it was "insufficient to create exigent circumstances by itself." 
Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198 at fl4; see Stuart, 2005 UT 13 at TTJ37-44. To hold 
otherwise would have "unduly threatened] the special protection the Fourth Amendment 
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bestows on people." IcL at {^40. As admitted by the State, n[i]mpaired driving 
investigations occur on a daily basis in Utah." Pet. Br. at 8. A per se rule of exigency 
would remove Fourth Amendment protection in every investigation where officers could 
establish probable cause to suspect impairment. See Stuart. 2005 UT 13 at ^ [40. 
Despite the strong precedent against per se rules of exigency set by this Court and 
the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court's and other jurisdictions' repeated use of the 
totality of the circumstances test to decide exigency in DUI cases, the State argues the 
court of appeals erred by declining to abandon the totality of the circumstances test and 
adopt a per se rule of exigency in DUI cases. Pet. Br. at 7-9. To support this argument, 
the State cites several cases without any analysis. Id at 11-12; see State v. Jaeger, 1999 
UT l , p 1, 973 P.2d 404 (noting adequate briefing "'requires not just bald citation to 
authority but development of that authority and reasoned analysis based upon that 
authority'" (citation omitted)). Even if these cases specifically adopted a per se rule of 
exigency in DUI cases, they are not binding on this Court and should not be followed 
because, as explained above and by the court of appeals, this Court and the Supreme 
Court have already spoken strongly against per se rules of exigency. See Minims. 434 
U.S. at 108-09; Stuart. 2005 UT 13 at [^42 (citing Mincev. 437 U.S. at 395; Pavton. 445 
U.S. at 574, 590; Banks. 540 U.S. at 36); Rodriguez. 2004 UT App 198 at ^ [10. 
Besides, the cases cited by the State do not adopt a per se rule of exigency in DUI 
cases. In most of the cases cited by the State, the defendants did not challenge exigency 
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and the ongoing and continuous nature of the investigations combined with the 
evanescence of the evidence sought made exigency obvious. See United States v. Reid. 
929 F.2d 990, 993 (4th Cir. 1991) (investigation continuous and defendant did not argue 
officers had time to obtain warrant); Nelson v. City of Irvine. 143 F.3d 1196, 1204-05 
(9th Cir. 1998) (noting n[n]either side disputes" exigency existed); State v. Cocio. 709 
P.2d 1336, 1345 (Ariz. 1985) (investigation continuous and defendant did not argue 
officers had time to obtain warrant); People v. Clark, 857 P.2d 1099, 1125 (Cal. 1993) 
(same); People v. Sugarman, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 689, 691-93 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (same); 
State v. Tavlon 531 A.2d 157, 160-61 (Conn. App. Ct. 1987) (same); State v. McGarrv . 
477 So.2d 1030, 1031-32 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1985) (same); State v. Entrekin , 47 P.3d 
336, 348 (Haw. 2002) (same); State v. Cooper. 39 P.3d 637, 640-41 (Idaho Ct. App. 
2002) (same); State v. Murrv. 21 P.3d 528, 534-35 (Kan. 2001) (same); State v. Baker, 
502 A.2d 489, 490, 493 (Me. 1985) (same); People v. Morse. 242 N.W.2d 47, 48-50 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1976) (not discussing exigency because "sole question before us is 
whether or not the results of a blood alcohol test taken from an unconscious person 
without his consent and prior to arrest are admissible"); State v. LeRette, 858 S.W.2d 
816, 818-19 (Mo. App. Ct. 1993) (investigation continuous and defendant did not argue 
officers had time to obtain warrant); Galvan v. State. 655 P.2d 155, 157 (Nev. 1982) 
(noting there was "no dispute" that exigency existed); State v. Ravotto. 777 A.2d 301, 
315 (N.J. 2001) (investigation continuous and defendant did not argue officers had time 
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to obtain warrant); Wilhelmi v. Dir. of Pep't of Transp.. 498 N.W.2d 150, 155 (N.D. 
1993) (not discussing exigency); State v. Milligan. 748 P.2d 130, 134 (Or. 1988) (same); 
Miff v. State. 627 S.W.2d 166, 169-70 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (investigation continuous 
and defendant did not argue officers had time to obtain warrant); Tipton v. 
Commonwealth. 444 S.E. 2d 1, 3 (Va. Ct. App. 1994) (same); State v. Baldwin. 37 P.3d 
1220, 1224-25 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (same); State v. Faust. 682 N.W.2d 371, 376-82 
(Wis. 2004) (same), cert, denied. 125 S. Ct. 964 (2005); State v. Bohling. 494 N.W.2d 
399,402-07 (Wis. 1993) (same). 
Specifically, as explained above, the Arizona Supreme Court had no opportunity 
to analyze exigency in DUI cases in Cocio because, in that case, the investigation was 
continuous and the defendant did not argue the officers had time to obtain warrant. See 
Cocio. 709 P.2d at 1345. In a later case, however, the Arizona Court of Appeals had an 
opportunity to analyze exigency in DUI cases and reached a conclusion similar to our 
court of appeals' decision. See Flannigan. 978 P.2d 127. In that case, the defendant was 
in a serious car accident, appeared to officers to be impaired, consented to field sobriety 
tests, was transported to the police station and read the Miranda warnings, was arrested, 
and finally had his blood drawn. Id. at 128. The appellate court determined that 
"Schmerber does not provide a blanket exception to the warrant requirement whenever a 
suspect is believed to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs." IdL_ at 131. "Rather, 
the evanescent quality of alcohol and drugs in a person's body creates an exigency only if 
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the evidence might disappear before the police can obtain a warrant." IdL_ Proceeding to 
the totality of the circumstances test, the appellate court noted: 
The record does not suggest that the police reasonably 
believed that evidence of [defendant's] drug consumption 
would disappear from his system before they could obtain a 
warrant. Rather, as the officers readily admitted, they did not 
seek a warrant because they had been instructed that exigent 
circumstances always exist in vehicular manslaughter or 
aggravated assault cases in which a person is suspected of 
driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol. 
Id. Thus, exigency did not exist because the record did not reveal "how long the delay 
would have been" to obtain a warrant since "the police made no effort whatsoever to 
obtain a warrant. The mere possibility of delay does not give rise to an exigency." Id. 
The remainder of the cases cited by the State, while not analyzing exigency in 
great detail, recognize circumstances beyond the evanescence of blood alcohol, such as 
the amount of time officers had to seek a warrant, are relevant to determining exigent 
circumstances. See Berry, 866 F.2d at 891 (holding exigency existed "in this case" 
because there was "no time reasonably to expect the officer to obtain a warrant"); People 
v. Schall 59 P.3d 848, 851-53 (Colo. 2002) (focusing on probable cause argument, but 
noting exigent circumstances existed because time elapsed while defendant was "airlifted 
to a hospital" and "investigating officer [was] detained at the accident scene"); Justice v. 
State. 552 N.E.2d 844, 847-48 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (interpreting Schmerber to say "the 
fact that Schmerber was involved in an accident requiring treatment and police 
investigation is what rendered the dissipation of alcohol in the blood an exigent 
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circumstance" and holding blood draw was unlawful); State v. Oevering, 268 N.W.2d 
68, 74 (Minn. 1978) (holding exigency existed because investigation continuous and 
"over 4 hours had expired since the collision" when defendant's blood was drawn); 
Holloman v. State. 820 So.2d 52, 55 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002) (holding exigent 
circumstances included "limited number of investigating officers," "major vehicle 
accident," "serious injuries to the two drivers," "fatality to one passenger," and "fact that 
drug and alcohol content in a person's system can dissipate"); State v. Stern, 846 A.2d 
64, 69 (N.H. 2004) (holding exigency "is judged by the totality of the circumstances" and 
upholding trial court's finding of exigency based on "nature of blood alcohol evidence 
and the delay inherent in obtaining a search warrant at night"); State v. Trover. 2003 
Ohio App. LEXIS 529, *1, * 15-16 (Ohio Ct. App. February 5, 2003) (citing Schmerber 
and holding exigency existed because accident occurred in "late evening and blood test 
was finally conducted "more than two hours" after accident) (Addendum D); State v. 
Shepherd. 840 P.2d 644, 646-47 (Okla. Ct. App. 1992) (holding exigency existed "where 
time had been taken to bring the accused to a hospital and investigate the scene of the 
accident" because "there was not sufficient time to seek out a magistrate to secure a 
warrant"); State v. Engesser, 661 N.W.2d 739, 748 (S.D. 2003) (noting exigency existed 
because investigation continuous and "[t]hree hours had already elapsed since the 
accident when [defendant's] blood was drawn"). 
Thus, following this Court's and the Supreme Court's strong precedent against per 
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se rules of exigency, this Court should affirm the court of appeals' decision because the 
dissipation of alcohol in the blood, without more, did not create an exigent circumstance 
justifying the warrantless extraction of a blood sample from Rodriguez. 
R This Court Should Not Review the Court of Appeals5 Application of the 
Totality of the Circumstances Test and. Even If It Does, This Court Should 
Affirm Because the Court of Appeals Applied the Test Correctly. 
Rule 49 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure says n[o]nly the questions set 
forth in the petition or fairly included therein will be considered by the Supreme Court." 
Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4). In this case, this Court granted a writ of certiorari to decide 
one issue: "Whether the dissipation of alcohol in the blood, without more, created an 
exigent circumstance justifying the warrantless extraction of a blood sample from 
respondent." Order dated October 18, 2004. This statement of the issue encompasses 
the entire issue the State asked this Court to review on certiorari. See Cert. Pet. at 1 
(asking Court to grant writ of certiorari to decide whether court of appeals erred by 
refusing to hold "evanescence of blood alcohol evidence alone creates an exigency that, 
coupled with probable cause, justifies a warrantless blood draw"). In its opening brief on 
certiorari, the State now asks this Court, if it holds the dissipation of alcohol in the blood 
alone does not automatically create exigent circumstances, to review an additional issue: 
whether the court of appeals applied the totality of the circumstances test correctly in this 
case. See Pet. Br. at 13-26. This Court should decline to address this separate issue 
because the State did not ask for review of this issue in its petition for a writ of certiorari 
29 
and this issue is not included within this Court's statement of the issue on certiorari 
review. See Order date October 18, 2004; Cert. Pet. at 5-10. 
Regardless, this Court should affirm because the court of appeals correctly applied 
the totality of the circumstances test to this case. The totality of the circumstances test is 
a "flexible, common sense" test. State v. Saddler, 2004 UT 105,1(27, 104 P.3d 1265. 
When applying the totality of the circumstances test, a court's "task is to review the 
totality of the facts and circumstances of a particular case to determine if the finding of 
exigency was proper." Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1258. In this case, the court of appeals 
correctly applied the totality of the circumstances test. See Rodriguez. 2004 UT App 198 
at IHf 15-21. First, it named the "dissipation rate of alcohol in the blood" as "important to 
the equation," but concluded that the trial court erred by finding exigency based on this 
factor alone. Id at ffi[14, 17. Second, the court of appeals explained that the trial court 
completely ignored other circumstances relevant to exigency. IdL. at 1fl7. Specifically, it 
noted that the trial court "left open the question of time." IcL Whether an officer 
reasonably believed he did not have time to seek a warrant is the central question to 
determining exigency. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-71 (holding exigency existed to 
justify warrantless blood draw because "there was no time to seek out a magistrate and 
secure a warrant"); Larocco, 794 P.2d at 470 ("The amount of time necessary to obtain a 
warrant by traditional means has always been considered in determining whether 
circumstances are exigent."); Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1266 (holding courts should consider 
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"time available for the officers to have obtained a search warrant once [events] triggered 
the existence of probable cause and immediate exigency"). Regardless, the trial court did 
not even consider such things as: 
the proximity of the nearest magistrate; the alternatives 
explored and discarded by the officers; the estimated delay 
the officers faced in seeking a warrant; the impact that the 
delay could have had on obtaining viable evidence; and the 
point of time in the accident investigation when the decision 
was made to extract Rodriguez's blood. 
Rodriguez. 2004 UT App 198 at ^[17; see Flannigan, 978 P.2d at 131 (concluding that 
under Schmerber "evanescent quality of alcohol and drugs in a person's body creates an 
exigency only if the evidence might disappear before the police can obtain a warrant"); 
Henrie, 868 P.2d at 1392 (analyzing similar circumstances to determine whether 
evanescence of blood alcohol evidence created exigency to search home). 
Third, the court of appeals concluded that exigent circumstances did not exist 
under the totality of the circumstances as presented by the State. The record shows two 
officers were in a position to seek a warrant and neither "made any efforts to procure a 
warrant, or even inquire about the availability of a magistrate." Rodriguez, 2004 UT 
App 198 at [^20; see Flannigan, 978 P.2d at 131 (holding no exigency in blood draw case 
because police did not even try to obtain warrant and "mere possibility of delay does not 
give rise to an exigency"). The supervising officer decided to have Rodriguez's blood 
drawn "soon after the accident occurred, at a time 'when the courts [were] open and 
search warrants [could] be readily requested' either in person or by telephone." 
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Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198 at [^19 (citation omitted). "Yet the supervising officer 
testified that he made no effort to obtain a warrant." Id. Similarly, Officer Swensen 
testified that upon completing his investigation, he "just st[ood] there waiting" for 
"twenty to twenty-five minutes" for the blood technician to arrive. R. 560:53; Rodriguez, 
2004 UT App 198 at ^[18. During this break in the investigation, Officer Swensen was 
not guarding or questioning Rodriguez and could have sought a warrant by driving the 
short distance to the courthouse himself, requesting that another officer drive to the 
courthouse, or using his cell phone or a hospital telephone to request a telephonic 
warrant pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-4(2) (1990). R. 286; 560:3, 21, 50-53, 57. 
Yet he did not even consider seeking a warrant during this break in the investigation. 
Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198 at 1fi[l9-20; see Ashe. 745 P.2d at 1268 (suggesting 
warrant not required because officers could not have "waited even an additional twenty 
to thirty minutes to obtain a telephone search warrant"); State v. Lopez, 676 P.2d 393, 
397 (Utah 1984) (noting that obtaining telephonic warrant in that case "took 24 
minutes"); United States v. Patino. 830 F.2d 1413, 1416 (7 th Cir. 1987) (holding fact that 
officer waited for backup agents who were thirty minutes away but did not seek warrant 
"alone demonstrate^] the lack of exigent circumstances"); United States v. Diaz, 814 
F.2d 454, 456-59 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding no exigency where defendant drug dealer 
indicated he would wait thirty minutes for undercover agent to return). Rather, both 
officers overlooked the warrant requirement in favor of the Salt Lake City Police 
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Department policy that blood draws are "a matter of routine1' and do not require warrants. 
Rodriguez. 2004 UT App 198 at H19-20; s_ee Flannigan. 978 P.2d at 132 ("The officers' 
rote application of the department's untenable policy that exigent circumstances always 
exist in vehicular manslaughter and aggravated assault cases violated [defendant's] right 
to be free from unreasonable search and seizure."). 
In its brief, the State concedes that the timing factors considered by the court of 
appeals "are helpful in some exigent circumstance determinations." Pet. Br. at 16. It 
argues, however, the court of appeals incorrectly applied the totality of the circumstances 
test in this case because the court failed to adequately consider two circumstances: (1) the 
"State's need to obtain defendant's blood without first seeking a warrant," and (2) the 
"minimal intrusion on the individual's privacy and personal integrity" created by blood 
draws. IcL at 16, 19, 21-25. Neither of these proposed circumstances create exigency. 
First, the State argues that if the court of appeals had adequately considered the 
State's "need" to perform warrantless blood draws, then it would have held the totality of 
the circumstances established exigency in "the instant case, and in every impaired driving 
case." IcL at 13-14, 16, 21-25. This argument is simply a restatement of the State's 
proposed per se rule of exigency, and, if accepted, would eviscerate the Fourth 
Amendment's guarantee that "warrantless searches '"are per se unreasonable."'" Stuart, 
2005 UT 13 at 1fl[l5, 40-44 (citations omitted) (declining to create per se rule of exigency 
in domestic violence cases even though they are "one of the most common and volatile 
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setting for serious injury or death"). The State always has a "need" to search without first 
seeking a warrant. Pet. Br. at 16. In fact, it is this universal "need" that the Fourth 
Amendment was created to curtail. See State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380, 1382 (Utah 
1986) ("We note that the warrant requirement is an important check upon the power of 
the State to subject individuals to unreasonable searches and seizures and is not to be 
lightly disregarded."). Thus, the State cannot satisfy the exigent circumstances exception 
to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement simply by referencing this "need." See 
Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1258 (noting exceptions to warrant requirement are "'"jealously and 
carefully drawn"'" (citation omitted)). Rather, it must show through the totality of the 
circumstances that a particular warrantless search was justified because officers had no 
time to seek a warrant. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-71 (holding exigency existed 
because "there was no time to seek out a magistrate and secure a warrant"); Ashe, 745 
P.2d at 1266 (holding courts should consider "time available for the officers to have 
obtained a search warrant once [events] triggered the existence of probable cause and 
immediate exigency"). In this case, the State failed to show it lacked time to seek a 
warrant. See Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198 at ^[18-20. Instead, it showed the searching 
officers had time to seek a warrant, including a twenty to twenty-five minute break in the 
investigation, but chose not to. IcL_ 
Second, the State argues exigent circumstances exist in every DUI case because 
blood draws are a "minimal intrusion on the individual's privacy and personal integrity." 
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Pet. Br. at 19. As discussed above, however, blood draws "plainly involve[] the broadly 
conceived reach of a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment." Schmerber, 384 
U.S. at 767. Thus, regardless of the invasiveness of the blood draw, it must be 
accompanied by a warrant or justified by exigent circumstances under the totality of the 
circumstances. See kL at 770 ("Search warrants are ordinarily required for searches of 
dwellings, and absent an emergency, no less could be required where intrusions into the 
human body are concerned."). The question of how invasive the blood draw is goes to 
whether "the method chosen is a reasonable one, performed in a reasonable manner." 
See Palmer, 803 P.2d at 1252 (holding warrantless body search is lawful if, in addition to 
probable cause and exigent circumstances, "method chosen is a reasonable one, 
performed in a reasonable manner" (citing Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768-72)). 
C. This Court Should Not Consider the Amicus Brief. Regardless, this Court 
Should Affirm Because, Even Considering Amiri's Information, the 
Dissipation of Alcohol in the Blood, Without More, Did Not Create Exigent 
Circumstances Justifying the Warrantless Extraction of Rodriguez's Blood. 
An amicus brief "may be filed only by leave of court granted on motion or at the 
request of the court." Utah R. App. P. 25. Amicus briefs "should be allowed only 
sparingly/' News and Sun-Sentinel Co. v. Cox, 700 F.Supp. 30, 32 (S.D. Fla. 1988); and 
should be used to provide the court with "unique information or perspective that can help 
the court beyond the help that the lawyers for the parties are able to provide." Ryan v. 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n. 125 F.3d 1062, 1063 (7 th Cir. 1997). This Court 
should not consider the amicus brief filed in this case because it inappropriately enlarges 
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the issue before this Court and relies on factual information that is not in the record.1 
First, this Court should disregard the amicus brief because it enlarges the issue on 
certiorari review. "It is a 'well-settled rule that an amicus brief cannot extend or enlarge 
the issues on appeal' and [this Court] will consider only 'those portions of the amicus 
brief that bear on the issues pursued by the parties to [the] appeal.'" State v. Green. 2004 
UT 76,f35, 99 P.3d 820 (citation omitted); McCleskev v. Zant. 499 U.S. 467, 523 n. 10 
(1991) (same). For example, in Green, this Court declined to "address amici's arguments 
because [the defendant] neither preserved nor properly raised or argued" the amici's 
arguments in his own briefs. Green, 2004 UT 76 at f35. Thus, "Green failed to 
adequately present the issues on which amici rely." Id. at^[36. 
In this case, amici use scientific articles to argue alcohol dissipates from blood and 
dissipation is affected by factors such as food, gender, age, health, the type of beverage 
consumed, the circumstances under which the beverage consumed, and blood alcohol 
concentration. Amicus Brief at 4-6; id. at Addenda B-K ("scientific articles"). The fact 
that alcohol dissipates and that various factors affect dissipation, however, is not an issue 
1
 On January 31 and February 7, 2005, Rodriguez filed memoranda in opposition 
to amici's motion for leave to appear as amicus curiae pursuant to rule 25 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rodriguez argued this Court should not grant amici leave 
to file an amicus brief because the information amici proposed to present expanded the 
issue on certiorari and was factual information that should have been presented to the 
trial court. See Utah R. App. P. 25. This Court granted amici leave to file an amicus 
brief. See Order dated February 22, 2005. Rodriguez now renews her opposition to 
amici's motion for leave to appear as amicus curiae. 
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on certiorari review. See Order dated October 18, 2004. This Court granted a writ of 
certiorari to decide one narrow issue: "Whether the dissipation of alcohol in the blood, 
without more, created an exigent circumstance justifying the warrantless extraction of a 
blood sample from respondent." Id_ The facts relevant to this issue are simple. 
Following Rodriguez's car accident, the supervising officer dispatched Officer Swensen 
to witness the blood draw but did not seek a warrant. R. 560:14-17, 19, 50. At the 
hospital, Officer Swensen witnessed the blood draw without seeking a warrant even 
though he "just st[ood] there waiting" for twenty to twenty-five minutes before the blood 
technician arrived. Id at 53-54. Thus, the only issue before this Court is whether the 
fact that alcohol dissipates from blood justified the warrantless extraction of Rodriguez's 
blood even though the totality of the circumstances showed the officers had time to seek 
a warrant but chose not to. See Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198 at ^[17-20; Schmerber., 
384 U.S. at 770-72 (noting "percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly 
after drinking stops," but deciding exigency based on "special facts" of particular case). 
Accordingly, the amicus brief and its scientific articles are outside the issue on certiorari 
review and should not be considered by this Court. 
Amici also argue this Court should expand the certiorari issue to include drug 
impairment cases. Amicus Brief at 13. As acknowledged by amici, however, this case 
does not involve drug impairment and the court of appeals' decision "does not address 
drug impaired drivers." IdL Further, as acknowledged by amici, drug detection is 
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different than alcohol detection because it Mvar[ies] widely/' "[l]ittle is known about the 
metabolism of many drugs," and different drugs "pass out of the blood" at different rates. 
Id. at 14. Thus, because the issue of drug impairment is not before this Court and has not 
been briefed, this Court should decline to expand the issue on certiorari to include drug 
impairment cases. See Green, 2004 UT 76 at ^ [35. 
Second, this Court should disregard the amicus brief because it relies on factual 
information that is not in the record. Amici's scientific articles say alcohol dissipates 
over time and various factors affect dissipation. See. Amicus Brief at Addenda B-K. The 
majority of amici's argument summarizes these articles. See id at 3-15. As explained 
above, however, whether alcohol dissipates and what factors affect dissipation are not at 
issue in this case. See Order dated October 18, 2004. Thus, the scientific articles are not 
"pertinent... scientific commentaries" that this Court should review in order to establish 
whether the dissipation of alcohol from the blood is a "generally accepted" scientific 
finding. State v. ButterfiekL 2001 UT 59,1|33 n.5, 27 P.3d 1133 (holding this Court 
"may consider and rely upon legal and scientific commentaries when reviewing the trial 
court's determinations regarding the admissibility of DNA evidence, even if the 
commentaries were not originally before the trial court"). 
Instead, the scientific articles introduce factual circumstances that, if pertinent to 
the case, should have been presented to the trial court. See. Brookside Mobile Home 
Park. Ltd v.Peebles. 2002 UT 48,ffl[12-16, 48 P.3d 968 (declining to review issue on 
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certiorari unless properly preserved). Such a presentation would have ensured the 
scientific articles were subjected to cross-examination, countered by expert testimony or 
other evidence, and considered only if reliable and relevant. See Utah R. Evid. 803(18) 
(excluding from hearsay rule scientific materials "relied upon by the expert witness" and 
"established as a reliable authority"); State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994) 
(concluding trial court is free to accord whatever weight it deems appropriate to 
testimony "because it is before that court that witnesses . . . appear and the evidence is 
adduced"); State v. Webb. 779 P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah 1989) (holding "'essence of the 
confrontation right is the opportunity to have the accusing witness in court and subject to 
cross-examination, so that bias and credibility can be evaluated by the finder of fact'" 
(citations omitted)); State v. Hollen. 2002 UT 35,^69, 44 P.3d 794 (holding expert 
testimony must be "'"helpful to the finder of fact"5" (citations omitted)). 
Factual review of the scientific articles was especially important in this case 
because amici's scientific articles are not the only scientific articles discussing alcohol 
dissipation, and, in fact, are contradicted by other scientific articles not presented by 
amici. See, e.g., Labianca, Dominick A., Uncertainty in the Results of Breath-Alcohol 
Analyses, 76 J. Chemical Educ. 4, 508-09 (Apr. 1999) (criticizing techniques and 
conclusions reached by scientific article relied on by amici and included in amici's 
Addendum G); Lands, W.E.M., A Review of Alcohol Clearance In Humans , 15 Alcohol 
2, 147-57 (1998) (reviewing literature of past 50 years and finding that it, unlike amici's 
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Addendum B, consistently applied zero-order kinetics); Stowell, A. R., Stowell, L. I., 
Estimation of Blood Alcohol Concentrations After Social Drinking. 43 J. Forensic Sci. 1, 
14-21 (Jan. 1998) (concluding, contrary to amici's Addendum B, that back extrapolations 
of blood alcohol content are possible); U.S. Dept. of Transportation, Nat'l Highway 
Traffic Safety Admin., Computing a BAC Estimate (Oct. 1994), 
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/injury/alcoho^acreport.html (same as Stowell article); 
Montgomery, M., Reasor, M, Retrograde Extrapolation of Blood Alcohol Data: An 
Applied Approach. 36 J. Toxicology and Envt'l. Health 4, 281-92 (1992) (same as 
Stowell article); Jones, A.W., Neri, A., Evaluation of Blood-Ethanol Profiles After 
Consumption of Alcohol Together With a Large Meal. 24 Canadian Soc'y Forensic Sci. 
J. 3, 167-70 (1991) (concluding, contrary to amici's Addendum H, that eating a meal 
while drinking did not prolong time to reach peak blood alcohol level and did not reduce 
length of peak time); Winek, C.L., Murphy, K.L., The Rate and Kinetic Order of Ethanol 
Elimination, 25 Forensic Sci. Int'l 3, 159-66 (July 1984) (concluding, contrary to amici's 
Addendum B, that alcohol elimination is a zero-order process). See Addendum E. 
Thus, the scientific articles, if pertinent, should have been subjected to the trial 
court's fact-finding process. See State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,Tfl 1, 10 P.3d 346 
(holding preservation exists because "trial court ought to be given an opportunity to 
address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it"). But the State chose not to present 
the scientific articles to the trial court despite its burden of showing the warrantless 
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search was lawful. See Larocco, 794 P.2d at 471 ("The State carries the burden of 
showing that a warrantless search was lawful."). Accordingly, the scientific articles are 
not part of the record and should not now be made part of the record through use of an 
amicus brief. See State v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30,1(11, 76 P.3d 1159 (rejecting State's 
argument that it, "after having had one opportunity to establish the admissibility of 
evidence in the face of a Fourth Amendment challenge, is entitled to a remand to put on 
new evidence," and holding that "when the State has the burden of proof and the record 
on appeal fails to sustain any theory of admissibility, the State 'is not entitled to a remand 
to put on new evidence'" (citations omitted)). 
The remainder of the amicus brief relies on the anecdotal experiences of amici's 
attorney ("counsel"). See Amicus Brief at 6-14. To support amici's assertions that 
warrants take "more than two hours" to obtain, "[m]ost impaired driving cases do not 
take place during standard working hours," the "signs of drug impairment vary widely," 
and it "is unlikely that driving with a measurable amount of metabolite can be 
successfully prosecuted without a test result," amici do not cite any case law or other 
recognized authority. See Amicus Brief at 12-14; Coleman v. Stevens. 2000 UT 98,1f7, 
17 P.3d 1122 ("Failure to provide any analysis or legal authority constitutes inadequate 
briefing." (citations omitted)); State v. Thomas. 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998) 
(declaring issue inadequately briefed when "overall analysis of the issue is so lacking as 
to shift the burden of research and argument to the reviewing court"). Instead, amici cite 
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counsel's personal observations as a prosecutor. See. Amicus Brief at 6-14. If counsel's 
factual observations were pertinent to the case, then the State should have called counsel 
as an expert in the trial court. See Utah R. Evid. 702 ("If scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact . . . a witness qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto."). This would 
have ensured that counsel was qualified to make her assertions, counsel's assertions were 
relevant and reliable, counsel was subjected to cross-examination and adverse expert 
testimony, and counsel's assertions and demeanor were judged by the finder-of-fact. See 
id.; Pena, 869 P.2d at 936 (concluding trial court is free to accord whatever weight it 
deems appropriate to testimony "because it is before that court that witnesses . . . appear 
and the evidence is adduced"). But the State chose not to call counsel despite its burden 
of showing the warrantless search was lawful. See Larocco, 794 P.2d at 471. Thus, 
counsel's factual assertions are not part of the record and should not now be made part of 
the record through use of an amicus brief. See_ Topanotes, 2003 UT 30 at ^[11; Brookside 
Mobile Home Park. Ltd., 2002 UT 48 at 11112-16. This is especially true in this case 
because amici and counsel are employees of the State and the amicus brief supports the 
State's argument. See United States v. Smith. 686 F.Supp. 847, 853 n. 9 (D. Colo. 1988) 
(denying permission to file amicus brief because amicus was "by definition an arm of the 
United States," who was already a party); United States v. Alimed, 788 F.Supp. 196, 198 
n. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (denying leave for National Association of Criminal Defense 
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Lawyers to appear as amicus because defendant's interests were adequately represented 
by defense counsel); Ryan, 125 F.3d at 1063 ("The term 'amicus curiae' means friend of 
the court, not friend of a party." (citations omitted)). 
Regardless, this Court should affirm because amici present no argument that 
justifies retreating from this Court's and the Supreme Court's clear stance against per se 
rules of exigency. See supra at Section A. First, amici argue a per se rule of exigency in 
DUI cases is appropriate because "[a]ll impaired driving investigations involve some 
delay." Amicus Brief at 6. The existence of delay, however, does not create exigency 
unless the delay leaves "no time" to secure a warrant. Schmerber. 384 U.S. at 770-72; 
see Larocco, 794 P.2d at 470 ("The amount of time necessary to obtain a warrant by 
traditional means has always been considered in determining whether circumstances are 
exigent."); Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1266 (holding courts should consider "time available for 
the officers to have obtained a search warrant"). Thus, per se rules are inappropriate 
because only the totality of the circumstances can reveal whether the searching officer 
had time to seek a warrant. See supra at Sections A, B. 
Second, amici argue this Court should reverse because the court of appeals held 
that an officer must determine exigency by estimating "how long she may wait before she 
risks losing the evidence" and "how long it would take her to obtain a warrant." Amicus 
Brief at 6, 9-11. This strict rule, however, was not adopted by the court of appeals. See 
Rodriguez. 2004 UT App 198 at ^ [14-21. In fact, the court of appeals rejected the strict 
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per se rule proposed by the State in favor of the flexible totality of the circumstances test 
traditionally required by this Court and the Supreme Court. IdL; see supra at Section A. 
Under the court of appeals' decision, as in all exigency cases, officers must look at 
the circumstances of the case before conducting the warrantless search. See Rodriguez, 
2004 UT App 198 at 1ffll7-20; Schmerber. 384 U.S. at 770 (holding exigency exists 
where officers "reasonably believed that they were 'confronted with an emergency, in 
which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened "the 
destruction of evidence"'" (citation omitted)); Skinner. 498 U.S. at 623-24 
(distinguishing administrative searches from criminal investigations because 
administrative supervisors, unlike police officers, "have little occasion to become 
familiar" with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence). If the investigation is ongoing and 
continuous and the officer has a reasonable belief that he does not have time to seek a 
warrant, then he may rely on exigency. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-71 (holding 
exigency existed because continuous investigation and evanescence of blood-alcohol 
evidence left "no time" to secure warrant). But, if the investigation is not ongoing and 
continuous or if the officer foresees that the length of the investigation and the 
manpower available will allow him time to seek a warrant, then the officer should start 
the warrant process. See Ashe. 745 P.2d at 1268 (suggesting warrant not required 
because officers could not have "waited even an additional twenty to thirty minutes to 
obtain a telephone search warrant"); Patino. 830 F.2d at 1416 (holding fact that officer 
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waited for backup agents who were thirty minutes away but did not seek warrant "alone 
demonstrate [d] the lack of exigent circumstances"); Diaz, 814 F.2d at 456-59 (holding no 
exigency where defendant drug dealer indicated he would wait thirty minutes for 
undercover agent to return). Then, if the warrant ultimately takes more time than the 
officer can spare, exigency attaches and the officer may conduct a warrantless blood 
draw. See Flannigan. 978 P.2d at 131 (reversing because did "not know how long the 
delay would have been because the police made no effort whatsoever to obtain a 
warrant," but noting exigency may have existed "if the police had attempted to obtain a 
warrant but had encountered difficulties in reaching a magistrate"). 
Third, amici argue this Court should reverse because the court of appeals held a 
blood draw "cannot be exigent" because it is "routine procedure." Amicus Brief at 6, 9-
11. The court of appeals, however, did not hold that a blood draw can never be exigent 
or that a blood draw is a matter of routine. See. Rodriguez. 2004 UT App 198 at ffl|20-21. 
Rather, the court of appeals held that the existence of exigency to draw blood depends on 
the totality of the circumstances, and criticized the Salt Lake City Police Department for 
its policy of conducting warrantless blood draws as "a matter of routine." Id. 
Fourth, amici argue this Court should adopt a per se rule of exigency in DUI cases 
because warrants are hard to get. See Amicus Brief at 11-12. Difficulty obtaining a 
warrant, however, is not an issue before this Court and, regardless, is not justification to 
abandon the Fourth Amendment. See. Order dated October 18, 2004. 
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[T]he mere fact that law enforcement may be made more 
efficient can never by itself justify disregard of the Fourth 
Amendment. The investigation of crime would always be 
simplified if warrants were unnecessary. But the Fourth 
Amendment reflects the view of those who wrote the Bill of 
Rights that the privacy of a person's home and property may 
not be totally sacrificed in the name of maximum simplicity 
in enforcement of the criminal law. 
Mincey, 437 U.S. at 394 (internal citations omitted). 
Instead, difficulty obtaining a warrant, if such a difficulty exists, is a problem to 
be brought before the Utah Legislature. See Board of Educ. v. Salt Lake County. 659 
P.2d 1030, 1037 (Utah, 1983) (noting courts have "authority to interpret the law" and 
legislature has "task of writing it"). In fact, the Legislature has already addressed the 
difficulties claimed by the amicus brief. See Amicus Brief at 12. For example, to speed 
the warrant process, the Legislature has enacted legislation allowing officers to obtain 
search warrants over the telephone. See. Utah Code Ann. 77-23-204(2) (1999); Larocco. 
794 P.2d at 470 ("Recognizing the delay that is often incurred in procuring a warrant, 
Utah has adopted a procedure whereby warrants may be issued over the telephone."); 
Palmer, 803 P.2d at 1253 ("'In light of the comparative ease with which a warrant can be 
obtained under Utah's telephonic warrant statute, little or no impediment is presented to 
police investigations.'" (citations omitted)). The telephonic search warrant option has 
become even more convenient with the "increasing availability of cellular and other 
portable telephones to law enforcement personnel." Larocco, 794 P.2d at 470 n.2. 
Fifth, the amicus brief argues this Court should reverse because a per se rule of 
46 
exigency could assist defendants. Amicus Brief at 10. The Fourth Amendment, 
however, was enacted to ensure the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const, 
amend. IV. Thus, a warrantless search is "per se unreasonable," Stuart, 2005 UT 13 at 
TJ15, unless it falls under one of the "few specifically established and well-delineated 
exceptions." Katz, 389 U.S. at 357. The remote possibility that a defendant will benefit 
from a constitutional violation is not a recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment. 
See Stuart, 2005 UT 13 at {^16 (holding exceptions to warrant requirement entail 
"exceptional circumstances where 'the needs of law enforcement [are] so compelling that 
the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.'"). 
CONCLUSION 
Rodriguez requests this Court to affirm the court of appeals' decision in State v. 
Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198. 
SUBMITTED this Jitf"- day of June, 2005. 
LOkrt SEPfl 
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 
State of Utah, 
Petitioner, 
v. Case No. 20040566-SC 
Heather Jo Rodriguez, 
Respondent. 
ORDER 
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, filed on July 7, 2004. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 4 5 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is 
granted as to the following issue: 
Whether the dissipation of alcohol in the blood, without 
more, created an exigent circumstance justifying the warrantless 
extraction of a blood sample from respondent. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Or MM /IT. zoftj (JL^*7y}i..QMrf< 
Date / Christine M. Durham 
<&m—-
Chief Justice 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on October 19, 2004, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States 
mail to the parties listed below: 
MATTHEW D. BATES 
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160 E 300 S 6TH FL 
PO BOX 140854 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854 
SHANNON N. ROMERO 
LORI SEPPI 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 E 500 S STE 300 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was hand 
delivered to a personal representative of the courts listed 
below: 
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE 
ATTN: SOPHIE ORVIN /KATHY SHUPE 
450 S STATE ST 
PO BOX 1860 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-1860 
PAULETTE STAGG 
COURT OF APPEALS 
450 S STATE ST 
PO BOX 140230 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0230 
Deputy Clerk 
Case No. 20040566-SC 
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE, 011907005 
Addendum B 
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of $100,000 define the outer extent of expo-
sure to [Allstate] on a claim for underin-
sured motorist benefits The Arbitra-
tion Agreement did not operate to open or 
modify the terms of the insurance con-
tract The court finds that the insur-
ance policy limits of $100,000 constitute a 
contractual determination of the parties, 
which are not modified or altered by virtue 
of the arbitration agreements. 
We agree. There is no evidence th'at the 
parties intended the prior contractual rela-
tionship to be modified by either the Arbitra-
tion Agreement or the Binding Arbitration 
Agreement. In fact, correspondence be-
tween the parties just prior to the arbitration 
evidences the opposite intent. Therefore, 
while the trial court should have modified the 
arbitration agreement to reflect the matter 
submitted to the arbitrator, the trial court 
correctly found that the arbitration did not 
modify the original contractual obligations of 
the parties and ordered that Allstate pay 
Wong $100,000 pursuant to his insurance pol-
icy.6 Accordingly, we affirm.7 
1116 WE CONCUR: PAMELA T. 
GREENWOOD and NORMAN H. JACK-
SON, Judges. 
2004UTApp 198 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Heather Jo RODRIGUEZ aka Heather 
Holdman, Defendant and 
Appellant. 
No. 20030006-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
June 10, 2004. 
Background: Defendant pleaded guilty in 
the Third District Court, Salt Lake De-
6. However, a better way to reach the same cor-
rect result would have been for Allstate to file a 
declaratory action asking the court to determine 
the effect of the arbitrator's award on Allstate's 
obligation to pay Wong, its insured under the 
policy. 
partment, Dennis M. Fuchs. J., to automo-
bile homicide. She appealed. 
Holding: The Court of Appeals, Thome, 
Jr., J., held that exigent circumstances did 
not exist to justify warrantless blood draw 
from defendant. 
Reversed and remanded with direction. 
1. Criminal Law c=>1134(3), 1158(2) 
When reviewing a trial court's determi-
nation that exigent circumstances justified a 
warrantless intrusion, appellate court defers 
to the trial court's factual findings, but exam-
ines its ultimate legal conclusion for correct-
ness. U.S.CA. ConstAmend. 4. 
2. Automobiles §=»419 
Searches and Seizures <§=>78 
To justify a police officer's decision to 
extract blood without the benefit of a search 
warrant, the state bears the burden of show-
ing that (1) the officer had probable cause to 
believe that the defendant was involved in an 
alcohol-related offense, (2) the officer had 
reason to believe the blood sample would 
produce evidence of the defendant's level of 
intoxication when the crime was committed, 
(3) the officer reasonably believed that they 
were confronted with an emergency, in which 
the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, 
under the circumstances, threatened the de-
struction of the evidence, and (4) the method 
used by the officer to obtain the blood sam-
ple was performed in a reasonable manner. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
3. Searches and Seizures <3=s78 
Where a situation involves blood-alcohol 
evidence, exigent circumstances will be found 
to justify a warrantless blood draw only 
when the totality of the circumstances sjip" 
ports a finding that the law enforcement 
officer was confronted with an emergency^ 
which the delay necessary to obtain a w|£ 
7. Wong also seeks attorney fees pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated section 78-3la-16 (2003). ?* 
cause Ave affirm, attorney fees are not warranted. 
STATE v. RODRIGUEZ Utah 855 
Cite as 93 P.3d 854 (Utah App. 2004) 
rant, under the circumstances, threatened stances, a warrant must be obtained before 
the destruction of evidence. U.S.C.A. Const, drawing blood. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
Amend. 4. 
4. Searches and Seizures <2>78 
Mere fact that blood-alcohol evidence is 
evanescent is insufficient in itself to create 
exigent circumstances to justify a warrant-
less blood draw. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
5. Criminal Law <s>1158(2) 
In reviewing a trial court's finding that 
exigent circumstances existed to justify a 
warrantless intrusion, appellate court's task 
is to review the totality of the facts and 
circumstances of the particular case to deter-
mine if the finding of exigency was proper; 
however, although appellate court reviews 
the facts and circumstances of the case as a 
whole, should the trial court's findings fail to 
address any important factor, appellate court 
is in no position to supplement the findings. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
6. Automobiles <s=>419 
Exigent circumstances did not exist to 
justify warrantless blood draw from defen-
dant who was driver in automobile collision, 
even though supervising officer was informed 
that alcohol could have contributed to colli-
sion and that passenger in defendant's vehi-
cle would likely die; second officer was told 
by supervising officer no more than 25 min-
utes after collision to obtain blood sample 
from defendant, second officer waited addi-
tional 20 to 25 minutes for blood technician to 
arrive, courts were open at time and search 
warrant could have been readily requested, 
and neither officer made any efforts before 
blood draw to procure warrant or inquire 
about availability of magistrate. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 4. 
7. Searches and Seizures <3=>42.1 
Reasonable belief that an emergency is 
at hand is always required if warrantless 
action is to be justified on the basis of exi-
gent circumstances. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 
4. 
8. Searches and Seizures &=>7% 
Without some reasonable belief that the 
steady dissipation of blood-alcohol constitutes 
an emergency under the particular circum-
Lori J. Seppi and Shannon N. Romero, 
Salt Lake City, for Appellant. 
Mark L. Shurtleff, atty. gen., and Matthew 
D. Bates, asst atty. gen., Salt Lake City, for 
Appellee. 
Before Judges DAVIS, JACKSON, and 
THORNE, Jr. 
OPINION 
THORNE, Jr., Judge: 
111 Heather Jo Rodriguez appeals from the 
trial court's denial of her motion to suppress 
evidence and her subsequent conviction 
through a conditional guilty plea. We re-
verse. 
BACKGROUND 
112 On the afternoon of May 9, 2001. 
Heather Jo Rodriguez was driving south-
bound on Main Street, in Salt Lake City, 
accompanied by her friend, Terry Stewart. 
Between 4:45 and 4:50 pm, soon after she 
passed through the controlled intersection of 
17th South and Main Street, Rodriguez 
abruptly turned left into oncoming traffic, 
directly in front of a school bus. Rodriguez's 
sudden turn gave the bus driver no time to 
evade the car, and the bus struck the passen-
ger side of Rodriguez's car, throwing the car 
off of the road and onto a nearby yard. The 
bus driver immediately reported the acci-
dent Paramedics arrived on the scene at 
4:50 pm. After removing Rodriguez from 
the vehicle, the paramedics determined that 
she was in critical condition and quickly 
moved her to an ambulance, which transport-
ed her to LDS Hospital. The paramedics 
then noted that Stewart had severe head 
injuries and determined that she was near 
death and likely to die. They moved her to 
an ambulance for transport to the University 
Hospital. At about that point, the first of the 
responding Salt Lake City police officers ar-
rived on the scene. 
113 As the officers began to examine the 
scene and look for possible witnesses they 
856 Utah 93 PACIFIC REPORTER, 3d SERIES 
were approached by someone who appeared 
to be a paramedic. That person told the 
officers that the occupants of Rodriguez's car 
smelled of alcohol. When the officers looked 
in Rodriguez's car, they found a purse, which 
turned out to be Stewart's. In the purse the 
officers found an open, partially empty bottle 
of vodka. Soon thereafter, the supervising 
officer arrived. He was informed of the cir-
cumstances surrounding the accident, the ap-
parent paramedic's observations, and the 
partially empty bottle of vodka found in the 
car. He immediately requested that dis-
patch send an officer to obtain a blood sam-
ple from Rodriguez. 
H 4 At 5:10 pm—no more than twenty-five 
minutes after the accident occurred—dis-
patch instructed officer Nate Swensen to lo-
cate the driver and "witness a blood draw." l 
Swensen first drove to the University Hospi-
tal. There, he learned that the driver had 
been taken to LDS Hospital and that Stew-
art, the passenger, was expected to die. He 
then drove to LDS Hospital. Although he 
did not know Rodriguez's name at the time, 
when Swensen entered the emergency room 
he asked the staff to direct him to the "pa-
tient that was brought in from the traffic 
accident." The staff directed him to the CT 
room where Swensen found Rodriguez lying 
on a CT table, waiting for a CT scan. He 
noticed that she was being very uncoopera-
tive with the medical staff and that her 
breath had a heavy odor of alcohol. He also 
noticed that her eyes were red and that her 
speech was slurred. In general, Swensen 
described Rodriguez as "uncooperative," 
"very angry," and "belligerent." 
H5 Upon locating Rodriguez, Swensen 
asked her some questions, but found her to 
be uncooperative. He then waited between 
twenty and twenty-five minutes for the blood 
draw technician to arrive. When the techni-
cian arrived, Swensen informed Rodriguez 
that they "were going to draw blood from her 
just as we do in accidents." The technician 
drew blood from an IV line that had been 
inserted into Rodriguez's arm upon her arriv-
al. The vials containing the blood were then 
1. The trial court made no findings concerning 
the timing of these events; consequently, we rely 
on the only lehable time reference m the record: 
labeled, stored, and the blood was eventually 
tested. The test revealed that, at the time of 
the blood draw, Rodriguez's blood-alcohol 
level was .39. 
116 StewTart died and Rodriguez was 
charged with one count of automobile homi-
cide. Rodriguez filed a motion to suppress 
any evidence derived from the warrantless 
blood draw, which the trial court initially 
granted. However, after the State petitioned 
for relief from the judgment, the trial court 
reconsidered and denied the motion. Rodri-
guez subsequently entered into an agreement 
with the State, pleading guilty to the charge, 
but reserving her right to appeal the trial 
court's denial of her motion to suppress. 
She now appeals. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF APPEAL 
[1] 117 Rodriguez argues that the trial 
court erred in refusing to suppress all evi-
dence that resulted from the warrantless 
blood draw performed after her automobile 
accident, because the State failed (1) to dem-
onstrate that the officer had probable cause 
to believe she had committed an alcohol re-
lated offense, and (2) to show that the extrac-
tion was justified by exigent circumstances. 
When reviewing a trial court's determination 
that exigent circumstances justified a war-
rantless intrusion, we defer to the court's 
factual findings, but examine its ultimate le-
gal conclusion for correctness. See City of 
Orem v. Henrie, SOS P.2d 1384, 1386 (Utah 
Ct.App.1994). 
ANALYSIS 
H 8 Rodriguez argues that the State's deci-
sion to obtain forcibly a blood sample from 
her was unsupported by either probable 
cause or exigent circumstances. "Warrant-
less searches are per se unreasonable under 
both the state and federal constitutions." 
State v. Morck, 821 P.2d 1190,1192-93 (Utah 
Ct.App.1991). "However, the presumption 
against warrantless searches is not without 
its exceptions, which are ' "jealously and 
carefully drawn." ' " City of Orem v. Henrie, 
that of the responding officer. The supervising 
officer testified that he did not remember the 
exact time he had called dispatch. 
STATE v. RODRIGUEZ 
Cite as 93 P.3d 854 (UtahApp. 2004) 
Utah 857 
868 P.2d 1384, 1387-88 (Utah Ct.App.1994) 
(quoting State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 
(Utah 1987) (additional citation omitted)). 
"One such exception to the warrant require-
ment recognized by both the United States 
Supreme Court and Utah's appellate courts 
is exigent circumstances." Salt Lake City v. 
Davidson, 2000 UT App 12,119, 994 P.2d 
1283. 
[2] H 9 To justify a police officer's deci-
sion to extract blood without the benefit of a 
search warrant, the State bears the burden 
of showing that (1) the officer had probable 
cause to believe that the defendant was in-
volved in an alcohol-related offense; (2) the 
officer had reason to believe the blood sam-
ple would produce evidence of the defen-
dant's level of intoxication when the crime 
was committed; (3) the officer reasonably 
believed that they were "confronted with an 
emergency, in which the delay necessary to 
obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, 
threatened 'the destruction of the evi-
dence/ "; and (4) the method used by the 
officer to obtain the blood sample was "per-
formed in a reasonable manner." Schmerber 
u California, 384 U.S. 757, 771-72, 86 S.Ct. 
1826,1836-37,16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (citation 
omitted); see also Henrie, 868 P.2d at 1388 
(stating "the [State] bears the burden of 
showing both probable cause and exigent 
circumstances"). Because we find the exi-
gency question to be dispositive, we do not 
address the issue of probable cause. 
1110 Rodriguez argues that the trial court 
erred in failing to examine the totality of the 
circumstances of this case before deciding 
that the drawing of her blood was justified 
by exigent circumstances. The State coun-
ters that "[t]he U.S. Supreme Court and a 
majority of jurisdictions that have considered 
the issue have held that the evanescence of 
blood-alcohol evidence coupled with delays 
inherent in investigating an alcohol-related 
traffic accident constitutes exigent circum-
stances under the Fourth Amendment." See, 
&£., United States v. Berry, 866 F.2d 887, 
891 (6th Cir.1989) ("Because evidence of in-
toxication begins to dissipate promptly, it is 
evidence in this case that there were exigent 
circumstances indicating the need to take 
such action."); State v. Cocio, 147 Ariz. 277, 
709 P.2d 1336, 1345 (1985) (concluding that 
"because of the destructibility of the [blood-
alcohol] evidence, exigent circumstances ex-
isted"); People v. Milhollin, 751 P.2d 43, 49 
(Colo.1988) (stating "[t]he inherent nature of 
a blood alcohol test justifies the conclusion 
. . . that exigent circumstances existed"); 
State v. Cooper, 136 Idaho 697, 39 P.3d 637, 
640-41 (Ct.App.2001) (recognizing the propri-
ety of the warrantless extraction of blood 
"since blood alcohol concentration begins to 
dissipate due to the body's natural metabo-
lism of alcohol shortly after a person stops 
drinking"); State v. BoMing, 173 Wis.2d 529, 
494 N.W.2d 399, 402 (1993) ("A logical analy-
sis of the Schmerber decision indicates that 
the exigency of the situation presented was 
caused solely by the fact that the amount of 
alcohol in a person's blood stream diminishes 
over time."); cf. United States v. Reid^ 929 
F.2d 990, 994 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that 
exigent circumstances justify a warrantless 
administration of a breathalyzer test because 
"[t]ime is of the essence when testing for 
alcohol in the bloodstream," and because of 
society's interest in "protecting its citizens 
from drunk drivers"). Although we recog-
nize that several jurisdictions have interpret-
ed Schmerber as creating what is, in effect, a 
per se rule, we conclude that the Schmerber 
language comports with accepted exigent cir-
cumstances doctrine and decline to adopt the 
per se interpretation urged by the State. 
1111 In Schmerber, the United States Su-
preme Court recognized that in certain situa-
tions police officers may be presented with 
exigent circumstances that justify the offi-
cer's failure to comply with the Fourth 
Amendment warrant requirement. See 
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-72, 86 S.Ct. at 
1835-36. After an automobile accident in 
which the defendant and his passenger were 
injured, the defendant was taken to a hospi-
tal where he was placed under arrest. See 
id. at 758 & n. 2, 86 S.Ct. at 1829 & n. 2. 
Following the arrest, "[a]t the direction of a 
police officer, a blood sample was then with-
drawn from [the defendant's] body by a phy-
sician." Id. at 758, 86 S.Ct. at 1829. Over 
the defendant's objection, the state's analysis 
of the involuntary warrantless blood sample 
was then used to convict him of driving un-
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der the influence of alcohol. See id. at 758-
59, 86 S.Ct. at 1829. 
1112 On appeal, the Supreme Court began 
by noting that the blood draw violated nei-
ther the defendant's constitutional Due Pro-
cess rights, nor his Fifth Amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination. See id. at 
759-61, 86 S.Ct. at 1830-51. The Court then 
highlighted that the extraction of blood for 
evidentiary reasons clearly implicates the 
Fourth Amendment, but that "the Fourth 
Amendment's proper function is to constrain, 
not against all intrusions as such, but against 
intrusions which are not justified in the cir-
cumstances, or which are made in an improp-
er manner." Id. at 768, 86 S.Ct. at 1834. 
After quickly disposing of the probable cause 
issue, the Court addressed the warrant re-
quirement, stating that "[sjearch warrants 
are ordinarily required for searches of dwell-
ings, and, absent an emergency, no less could 
be required where intrusions into the human 
body are concerned." Id. at 770, 86 S.Ct. at 
1835. "The importance of informed, de-
tached and deliberate determinations of the 
issue of whether or not to invade another's 
body in search of evidence of guilt is indis-
putable and great." Id. However, the Court 
concluded that under certain circumstances, 
warrantless searches do not violate the 
Fourth Amendment. Specifically, the Court 
determined that when a trial court is able to 
find that a police officer's warrantless search 
was premised upon a reasonable belief that 
"he was confronted with an emergency," and 
"the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, 
under the circumstances, threatened 'the de-
struction of evidence,' " the warrantless ex-
traction of blood is justified. 7c?. (citation 
omitted). After acknowledging that "the 
percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to 
diminish shortly after drinking stops" the 
Court concluded: "Particularly in a case such 
as this, where time had to be taken to bring 
the accused to a hospital and to investigate 
the scene of the accident, [encompassing ap-
2. We acknowledge that later statements by the 
United States Supreme Court concerning 
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 
1826, 16 LEd.2d 908 (1966), suggest that the 
evanescent nature of blood-alcohol may be suffi-
cient, in and of itself, to justify a warrantless 
blood draw. See Skinner v. Railwav Labor Exec-
proximately two hours time,] there was no 
time to seek out a magistrate and secure a 
warrant." Id. at 770-71, 86 S.Ct. at 1836. 
1f 13 Consequently, the Court determined 
that the police officers involved in Schmerber 
did not violate the Fourth Amendment be-
cause they were faced with exigent circum-
stances. See id. However, the Court did 
not conclude that exigent circumstances ex-
isted solely because the evidence involved 
was blood-alcohol. Instead, the Court fo-
cused on the evanescent nature of blood-
alcohol evidence coupled with the time that 
had elapsed between the occurrence of the 
accident and the opportunity to draw the 
defendant's blood. Moreover, the Court's 
language—highlighting the potential difficul-
ties California police officers faced in contact-
ing a magistrate at that time—suggests that 
other factors important to the analysis are 
magistrate availability and local warrant pro-
cedures. See State v. Flannigan, 194 Ariz. 
150, 978 P.2d 127, 131 (CtApp.1998) (con-
cluding that under Schmerber "the evanes-
cent quality of alcohol and drugs in a per-
son's body creates an exigency only if the 
evidence might disappear before the police 
can obtain a warrant"). Finally, the lan-
guage in Schmerber itself supports a conclu-
sion that the court did not adopt a per se 
approach. The language states: 
It bears repeating, however, that, we reach 
this judgment only on the facts of the 
present record. The integrity of an indi-
vidual's person is a cherished value of our 
society. That we today hold that the Con-
stitution does not forbid the State's minor 
intrusion into an individual's body under 
stringently limited conditions in no way 
indicates that it permits more substantial 
intrusions, or intrusions under other condi; 
tions. 
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 772, 86 S.Ct. at 1836.2 
[3,4] 1114 Relying upon the language of 
Schmerber, we conclude that exigent circum-
wives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 623, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 
1416, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989) (addressing blood 
tests and railway employees); South Dakota v. 
Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 103 S Ct. 916, 74 L.Ed.2<J 
748 (1983) (concluding that a defendant's refusal 
to take a blood test is admissible evidence not 
violative of the Fifth Amendment). However, 
STATE v. RODRIGUEZ 
Cite as 93 P.3d 854 (Utah App. 2004) 
stances will be found, where the situation cient to overcome 
involves blood-alcohol evidence, only when 
the "totality of the circumstances," City of 
Orem v. Henrie, 868 P.2d 1384, 1388 (Utah 
Ct.App.1994), supports a finding that the offi-
cer "was confronted with an emergency, in 
which the delay necessary to obtain a war-
rant, under the circumstances, threatened 
'the destruction of evidence/ " Sckmerber, 
384 U.S. at 770, 86 S.Ct. at 1835 (citation 
omitted). Moreover, the mere fact that 
blood-alcohol evidence is evanescent, al-
though important to the equation, is insuffi-
cient to create exigent circumstances by it-
self. 
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the need for a search 
[5] 1f 15 Therefore, we must examine the 
instant case to determine whether or not the 
totality of the circumstances supports a con-
clusion that the officer was faced with exi-
gent circumstances when he extracted Rodri-
guez's blood without a warrant. " 'Exigency 
does not evolve from one individual fact. In-
stead, there is often a mosaic of evidence, no 
single part of which is itself sufficient. Our 
task is to review the totality of the facts and 
circumstances of the particular case to deter-
mine if the finding of exigency was proper/ " 
Henrie, 868 P.2d at 1388 (alteration omitted) 
(quoting State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 
(Utah 1987)).3 However, although we review 
"the facts and circumstances of the case" as a 
whole, State v. White, 856 P.2d 656, 659 
(Utah Ct.App.1993), should the tiial court's 
findings fail to address any important factor, 
we are in no position to supplement the 
findings. See Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 
58,UK 19-20, 52 P.3d 1158; Brigham City v. 
Stuart, 2002 UT App 317,1110, 57 P.3d 1111, 
eert. granted, 65 P.3d 1190 (Utah 2003). 
H 16 We have, in the past, highlighted sev-
eral factors for use in determining whether a 
situation created exigent circumstances suffi-
because these cases do not directly address the 
question that we face today, and because the 
Schmerber references found therein are best de-
scribed as dicta, we adhere to what we believe 
the plain language of Sckmerber demands: a 
totality of the circumstances approach with the 
understanding that blood-alcohol evidence is eva-
nescent. 
3. Although the thrust of City of Orem v. Henrie. 
868 P.2d 1384 (Utah Ct.App.l994\ was focused 
on the warrantless invasion of Henries home, 
warrant. 
Relevant facts may include the distance to 
the nearest magistrate, the availability of a 
telephonic warrant, the feasibility of a 
stake-out or other form of surveillance 
while a warrant is being obtained, the seri-
ousness of the underlying alcohol-related 
offense, the commission of another offense 
such as fleeing the scene, the ongoing and 
continuing nature of an investigation, the 
extent of probable cause, and the conduct 
of the investigating officers. 
Henrie, 868 P.2d at 1392. 
f 17 In this case, the trial court ruled that 
the dissipation rate of alcohol in the blood 
created an exigency that justified the war-
rantless extraction of Rodriguez's blood. 
The court also ruled that the alcohol-related 
accident was quite serious and that the police 
officers had probable causs to believe that 
Rodriguez was driving while intoxicated. 
However, the trial court left open the ques-
tion of time; the proximity of the nearest 
magistrate; the alternatives explored and 
discarded by the officers; the estimated de-
lay the officers faced in seeking a warrant; 
the impact that the delay could have had on 
obtaining viable evidence; and the point of 
time in the accident investigation when the 
decision was made to extract Rodriguez's 
blood. The court's failure to address these 
factors is fatal to its determination that exi-
gent circumstances existed in this case. 
[6] 118 Our review of the record reveals 
that the accident occurred between approxi-
mately 4:45 and 4:50 pm on Wednesday, May 
9, 2001. After arriving on the scene and 
being apprised of the seriousness of the acci-
dent, the condition of Rodriguez and her 
passenger, and the possibility that alcohol 
may have contributed to the accident, the 
central to that issue was the importance of pre-
serving blood-alcohol evidence. See id. at 1388 
("[W]e consider only whether the possible de-
struction of evidence of defendant's alcohol con-
tent under the facts and circumstances presented 
was an exigent circumstance justifying this war-
rantless home search."). Consequently, we con-
clude that the Henrie analysis is applicable to the 
warrantless extraction of blood from a defen-
dant. 
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supervising officer, through dispatch, or-
dered Swensen to ensure that the State pro-
cured a sample of Rodriguez's blood. Swen-
sen testified that he received the call at 
5:10—no more that twenty-five minutes after 
the accident occurred. Swensen further indi-
cated that he first went to the University 
Hospital—where Stewart had been taken— 
and then to LDS Hospital, where he found 
Rodriguez. There, he waited an additional 
twenty to twenty-five minutes before the de-
partment's authorized blood technician ar-
rived. Only then did Swensen inform Rodri-
guez that he was there to supervise the 
extraction of her blood "as we do in acci-
dents." 
U 19 It is clear from the record that the 
decision to extract Rodriguez's blood was 
made soon after the accident occurred, at a 
time "when courts are open and search war-
rants can be readily requested" either in 
person or by telephone. State v. Northrup, 
756 P.2d 1288,1292 (Utah Ct.App.1988). Yet 
the supervising officer testified that he made 
no effort to obtain a warrant. The record is 
also devoid of any indication that Swensen 
considered requesting a warrant. Moreover, 
the State presented no testimony that any-
one, at any time, had assessed the difficulty 
and time required to obtain a proper search 
warrant to obtain Rodriguez's blood. Rath-
er, both officers seemingly proceeded with 
the understanding that a warrant was not 
necessary to extract Rodriguez's blood. 
[7] 1120 Under these circumstances, we 
conclude that the State has failed to meet its 
burden of proving exigency. Neither officer 
made any efforts to procure a warrant, or 
even inquire about the availability of a magis-
trate, prior to performing the blood draw on 
Rodriguez. More troubling is Officer Swen-
son's statement that the blood draw was to 
be done "as we do in accidents," which sug-
gests that officers of the Salt Lake City 
Police Department view such blood draws as 
4. Having failed to present sufficient evidence to 
support the trial court's conclusion, the State is 
foreclosed any oppoi tunity to revisit this issue on 
remand. See State v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30,-
111, 76 P.3d 1159 (stating "we have previously 
held that when the State has the burden of proof 
and the record on appeal fails to sustain any 
theory of admissibility, the State 'is not entitled 
a matter of routine. However, exigency is 
the opposite of routine, and a reasonable 
belief that an emergency is at hand is always 
required if warrantless action is to be justi-
fied on the basis of exigent circumstances. 
[8] H 21 The evanescent nature of blood-
alcohol evidence does not, per se, convert 
every alcohol-related blood draw into an 
emergency. Without some reasonable belief 
that the steady dissipation of blood-alcohol 
constitutes an emergency under the particu-
lar circumstances, a warrant must be ob-
tained. The record does not reflect such a 
reasonable belief in this case; consequently, 
the evidence arising from the warrantless 
draw of Rodriguez's blood must be sup-
pressed. 
CONCLUSION 
11 22 The trial court erred in admitting the 
evidence obtained through the warrantless 
extraction of Rodriguez's blood. The exigent 
circumstances doctrine requires the State to 
show that the situation amounted to an emer-
gency. Here, however, the State has shown 
only that the warrantless blood draw oc-
curred pursuant to routine procedure fol-
lowed by the Salt Lake City Police Depart-
ment. Accordingly, we reverse Rodriguez's 
conviction for driving under the influence of 
alcohol and remand, instructing the trial 
court to suppress all evidence derived from 
the warrantless blood draw.4 
K 23 WE CONCUR: JAMES Z. DAVIS 
and NORMAN H. JACKSON, Judges. 
to a remand to [possibly] put on new evidence' 
(quoting State v Hodson, 907 P.2d 1155, 1159 
(Utah 1995))). Because Topanotes also fore* 
closes any possible remand for the trial court to 
enter additional factual findings, we remand <»-
reeling the trial court to grant Rodriguez's mp{ 
tion to suppress. 
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Defendant. 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence having come before this Court for 
hearing in the above entitled manner on October 12, 2001, in which Defendant was 
represented by counsel, Shannon Romero, and the State was represented by counsel, 
Michael E. Postma, the Court having heard evidence and having considered oral 
arguments of counsel, the Court now enters the following Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On May 9, 2001, the defendant was driving an Isuzu Trooper southbound on 
State Street and approximately 1700 South in Salt Lake County. Terry Lee 
Stewart was a passenger in the Trooper. 
XQ£ 
S; 
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2. The defendant made a left hand turn into the path of an oncoming school bus. 
The school bus struck the Trooper on the passenger side and critically injured 
the passenger, Ms. Stewart. 
3. Salt Lake City Police Officers and emergency personnel responded to the 
scene of the collision. Emergency personnel removed the defendant from the 
driver's seat. Emergency personnel informed the officers on the scene that the 
passenger of the vehicle was in critical condition. Emergency personnel also 
informed the officers on the scene that the defendant smelled of alcohol. 
4. Defendant Rodriguez was transported by ambulance to L.D.S. Hospital. Terry 
Lee Stewart was transported by ambulance to University Hospital. 
5. Officer Peterson located a partially consumed bottle of Rothchild's vodka in a 
purse in the Trooper. The bottle of vodka was approximately three-quarters 
full. Terry Lee Stewart's identification was located in the purse. 
6. Officer Swenson was dispatched to observe the defendant's blood being 
drawn. Officer Swenson first went to University Hospital where Ms. -Stewart 
was being treated and learned she was not expected to live. 
7. Officer Swenson then went to L.D.S. Hospital where the defendant was being 
treated. Officer Swenson observed that the defendant smelled very heavily of 
alcohol, and when she spoke her speech was very slow and slurry. The 
defendant's eyes were red and bloodshot and she was uncooperative. 
8. Officer Swenson was unaware how long the defendant had been in the 
hospital. He was also unaware of any medications that the defendant may 
have received or her medical evaluations. 
9. Officer Swenson told the defendant that her blood was being drawn because 
of the traffic accident. The defendant did not respond to Officer Swenson. 
The defendant did not object to her blood being drawn. 
10. Officer Swenson observed Brian Davis, a blood technician, draw blood from 
the defendant using an existing IV line, which had previously been inserted by 
medical personnel to treat the defendant following the collision. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The admissibility of the blood draw is governed by Utah Code § 76-5-207(6). 
2. Officers had probable cause to believe that a serious crime had been committed. 
Officers were aware of the serious nature of the collision, and the fact that the 
passenger of the vehicle was not expected to live. Officers also had probable 
cause to believe that the defendant was intoxicated at the time of the collision. 
3. Exigent circumstances existed because the dissipation of alcohol in the blood is 
sufficient to create an exigent circumstance. 
4. Information known to the officers investigating the scene of the accident was 
deemed to be known by Officer Swenson. 
5. Because of the exigent circumstances and the probable cause that a serious 
offense occurred, there was no need to get a warrant, telephonic or otherwise, to 
draw the defendant's blood. Additionally, no arrest was necessary to draw the 
defendant's blood. 
6. Negligently operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, which 
results in the death of another is a felony, and is a serious offense. 
7. Drawing blood from an existing IV line was non-intrusive because it was already 
in the defendant's body for medical purposes. The defendant's blood was drawn 
in a manner that does not shock the conscience. 
8. The police conduct was reasonable in light of all of the circumstances. 
9. The admissibility of the blood evidence is not prohibited by the Rules of Evidence 
or the constitution. 
DATED this _ ^ day of>ferefC2002. 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
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HEATHER RODRIGUEZ, 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPRESS 
Case No. 011907005 FS 
Judge Dennis M. Fuchs 
Based upon the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
and for good cause, the Defendant's Motion to Suppress Blood Evidence is denied. 
Dated this V_ day o^ MareTT, 2002. 
BY THE COIJRX;..... 
Honorable Dennis M. FuchsS 
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This cause was heard upon the record in the trial court. 
Each error assigned has been reviewed and the following 
disposition is made: 
BATCHELDER, Judge. 
Appellant, Steven A. Troyer, appeals from a judgment 
of conviction in the Wayne County Court of Common 
Pleas. We affirm. 
I. 
A two-car traffic accident occurred on Back Orrville 
Road in Wayne County in the late evening of May 25, 
2001. As a result of that accident, Appellant was charged 
with three counts: (1) aggravated vehicular assault, (2) 
driving while under the influence of alcohol, and (3) 
driving with a prohibited blood-alcohol concentration. 
Appellant entered a plea of not guilty to all counts and filed 
a motion to suppress the [*2] results of a blood-alcohol 
test. As grounds, he asserted that the blood was withdrawn 
in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and also that it was not withdrawn within two 
hours of his alleged operation of the vehicle. Following a 
hearing, the trial judge overruled the Fourth Amendment 
argument and dismissed the third court, pursuant to the 
two-hour requirement of R.C. 4511.19(D)(1). 
Appellant proceeded to trial on the remaining two 
counts and a jury returned a verdict of guilty on both. The 
trial judge sentenced Appellant to a term of five years on 
the charge of aggravated vehicular assault and six months 
on the charge of driving while under the influence of 
alcohol, to be served concurrently. Appellant has appealed 
to this court and has assigned two errors for review. 
II. 
Assignment of Error No. 1 
"The trial court erred by overruling appellant's motion 
to suppress the results of the blood alcohol test, which was 
obtained as the result of blood drawn at the instruction of 
the state patrol in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution, when there was no probable 
cause for the blood draw, [*3] no probable cause for an 
arrest, no search warrant authorizing the blood draw, and 
no consent by appellant." 
In his first assignment of error, Appellant contends the 
trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress the 
results of a nonconsensual and warrantless blood-alcohol 
test, taken while he was unconscious. He contends that this 
procedure violated the Fourth Amendment. 
The relevant facts, as presented at the hearing on the 
motion to suppress, came from the testimony of two state 
troopers. Shortly after 11:00 p.m., on May 25,2001, state 
highway patrol officers were dispatched to the scene of a 
two-car accident. Each vehicle had one occupant. By the 
time the highway patrol arrived at the scene, Appellant had 
already been taken to Orrville Dunlap Hospital by members 
of the Orrville Fire Department and was subsequently life-
flighted to Aultman Hospital. Emergency workers were 
still attempting to free the other driver from her severely 
damaged automobile. 
Trooper Mark Haines conducted an inventory of 
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Appellant's vehicle and testified that he detected the odor 
of alcohol in the vehicle. Trooper Haines determined that 
a blood sample had not been taken from Appellant at 
Orrville [*4] Dunlap Hospital. Thereupon, he contacted 
the highway patrol post closest to Aultman Hospital and 
requested that an officer go to the hospital to obtain a 
blood sample from Appellant for purposes of conducting 
a blood-alcohol test. 
Shortly after 1:00 a.m., Trooper Steven Sherrod 
received a dispatch to proceed to Aultman Hospital and 
attempt to obtain a blood sample from Appellant. Trooper 
Sherrod testified that he located Appellant in the trauma 
room of the hospital, where several doctors and nurses 
were attending him. Trooper Sherrod stated that he could 
smell the odor of an alcoholic beverage while several feet 
away from Appellant. When Trooper Sherrod asked to 
speak to Appellant, the nurse explained that he was 
incoherent and incapable of communicating. Appellant was 
not responding to the doctors and nurses attending him. In 
compliance with Trooper Sherrod's request, a medical 
technician drew a sample of Appellant's blood at 
approximately 1:30 a.m., which subsequently revealed a 
blood-alcohol concentration of .176 grams of alcohol per 
100 milliliters of blood. 
The trial court denied Appellant's motion to suppress, 
finding that the blood-draw was reasonable under the 
circumstances [*5] and did not violate Appellant's Fourth 
Amendment rights. 
Appellate review of a ruling on a motion to suppress 
presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Long 
(1998), 127 Ohio AppJd 328, 332, 713 N.E.2d 1. '"In a 
hearing on a motion to suppress evidence, the trial court 
assumes the role of trier of facts and is in the best position 
to resolve questions of fact and evaluate the credibility of 
witnesses.'" State v. Hopfer (1996), 112 Ohio App. 3d 521, 
548, 679N.E.2d321, appeal not allowed, (1996), 77 Ohio 
St. 3d 1488, 673 N.K2d 146, quoting State v. Venham 
(1994), 96 Ohio AppJd 649, 653, 645 N.K2d 831. 
Accordingly, "an appellate court must review the trial 
court's findings of historical fact only for clear error, giving 
due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by the trial 
court. The trial court's legal conclusions, however, are 
afforded no deference, but are reviewed de novo" State v. 
Russell (1998) 127 Ohio AppJd 414, 416, 713N.E.2d56, 
citing Ornelas v. United States (1996), 517 U.S. 690, 699, 
134 L. Ed. 2d 911, 116 S Ct. 1657. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution |*6] guarantees the "right of the people to be 
secure in their persons *** against unreasonable searches 
and seizures" and ensures that "no Warrants shall issue but 
upon probable cause ***." The "overriding function of the 
Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and 
dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State." 
Schmerberv. California (1966), 384 U.S. 757, 767, 16 L. 
Ed. 2d 908, 86 S. Ct. 1826. 
The withdrawal of a sample of blood from the body of 
an individual in order to determine its blood-alcohol 
content for the purpose of proving a criminal charge 
constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767. See, also, State 
v. Sisler (1996), 114 Ohio AppJd 337, 341, 683 N.E2d 
106. Fourth Amendment analysis neither permits nor 
forbids all such bodily intrusions; rather, "the Fourth 
Amendment's proper function is to constrain, not against 
all intrusions as such, but against intrusions which are not 
justified in the circumstances, or which are made in an 
improper manner." Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768. 
In Schmerber, where there had been a prior arrest, the 
Court set [*7] forth several criteria for the reasonableness 
of an intrusive search, including the following: (1) the 
government must have a clear indication, rather than a 
mere chance, that incriminating evidence will be found; (2) 
there must be a search warrant or exigent circumstances, 
such as the imminent destruction of evidence, to excuse the 
warrant requirement; and (3) the method used to extract the 
evidence must be reasonable and must be performed in a 
reasonable manner. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-72. 
Appellant has not challenged the reasonableness of the 
blood-draw procedure, and we, therefore, do not address 
that factor. 
In a subsequent case, the Supreme Court noted that the 
reasonableness of an intrusive search depends on a case-
by-case approach, in which the individual's interests in 
privacy and security are weighed against society's interests 
in obtaining the evidence. Winston v. Lee (1985), 470 U.S. 
753, 760, 84 L. Ed. 2d 662, 105 S. Ct. 1611. See, also, 
Whren v. United States (1996), 517 US 806, 818, 135 L. 
Ed. 2d 89, 116S. Ct. 1769 (requiring a balancing analysis 
in searches involving a physical penetration of the body). 
"In [*8] a given case, the question whether the 
community's need for evidence outweighs the substantial 
privacy interests at stake is a delicate one admitting of few 
categorical answers." Winston, 470 U.S. at 760. The 
Winston court also recognized that Schmerber provides the 
appropriate framework for such cases. Id. 
No prior arrest 
We first consider Appellant's contention that the 
extraction of blood from him violated the Fourth 
Amendment because it was obtained in the absence of a 
prior arrest. He contends that Schmerber supports his 
position. The court in Schmerber admitted evidence of an 
Page 3 
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unconsented blood test, where it followed an arrest. Since 
Appellant was not under arrest at the time the blood was 
drawn from him, he claims the evidence should have been 
suppressed. 
In the case at bar, the absence of an arrest, however, is 
not determinative. While the Schmerber court concluded 
that the police were justified in taking a blood sample in 
that case because the circumstances indicated the blood test 
results would be positive and because the defendant was 
under arrest, the case did not require that an arrest take 
place before every nonconsensual [*9] search. Rather, it 
simply stated that "the attempt to secure evidence of blood-
alcohol content in this case was an appropriate incident to 
petitioner's arrest." Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771. Indeed, 
Ohio has since held that the Fourth Amendment does not 
require an arrest in all cases prior to administering a blood-
alcohol test. See, e.g., State v. Woods (Sept. 9, 1991), 12th 
Dist. No. CA90-07-125, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 4210. 
Therefore, we do not find that distinction to be dispositive. 
Unconscious Party 
The more precise question before us is whether the 
Fourth Amendment requires the arrest of an unconscious 
or incapacitated driver before a blood sample may be 
taken. Schmerber did not involve an unconscious or 
incapacitated driver. Furthermore, no Ohio case 
specifically addressing this question has been brought to 
our attention by either party and there appears to be a split 
of opinion among other jurisdictions upon it. nl See State 
v. Campbell (1980), 189 Mont. 107, 116, 615 P.2d 190, 
196; Annotation (1976), 72 A.L.RJd 325, Section 4; and 
3 LaFave, Search and Seizure (1996), Section 5.4(b), fn. 
21 and 22. 
n 1 At least one Ohio court has determined that 
R.C. 4511.191(B), Ohio's implied consent statute, 
authorizes the withdrawal of blood from an 
unconscious individual, notwithstanding the 
presence or absence of a prior actual arrest, where 
a police officer has reasonable grounds to believe 
the person was driving while under the influence of 
alcohol. See, e.g. State v. Taylor (1982), 2 Ohio 
App.3d394, 395, 2 Ohio B. 468, 442 N.E.2d 491. 
As noted by the State, however, Appellant does not 
assign error in application of this statute. Instead, 
his argument is based upon the Fourth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution. 
[*10] 
For its part, the State cites Breithaupt v. Abram 
(1957), 352 U.S. 432,1L. Ed. 2d448, 77 S. Ct. 408 for the 
principle that an unconscious individual may have a blood 
sample withdrawn consistent with constitutional principles. 
In that case, a driver was injured in a serious two-car traffic 
accident and was taken to a hospital for treatment. A nearly 
empty bottle of whisky was found in the glove 
compartment. While the driver was lying unconscious in 
the emergency room, the smell of liquor was detected on 
his breath. Believing him to be intoxicated, police officers 
directed medical personnel to withdraw a sample of his 
blood while he was unconscious. 
On review, the Supreme Court first declined the 
petitioner's invitation to extend the exclusionary rule to his 
state court conviction. Breithaupt, 352 U.S. at 434. 
Instead, the Breithaupt majority followed Wolf v. Colorado 
(1949), 338 U.S. 25, 93 L. Ed. 1782, 69 S. Ct. 1359 in 
holding that the exclusionary rule was not applicable to the 
states. Breithaupt, 352 U.S. at 434. It was not until Mapp 
v. Ohio (1961), 367 US. 643, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081, 81 S. Ct. 
1684, 86 Ohio Law Abs. 513 [*11] was decided, that the 
exclusionary rule was applied to state prosecutions for state 
crimes. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767. 
The Breithaupt Court proceeded to reject petitioner's 
due process claim, finding that the withdrawal of blood 
from an unconscious person by a trained technician in a 
hospital was not brutal and offensive conduct that 
"shocked the conscience" or offended a "sense of justice." 
Breithaupt, 352 U.S. at 435. Thus, Breithaupt was decided 
under the Fourteenth Amendment due process "sense of 
justice" test. See Sisler (1995), 114 Ohio App.3d at 343. 
Breithaupt does not resolve the question in the present case 
regarding suppression of evidence brought on Fourth 
Amendment grounds. 
Subsequently, in Cupp v. Murphy (1973), 412 US. 
291, 36 L. Ed 2d 900, 93 S. Ct. 2000, the United States 
Supreme Court permitted a nonconsensual, limited search 
of fingernail samples without a search warrant and without 
a formal arrest. The court found that the existence of 
probable cause to believe the man had murdered his wife 
justified a limited search in order to preserve the highly 
evanescent evidence they found [*12] under his 
fingernails. Id. at 296. 
In discussing Cupp, and the split of authority on the 
question of whether an arrest is required before a blood 
sample may be taken from an unconscious party in a traffic 
accident, Professor LaFave has stated: 
"Indeed, the case for permitting the taking of the blood 
sample upon probable cause that the defendant is 
intoxicated without first arresting him is, if anything, 
stronger than the case for the searches conducted in Cupp 
Page 4 
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and Franklin. In the blood sample case, as opposed to 
those cases, there is no room whatsoever for the argument 
that the lack of a formal arrest may decrease somewhat the 
chances that the evidence will be destroyed, for the 
'evanescent' character of the evidence is inherent in its 
nature and does not depend upon any motive of the 
defendant to destroy it. *** It is the height of formalism, to 
say the least, to suggest that a warrantless search on 
probable cause in order to meet this emergency is 
reasonable only if the police first declare the hospitalized 
defendant under arrest. In particular, it 'would be ridiculous 
to require a police officer to perform some formal ritual of 
arrest over the unconscious [*13] body of a critically 
injured person who was a party to a fatal automobile 
accident.' The claim that the contrary position 'provides 
some measure of assurance that probable cause is based 
upon considerations independent of the blood-alcohol test 
results' is untenable, as the need for a court to determine 
that probable cause existed prior to the test is present under 
either rule." (Citations omitted.) 3 LaFave, Search and 
Seizure (1996) 161-62, Section 5.4(b). 
The Sixth Circuit has adopted the view that the Fourth 
Amendment does not require an arrest prior to 
administering a blood-alcohol test to an unconscious driver 
believed to have been driving under the influence of 
alcohol. United States v. Berry (CA.6, 1989), 866 F.2d 
887, 888. See, also, State v. Oevering (Minn. 1978), 268 
N.W.2d 68, 73 (requiring "arrest ritual" of unconscious 
victims of alcohol-related accidents would be "absurd"); 
State v. Campbell (1980), 189 Mont 107, 115-116, 615 
P.2dl90, 196;Statev. Hollingsworth(1985), 77N.C.App. 
36, 43-44, 334 S.K2d 463; Wilhelmi v. Director of the 
Dept. of Tramp. (N.D.I 993), 498 N.W.2d 150, 154 [*14] 
(formal arrest of an unconscious driver would be an 
"empty gesture"); State v. Milligan (1988), 304 Ore. 659, 
671-72, 748P.2dl30; Alijfv. State (Tex.Crim.App.1982), 
627 S. W.2d 166, 170; Van Order v. State (Wyo. 1979), 600 
P.2d 1056, 1058. See, also, Annotation (1976), 72 
A.L.R.3d325, Section 4. n2 
n2 It also appears that a majority of states with 
implied consent statutes that have addressed the 
issue, have held that the arrest of an unconscious 
person is not a prerequisite to the application of the 
statute. SeeStatev. Wyrostek(1988),108NM 140, 
142-43, 767P.2d379. This majority includes Ohio. 
See, e.g., State v. Taylor (1982), 2 Ohio App.3d 
394, 395, 2 Ohio B. 468, 442 N.E.2d491. 
Other courts have required the formality of an arrest of 
an unconscious person, e.g. Commonwealth v. Hlavsa 
(1979), 266Pa.Super. 602, 405 A.2d 1270, 1271, or relied 
upon the presence of probable cause to arrest, Galvan v. 
State (1982), 98 Nev. 550, 655 P.2d 155. [*15] 
In light of the serious consequences to the victims of 
drunk drivers and the minimal intrusion to the suspected 
violator, we are persuaded that the better rule is that the 
Fourth Amendment does not require an arrest before a 
blood sample may be taken from an unconscious driver 
believed to have been driving under the influence of 
alcohol. 
Exigency 
Before the results of a nonconsensual, warrantless 
blood-alcohol test may be admitted into evidence, there 
must be a demonstration that the circumstances come 
within a specifically established and well-delineated 
exception. See Katz v. United States (1967), 389 U.S. 347, 
357, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576, 88 S. Ct. 507. One of these 
exceptions, excusing the obtaining of a warrant is the 
existence of an exigent circumstance. The Schmerber court 
concluded that because of the rapid rate at which alcohol 
diminishes in the blood, and because it would take some 
time for the officer to investigate and find facts 
establishing probable cause, there would be no time 
reasonably to expect the officer to obtain a warrant. 
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-71. Such facts demonstrate an 
exigent circumstance, excusing the obtaining [*16] of a 
warrant. 
In the case at bar, it was 1:30 in the morning and more than 
two hours had passed since the accident when Trooper 
Sherrod requested the blood test. The officer could 
reasonably have concluded that there was not sufficient 
time to obtain a warrant. 
Probable Cause - Clear Indication 
Appellant contends that there was no probable cause 
for the blood test in the case at bar. The particular language 
in Schmerber required that there must be a clear indication 
- as opposed to a mere chance - that incriminating evidence 
would be found before an intrusive search may be 
conducted. n3 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 769-70. 
n3 In State v. Pearson (1996), 114 Ohio 
App.3d 153, 158, 682 N.E.2d 1077, the Third 
District concluded that the "clear indication" test 
does not differ from the requirements of "probable 
cause." The Fourth District has found that the 
"clear indication" standard requires a greater 
quantum of evidence than that required by probable 
Page 5 
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cause. State v. Holmes (July 17, 1986), 4th Dist. 
No. 1163, 1986 Ohio App. LEXIS 7615. Appellant 
in the case at bar has argued no distinction on this 
point. Our result is the same by either standard. 
[*17] 
A law officer's decision to conduct a warrantless 
search is evaluated first by the trial court and is reviewed 
by this court de novo. See Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699, 
(determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause 
are generally reviewed de novo). Probable cause is 
determined from the totality of the circumstances. Illinois 
v. Gates (1983), 462 U.S. 213, 233, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, 103 
SCt. 2317. 
Our inquiry is directed to the question of whether, at the 
time the search took place, the totality of the circumstances 
was sufficient to warrant a prudent person to believe that 
Appellant had been driving under the influence of alcohol 
and that a blood-alcohol test would provide evidence 
thereof. 
Facts presented at the suppression hearing established that 
Appellant was involved in a serious two-car collision at 
approximately 11:00 in the evening and was taken from the 
scene of the accident for medical treatment. Trooper 
Haines subsequently detected the odor of alcohol in the 
rear of Appellant's vehicle. Trooper Sherrod reported to the 
hospital and there found Appellant to be incoherent and 
incapable of communication. Trooper Sherrod detected 
[*18] the odor of alcohol on Appellant's person from a 
distance of several feet, more than two hours after the 
accident. 
In balancing the individual's interests in privacy and 
security against society's interests in obtaining the 
evidence, we find the following. The need to obtain a 
sample of Appellant's blood was high. This was a serious 
accident, with both drivers requiring medical attention and 
both automobiles seriously damaged. The smell of alcohol 
was present in Appellant's automobile as well as on his 
person more than two hours later. Appellant was 
unconscious and it was not possible to conduct any less-
intrusive, field sobriety tests. The invasion that the search 
would entail, while clearly a search and a bodily invasion, 
was commonplace and involved virtually no risk, trauma, 
or pain to Appellant. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. at 761, 
quoting Schmerber, 384 US. at 771. The test was 
performed at a hospital by trained medical personnel. 
Under these circumstances, the need to conduct the search 
outweighed the invasion that the search would entail. 
Schmerber's clear indication test was satisfied. 
Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient. 
[*19] First, he cites Trooper Haines' testimony that he 
"had no proof that Appellant was driving under the 
influence. Haines' actual testimony was that he had no 
proof of intoxication beyond the odor of an alcoholic 
beverage in the vehicle. 
Next, Appellant contends that the discovery of an odor 
of alcohol in Appellant's automobile does not necessarily 
mean that Appellant had been drinking alcohol. Of course 
this is true, but neither the law officers nor this Court view 
each fact in isolation. Rather, such determinations are 
based on facts and circumstances collectively and as they 
comprise the totality of the circumstances. 
Finally, Appellant argues that Trooper Sherrod was 
not close enough to determine that the odor of alcohol, 
which he detected on Appellant's person, was from 
Appellant's breath. Again, while this claim may be true 
enough, it is another fact that is not properly considered in 
isolation. 
Under Appellant's scenario, he would have the 
troopers - and this Court in review - reason that another 
person sat in Appellant's vehicle immediately before 
Appellant's last excursion, spilled alcohol into the vehicle 
as well as onto Appellant's clothing and then left; that 
Appellant [*20] was shortly thereafter the innocent victim 
of a serious two-car accident; and that Trooper Sherrod 
smelled only the result of the alcohol spill onto Appellant's 
person or clothing when he approached Appellant at the 
hospital. 
While such a scenario is not impossible, the question 
before the trial court and this court on review is whether 
the law officers acted reasonably in concluding that 
unlawful activity probably occurred. State v. George 
(1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 325, 329, 544 N.E.2d 640, quoting 
Illinois v. Gates, 462 US. at 235. Probable cause does not 
require certainty, but rather invokes a question of 
probabilities - a probability that criminal activity has taken 
place. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 235. In this case, 
the probability that Appellant had been driving his 
automobile while under the influence of alcohol was 
sufficient to support the decision of the state troopers to 
request a blood-alcohol test and to permit the results of 
such test into evidence. 
Accordingly, the first assignment of error is overruled. 
Assignment of Error No. 2 
"The trial court erred by sentencing appellant to the 
maximum term of [*21 ] five years imprisonment when the 
sentence was imposed for two offenses arising out of a 
single incident, and the court imposed the maximum prison 
term for the offense of the highest degree." 
Page 6 
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In the second assignment of error, Appellant 
challenges the imposition of the maximum term of 
imprisonment by the trial court because the trial court 
focused solely on the serious physical harm to the victim, 
and failed to analyze and adequately address all of the 
seriousness factors contained in R.C. 2929J2(B). 
Appellant makes three arguments regarding his contention. 
Appellant first cites to R.C. 2929.12(B)(2) and argues 
that the fact that the victim suffered serious physical harm 
cannot establish that the offender's conduct is more serious 
than conduct normally constituting the offense. This is so, 
he claims, because the causing of serious physical harm is 
an essential element of the crime for which he was 
convicted, aggravated vehicular assault. See R. C. 2903.08. 
This argument is without merit. R.C. 2901.01(A)(5) 
defines serious physical harm to persons as including 
"any of the following:" (Emphasis added.) [*22] 
"(a) Any mental illness or condition of such gravity as 
would normally require hospitalization or prolonged 
psychiatric treatment; 
(b) Any physical harm that carries a substantial risk of 
death; 
(c) Any physical harm that involves some permanent 
incapacity, whether partial or total, or that involves some 
temporary, substantial incapacity; 
(d) Any physical harm that involves some permanent 
disfigurement or that involves some temporary, serious 
disfigurement; 
(e) Any physical harm that involves acute pain of such 
duration as to result in substantial suffering or that involves 
any degree of prolonged or intractable pain." 
The trial judge indicated in his journal entry that the 
injuries suffered by the victim in this case were "life-
threatening" and will cause her to be "permanently 
impaired." The record demonstrates that the victim 
suffered two broken femurs and had bars inserted into her 
legs to replace them, a broken knee cap, cracked pubic 
bone, cracked tail bone, broken nose, two broken wrists, 
broken ribs, and two collapsed lungs. She takes medication 
for pain, sleep, anxiety, depression and thyroid problems. 
The injuries suffered by the victim in this case [*23] met 
not only one of the statutory factors, but at least four. The 
trial judge could reasonably conclude that such injuries 
were more extensive and serious than what is minimally or 
normally required to constitute the element of serious 
physical harm for aggravated vehicular assault. 
Next, while Appellant concedes that the trial court 
entered findings that the minimum sentence would demean 
the seriousness of Appellant's conduct and also that 
Appellant had committed the worst form of the offense, he 
argues that the trial court erred in failing to "adequately 
articulate" its reasons for imposing the maximum sentence. 
In a case such as this, Ohio requires that a trial court must 
set forth its reasons for imposing the maximum prison 
term. R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(d); State v. Edmonson (1999), 86 
OhioSt.3d324, 328, 1999 Ohio 110, 715N.E.2dl3L The 
record reveals that the trial court did so. 
The trial judge stated at the sentencing hearing that he 
considered the impact of this accident upon the victim and 
found the injuries suffered by the victim to be "very 
disturbing." She was trapped for an hour and a half in her 
car and suffered serious injuries that will leave [*24] her 
incapacitated for the rest of her life. The judge also 
considered the fact that Appellant must have consumed a 
large quantity of alcohol in order to have such a high blood 
level and that he had a prior conviction for driving under 
the influence of alcohol. 
In addition, the trial judge indicated that he reviewed 
a presentence investigation report and a statement from the 
victim, which was read into the record at the sentencing 
hearing. That statement addressed the physical, emotional, 
and financial impact of this matter upon the victim and her 
family. On the night of the accident, the victim was on her 
way to work. She had not been able to work since the 
accident. Her family was forced to depend upon the aid of 
extended family. Following the accident, she faced nearly 
a year of surgeries and rehabilitation before she could even 
walk again. Her three young children, ages twelve, ten and 
two, suffered from the results of the accident as well. The 
victim still could not carry her small child. Thus, the trial 
judge adequately set forth his reasons for imposing the 
maximum sentence. 
Finally, Appellant asserts error in the failure of the 
trial court to address the seriousness factors [*25] of R.C. 
2929.12(B). While the trial court is required to consider 
these factors, the sentencing judge is not required to use 
specific language or make specific findings on the record 
in order to demonstrate consideration of the applicable 
seriousness factors of AC. 2929.12. State v. Arnett (2000), 
88 Ohio St.3d208, 215, 2000 Ohio 302, 724 N.K2d 793. 
Instead, "a rote recitation" that the applicable factors were 
considered has been held to suffice. Id. 
The trial judge indicated in his sentencing entry that he 
considered the record, oral statements, the purposes and 
principles of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11, the need for 
deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation and restitution and 
"the seriousness and recidivism factors relevant to the 
offense and offender pursuant to R.C. 2929.12[.]u 
(Emphasis added.) Thus, the trial court complied with 
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Arnett. Moreover, Appellant has proffered no reason why 
any of the other factors in R.C. 2929.12 are specifically 
relevant to a consideration of his sentence. Accordingly, 
the record demonstrates that the [*26] trial court properly 
considered the relevant sentencing factors set forth in R. C. 
2929 J 2(B). 
Appellant's second assignment of error is overruled. 
III. 
Appellant's two assignments of error are overruled. 
The judgment of the Wayne County Court of Common 
Pleas is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
WILLIAM G. BATCHELDER, Judge. 
FOR THE COURT 
BAIRD, P. J. 
WHITMORE, J. 
CONCUR 
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EVALUATION OF BLOOD-ETHANOL PROFILES AFTER 
CONSUMPTION OF ALCOHOL TOGETHER WITH 
A LARGE MEAL 
A.W. JONES1* and A. NERI2 
ABSTRACT 
Sixteen healthy men drank 1.43 g ethanol per kg of body weight as Swedish aquavit, 
export beer, and cognac during 90 min together with a 3-course meal. Capillary (finger-
tip) blood was drawn on 8 occasions starting at 0-10 min after the end of drinking and 
blood alcohol concentration (BAC) was determined by an enzymatic method. The peak 
BAG ranged from 0.97-1.41 mg/ml (mean 1.20 mg/ml) and this occurred 78 min after the 
end of drinking (range 0-230 min). The mean rate of disappearance of alcohol from blood 
(0) was 0.16 mg/ml/h (range 0.13-0.21) and the apparent volume of distribution of ethanol 
was 0.795 l/kg (range 0.64-0.93). The mean rate of ethanol elimination from the body 
was 128 mg/kg/h (range 99-160). The BAC increased on the average by 0.17 mg/ml (range 
0.0-0.45 mg/ml) before reaching the maximum level. During the absorption phase, the 
BAC had attained on the average 83%, 91 %, 95% and 98% of the final peak BAC within 
5 min, 45 min, 109 min and 175 min, respectively, after ingestion. These results suggest 
that part of the dose of alcohol is rapidly absorbed into the blood despite the presence 
of undigested food in the stomach. However, the absorption of the remaining dose of 
alcohol might proceed for several hours. 
R£SUM£ 
Seize hommes en bonne sante ont bu de I'ethanol dans une proportion de 1.43 g pour 
chaque kg de poids corporel durant une periode de 90 minutes tout en consommant 
un repas a trois services. L'ethanol provenait ou bien d'aquavit suddois, ou de bldre 
Imports ou encore du cognac. Une 6chantillon de sang capillaire (obtenu du bout du 
dolgt) a ete prgleve a 8 reprises en commengant 0 2 10 minutes aprds la fin de la con-
sommatlon d'alcool. Une m^thode enzymatlque a ete utilisSe pour mesurer ia concen-
tration sanguine d'alcool. La concentration maximale d'alcool dans le sang variait de 
0.97 d 1.41 mg/mL (moyenne de 1.20 mg/mL) et cette concentration a ete observ6e en 
moyenne 78 min apr6s la fin de la consommation d'alcool (ecart de 0 a 230 min). La 
Vitesse moyenne de disparition d'alcool dans le sang (jS) 6talt 0.16 mg/mL/h (ecart de 
0.13 d 0.21) et le volume apparent de distribution de i'6thanol 6tait 0.795 L/kg (6cart 
de 0.64 a 0.93). La vitesse moyenne d'elimination de l'6thanol du corps humaln etait 
128 mg/kg/h (ecart de 99 a 160). La concentration sanguine d'alcool a augmente en 
moyenne de 0.17 mg/mL (6cart de 0.0 a 0.45 mg/mL) avant d'atteindre son maximum. 
Durant la phase d'absorption, la concentration sanguine d'alcool a atteint en moyenne 
83%, 91 %, 95% et 98% de la vaieur maximale finale et ce dans un d<§lai de 5 min, 45 min, 
109 min et 175 min, respectlvement, aprfcs la fin de la consommation d'alcool. Ces 
rgsultats demontrent qu'une partie de la dose d'alcool est rapidement absorb6e dans 
le sang m&me en presence de nourriture non digeree dans I'estomac. Cependant, I'ab-
sorption du restant de la dose d'alcool peut se poursuivre pour plusieurs heures. 
1. Department of Alcohol Toxicology, National Laboratory or Forensic Chemistry, University Hospital, 
581 85 Linkoping, Sweden. 
2. Department of Alcohol and Drug Addiction Research, Karolinska Institute, Stockholm, Sweden. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The absorption, distribution and elimination of ethanol1 depend on a multitude of 
genetic and environmental factors (1). The magnitude of inter- and intra-individual variations 
in the pharmacokinetic profile of ethanol is important when the BAC at the time of sampling 
is used to estimate the BAC at some earlier time, such as, at the time of driving. This 
procedure, called retrograde extrapolation, is a controversial practice because of the many 
unknown factors involved (2-4). Although much work has been done to establish the BAC 
time course in healthy volunteers after ingestion of a bolus dose on an empty stomach 
(5-10), the pharmacokinetics of ethanol under real-world drinking conditions has not been 
extensively studied (11-14). It is widely known that ingestion of food together with alcohol 
delays the emptying time of the stomach and slows the rate of absorption of alcohol into 
the portal blood (15,16). The resulting BAC profile follows a lower course with a smaller 
area under the curve, a lower peak BAC (C,mx) and the time of its occurrence (Tnuix) is 
also influenced compared with the same dose taken on an empty stomach (17). 
This paper deals with the absorption, distribution and metabolism of alcohol in healthy 
men after they ingested a moderate dose together with a large meal lasting for 90 min. 
Particular attention was given to the rate of increase in BAC after the end of drinking 
and before the maximum level was reached. 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
Subjects and conditions 
Sixteen policemen volunteered for this experiment. Their ages ranged from 31 to 54 y 
(mean 42), their body weights from 73 to 98 kg (mean 84) and their heights from 176 
to 198 cm (mean 183). All the subjects were accustomed to moderate drinking and in this 
study received 1.43 g/kg body weight. Three different alcoholic beverages were available 
and served in the following order; Swedish aquavit (31.8% w/v ethanol), atadoseof 150 ml/ 
70 kg; export beer containing 4.5% w/v ethanol (450 ml/70 kg) and cognac containing 
31.6% w/v ethanol (100 ml/70 kg). 
The experiment began at 5.00 p.m. and continued until the following day. The principal 
aim of the investigation was to record the signs and symptoms of hangover. The results 
of this study of hangover were reported in detail elsewhere (18). The present article focuses 
on inter-individual differences in the blood-ethanol profiles obtained. Four subjects took 
part in each experimental session and alcohol was served together with food. The condi-
tions were made as pleasant as possible in an attempt to reproduce an evening together with 
friends. The meal consisted of raw herrings, meatballs and potatoes, bread, butter and cheese 
followed with cold roast beef, potatoes, lettuce and tomatoes and finally ice cream, coffee, 
cream and sugar. The total caloric value of the meal was about 1900 kcal made up of 120 g 
carbohydrates, 90 g protein and 120 g fat. Twelve of the subjects smoked several cigarettes 
during the experiment. After finishing the meal, various tests of performance decrement 
were conducted or otherwise the subjects relaxed reading magazines. A meal of bread, cheese, 
cold meat, and coffee was served 5 hours after the experiment started. 
Blood sampling and determination of ethanol 
Specimens of capillary blood were obtained at approximately 5,45, 110, 170,225, 405, 
650 and 775 min after the end of drinking. For practical reasons, the times of sampling 
l. The words ethanol and alcohol arc used interchangeably in this article. 
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blood were not exactly the same for all subjects. Triplicate samples of capillary (fingertip) 
blood were taken at each time point and aliquots for determination of ethanol were measured 
with the aid of 100 /*! glass capillaries. The blood was diluted with 900 \x\ of saponin-
fluoride in autoanalyzer cups. The concentration of ethanol was determined by an enzymatic 
oxidation procedure as described in detail elsewhere (19,20). 
Evaluation of blood-ethanol profiles 
Blood-ethanol profiles were plotted for each subject. The peak BAC (Cmx) and the time 
of its occurrence (Tm;lx) were recorded directly from the curves. The pharmacokinetics 
of ethanol were calculated as described by Widmark (21). In brief, a vStraight line was 
fitted to the rectilinear portion of the BAC time profile after the post-absorptive phase 
was well established. The slope of the disappearance phase corresponds to Widmark's 
/3-slopc. The y-intercept of the regression line represents the theoretical BAC obtained 
if the dose administered was absorbed and distributed in the body immediately at the start 
of drinking (C0). The x-intercept of the regression line (h0) is an estimate of the time 
needed for complete removal of ethanol from the body neglecting the curvilinear portion 
of the curve that begins at a BAC below about 0.1 mg/ml. The ratio of dose (g/kg) to 
C,> is the apparent volume of distribution of ethanol known also as Widmark's r-factor, 
or the ratio of alcohol in the body to alcohol in the blood at zero time. 
The rise in BAC after taking the first sample of blood (0-10 min post-drinking) until 
reaching the peak BAC was noted for each subject. The BAC at various times during the 
absorption phase (C,) was expressed as a percentage of the observed peak BAC (Cnux) 
for each of the subjects. Note that those subjects that had already reached their peak BAC 
were not included when average values of (Ct/Cmilx) were computed at later time points. 
The quantity of alcohol (g) absorbed and distributed in the body at the time the first sample 
of blood was taken between 0 and 10 min after the meal, was calculated as follows: 
Alcohol (g) « [(BAC/0.84) x TBW] + [(dosc/hj X t] 
In the above equation, BAC (mg/ml) is the concentration of alcohol in capillary bloi 
at the time of interest (t) measured from the start of drinking* 0.84 is the fraction of wate 
in whole blood in mass/volume units (22), TBW is the volume of total body water (liters) 
for each individual subject. The dose of alcohol administered is given by (1.43 x body 
weight) and h0 is the estimated time to zero BAC, Note that the ratio dose/hu is the rate 
of ethanol metabolism from the whole body. TBW was derived from a multiple regression 
equation with age (y), body weight (kg) and height (cm) of each subject as the indepen-
dent variables (23); 
TBW (1) = 2.447 - 0.09516 Age + 0.1074 height + 0.3362 weight 
RESULTS 
Figs I and 2 show the concentration-time profiles of ethanol for each of the 16 subjects. 
The absorption/distribution phases differ widely despite the standardized drinking conditions 
and similar intake of food. Subjects 6 and 16 had already reached their peak BAC by the 
time the first sample of blood was taken between 0-10 min after drinking. By contrast, 
subject 15 did not reach a peak BAC until 230 min after the end of drinking. Subjects 
1, 3 and 5 showed an alcohol concentration plateau and the BAC remained more or less 
unchanged for 2-3 hours. Subject 12 vomited 150 min after the start of drinking or 60 min 
after end of drinking. 
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Figure I. Concentration-time profiles of ethanol in capillary blood of healthy men (1-8) after they consumed 
1.43 g/kg ethanol as mixed drinks together with a meal lasting 90 min. 
168 
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 
CO 
E 
< 
cc 
h-z 
LU O 
2 
o 
o 
o o 
—I 
< 
I 
o 
o 
_ l 
DD 
«.v -
1.5 -
1.0-
0.5 -
0 ^ 
^ \ 
s \ 
\ 
{ r , , 
11 
\^ ^^ _^  
• > ^ > # . i 
d.V • 
1.5-
1.0-
0 .5 -
0 < 
\ 
\ 
V 
s \ ^s ^ 
> 
12 
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 0 2 4 6 10 12 14 
0 2 4 6 6 10 12 14 
«j.u -
1.5-
1.0-
0.5-
0 < 
s. 
N 
S 
s 
\ 1 - - i • • • - , 
15 
• i • • - i • •• i • <>• 1 
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 
TIME FROM START OF DRINKING, h 
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TABLE 1 
AMOUNT OF ALCOHOL ABSORBED AND DISTRIBUTED INTO THE BODY AT THE TIME T H E FIRST 
SAMPLE OF BLOOD WAS TAKEN AT 0-10 MIN POST-DRINKING. HEALTHY MEN DRANK 1.43 G/KG 
ETHANOL TOGETHER WITH A SUBSTANTIAL MEAL LASTING FOR 90 MIN. 
PARAMETER 
Alcohol ingested (g) 
TBW (liters)* 
Ethnnol turnover (g/h) 
BAC (mg/ml)# 
Alcohol absorbed (g) 
Per cent absorbed 
MEAN 
118 
46.2 
10.6 
1.03 
73.4 
61.6 
SD 
14.4 
3.46 
1.77 
0.19 
11.4 
8.7 
CV% 
12.2 
7.4 
16.6 
18.4 
15.5 
14. t 
RANGE 
104 - 151 
42 - 54 
8.4 - 14.6 
0 . 7 6 - 1.41 
51 - 96 
48 - 74 
* Total body water was derived from a nomogram based on age, weight and height, ti Blood-alcohol concentration 0-10 min 
post-drinking. 
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Figure 3 . Percent of peak BAC reached at various time points during the absorption phase, N = 16 subjects 
drank 1.43 g/kg ethanol together with food. N = the number of subjects included in calculating mean values. 
At various times during absorption, 2 , 10, 14 and 15 subjects respectively had already reached their peak BAC. 
Despite the presence of food in the stomach, an initial rapid absorption of alcohol occurred 
in all subjects. The mean BAC was 1.03 mg/ml (range 0.76-1.41) when the first blood sample 
was drawn 0-10 min post-drinking. Table 1 shows that on the average 61.6% (range 48-74) 
of the dose of alcohol consumed has already become absorbed and distributed in t he blood 
within 040 min of finishing the meal. The remaining part of the alcohol consumed is then 
absorbed much more slowly and without necessarily increasing the BAC. Figure 3 shows the 
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TABLE 2 
BLOOD-ALCOHOL PARAMETERS DERIVED FROM THE BAC PROFILES SHOWN IN FIGS. 1 AND 2 
SD = STANDARD DEVIATION, CV = COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION, N « 16 SUBJECTS 
PARAMETER 
Peak BAC (mg/ml) 
Time to peaktf 
BAC rise <mg/ml)t 
C0 (mg/ml) 
Widmark's /3-slope (mg/ml/h) 
Distribution volume (1/kg) 
Time to reach zero BAC (h) 
Rate of alcohol turnover (mg/kg/h) 
MEAN 
1.20 
78 
0.17 
1.80 
0.16 
0.795 
11.38 
128 
SD 
0.136 
* 
* 
0.160 
0.025 
0.069 
1.56 
17.3 
CV 
11.3 
* 
* 
8.9 
15.4 
8.7 
13.6 
13.5 
RANGE 
0.97- 1.41 
0 -230 
0 - 0.45 
1.54 -. 2.22 
0.13- 0.21 
0.64 - 0.93 
8.9 - 14.4 
99 - 160 
ti Time (ruin) lo peak is not normally distributed and can take only fixed values, t Measured from the lime of obtaining 
the first blood sample. 
rate of rise in BAC in relation to the observed peak BAC at various times after the end 
of drinking. Evidently, about 80% of the final peak BAC was reached between 0-10 min 
after the end of drinking. The blood-alcohol parameters when alcohol was taken together 
with food are shown in Table 2. These values were derived from linear regression analysis 
of the concentration-time profiles in Figs, 1 and 2. The broken diagonal lines were used 
in this analysis and the correlation coefficients were greater than 0.99. 
DISCUSSION 
The blood-alcohol concentration at the lime of offence cannot be reported with certainty 
unless a specimen of blood is available for quantitative determination of ethanol. Neverthe-
less, based on information about the drinking scenario, such as the duration of intake, 
the quantity and kind of alcoholic beverages consumed, whether the individual ate any 
food during the drinking, and the time of last drink in relation to the time of driving, scientists 
can assist the court in reaching a decision about whether or not the BAC was above or 
below the legal limit at the time of offence. 
In the present work, the concentration-time profiles of ethanol showed appreciable inte: 
subject variation. The peak BAC ranged from 0.97-1.41 mg/ml and the time of iu 
occurrence ranged from 0-230 min after the end of the meal. The faster the absorption, 
as reflected in an early occurring peak, the higher the concentration of alcohol in the blood. 
The average rate of disappearance of alcohol from blood was 0.16 mg/ml/h (range 
0,13-0.21) and this agrees well with the values normally cited in forensic case work of 
0.15 mg/ml/h (range 0.10-0.20) (24). However, if the 0-slope is computed using the 
concentration-time data immediately after reaching Cmax, abnormally low results are 
obtained. This underscores the need to construct the complete BAC time-profile in order 
to make a reliable pharmacokinetic analysis. Calculation of 0-slopes without knowledge 
about the shape of the entire BAC time-profile can lead to erroneous results. This might 
explain, at least in part, the wide range of j3 values reported in the literature (25,26). The 
broken diagonal lines in Figs. 1 and 2 show the segments of the post-peak phase used 
in the calculation of 0-values. 
The present work suggests that when ethanol is ingested together with food the absorption 
occurs in two phases. This supports the conclusions of Schultz et al (27) who advanced 
a two-pool hypothesis based on extensive experiments with fed and fasted rats. One part 
of the dose of alcohol becomes trapped by food particles and is not immediately available 
for absorption through the stomach wall. Another part of the dose, corresponding to the 
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*'unbound pool", is rapidly absorbed just as if the stomach was empty. This explains the 
initial rapid rise in BAC reaching about 80% of the final peak concentration within 0-10 min 
after the end of eating and drinking. However, the bound-pool of alcohol is absorbed slowly 
and the BAC either increases gradually over the next few hours, remains unchanged, or 
even decreases slowly. Direct support for this hypothesis was obtained by monitoring the 
rate of absorption of alcohol from the stomach and the duodenum at fixed intervals after 
ingestion of an experimental test meal of alcohol (0.8 g/kg) and nutrients (28). 
Note that a decreasing BAC does not necessarily signify the existence of the post-
absorptive state. Instead this indicates that the rate of absorption of alcohol into the systemic 
circulation is equal to or less than the rate of distribution and elimination of alcohol from 
the circulating blood. The wide inter-individual differences in the rate of absorption of 
alcohol might depend on differences in the size and shape of the stomach or the physiology 
of gastric emptying (1). Uptake of alcohol into the portal blood occurs at a much faster 
rate if the pylorus valve opens to release stomach contents into the large surface area of 
the duodenum. Food in the stomach delays gastric emptying and will accordingly retard 
the rate of absorption of alcohol into the portal blood (29). The Cmax and Tnwx parameters 
might also depend to some extent on the composition of the food in the stomach (fat, protein, 
carbohydrate) and even the particular alcohol formulation, such as, intake of beer, wines, 
spirits, or cocktails (30-33). Although subject 12 vomited 60 min post-drinking this event 
had no appreciable effect on the BAC time profile compared with the other subjects. This 
might suggest that most of the alcohol had already been absorbed from the gut at the time 
of vomiting. Smoking seems to delay gastric emptying and this might have contributed 
to the prolonged absorption phase for some subjects in this study (34). 
The results presented in this paper emphasise the need for caution when engaging in 
retrograde extrapolation of BAC for legal purposes. In some individuals, the absorption 
of alcohol might proceed for several hours after the end of drinking. However, despite 
this prolonged absorption phase, about 80% of the final peak BAC seems to be reached 
within 0-10 minutes after the end of eating and drinking. This is an important observation. 
The problems and uncertainties associated with back estimation of BAC could be avoided 
if drinking and driving statutes were defined as the BAC existing at the time of sampling 
as the relevant figure for prosecution. Until the necessary legislation is formulated, forensic 
scientists are obliged to provide the court with expert opinions on the BAC at the time 
of offence. The problems and pitfalls associated with retrograde extrapolation arc not new. 
More experiments are needed to establish the concentration-time profiles of ethanol under 
real-world drinking. 
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Uncertainty in the Results of Breath-Alcohol Analyses 
Dominick A. Labianca 
Department of Chemistry, Brooklyn College of The City University of New York, Brooklyn, NY 11210 
I would like to address some of the points made by Robert 
Q. Thompson in his article "The Thermodynamics of Drunk 
Driving" (J). It is no trivial task to calculate from first 
principles the in vivo postabsorptive blood- to breath-alcohol 
ratio (hereinafter termed "blood/breath ratio", and denoting 
the ratio of blood-alcohol concentration [BAC] to breath-
alcohol concentration [BrAC]) and its associated uncertainty for 
motor vehicle operators arrested for driving under the influence 
(DUI) of alcohol. Thompson is to be commended for his 
elegant analysis and development of this theoretical model. I 
do, however, have reservations concerning the limited scope 
and basis of some of Thompson's conclusions, and offer 
arguments in support of a broader perspective. These arguments 
address the impact of the state of alcohol absorption of DUI 
arrestees on the results of their breath-alcohol tests and 
statistical analysis of experimental blood/breath ratio data. 
Also considered is questionable scientific methodology 
characterizing some of the work cited by Thompson. 
Blood/Breath Ratios and the State of Alcohol 
Absorption 
Thompson's theoretical model assumes complete equili-
bration between BAC and BrAC. Therefore, the assumption 
of postabsorption necessarily applies to his model, and his 
comparisons between calculated and experimental blood/ 
breath ratios are restricted to the postabsorptive state. Given 
this condition, Thompson initially states that a blood/breath 
ratio of 1880:1 should be employed by breath-alcohol ana-
lyzers instead of the standard 2100:1 currently utilized in the 
USA and elsewhere. His selection of 1880:1—which is the 
difference between his calculated mean blood/breath ratio of 
2350:1 and 2.33 SD, where SD (standard deviation) is 200—is 
derived from normal, one-tailederror analysis involving 99% of 
the postabsorptive DUI population. He subsequently points 
out that normal, one-tailed error analysis of Dubowskis 
experimental postabsorptive blood/breath ratio data (number 
of blood/breath pairs: 393; mean: 2280:1; SD: 241.5) {2) 
"suggests" a lower limit blood/breath ratio of 1720:1, which, 
compared to 1880:1 and, more significantly, to 2100:1, 
would result in fewer DUI convictions stemming from over-
estimates of RkC 
One-Tailed vs Two-Tailed Normal Error Analysis 
One of several points I would make concerning 
Thompsons position is that the lower limit blood/breath ratio 
he cited for Dubowskis postabsorptive data (2) should be 
about 3.5% lower, or 1660:1, based on a two-tailed normal 
error analysis. (A similar reduction can be considered in con-
nection with Thompsons calculated lower limit ratio of 
1880:1.) A ratio of 1660:1 is the minimum ratio derived from 
Dubowski s data that would characterize the central 99% of 
the postabsorptive DUI population. This level of confidence 
is consistent with the statistical approach and recommendation 
of Rainey for meeting the "beyond-a-reasonable doubt" 
requirement for convictions in criminal proceedings, and 
reflects standard clinical laboratory practice as well (3). It is 
also somewhat more conservative than the 99.9% level of 
confidence cited by Jones for direct BAC analyses in Sweden 
(4), which he also recommends for breath-alcohol analyses 
in all jurisdictions (5) 
The following hypothetical scenarios reflect the signifi-
cance of a two-tailed analysis of postabsorptive blood/breath 
ratios. In the first, a DUI arrestee has a BAC of 0.10%, based 
on a breath test administered in a jurisdiction whose "legal 
limit" is 0.08%. At 1720:1, this individual's adjusted, trun-
catedBAC is an inculpatory 0.08%, whereas at 1660:1, it is 
an exculpatory 0.07%. (It should be noted that truncation, 
or deletion of the third decimal place, is the standard practice 
in law enforcement for reporting BACs [6].) In the second 
scenario, the test subject has an actual, inculpatory BAC of 
0.11% in a jurisdiction with a legal limit of 0.10%. How-
ever, at a blood/breath ratio of 2900:1, which is the upper 
limit of the 99% level of confidence derived from Dubowski's 
postabsorptive data {2j, the adjusted BAC would be an 
exculpatory 0.07%. 
The Absorptive and Postabsorptive States 
Thompsons model is predicated on postabsorption, 
but, in fact, any particular DUI arrestee is not necessarily 
postabsorptive at the time of the breath test. Therefore, 
Thompson's suggestion that DUI arrestees should be evaluated 
on the basis of the "lower fixed [blood/breath ratio] value of 
1720"—which, as noted above, is derived from Dubowskis 
data (2)—can be discriminatory. In this regard, Labianca and 
Simpson (7) have emphasized that the magnitude of the 
blood/breath ratio is dependent on the time elapsed after the 
end of drinking (2, 8-10) and the absorptive state, which is 
characterized by significant deviations from Dubowskis 
postabsorptive mean blood/breath ratio (2), is distinguished 
by a widely varying time frame. For fasting subjects, for 
example, the time-to-peak BAC typically ranges from 0.5 to 
2.0 h, with an average of 0.75 to 1.35 h, depending on dose 
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and time of last meal—whereas for nonfasting subjects, the 
range is 1.0 to 6.0 h, and the average is 1.06 to 2.12 h (Jfj. 
Based on lognormal statistical analysis of the data of 
Giguiere and Simpson (12), Labianca and Simpson (7) de-
termined a mean absorptive state blood/breath ratio of 
1836:1, with a statistical range of 1128:1 to 2989:1 for 99% 
of the population. These data, coupled with the results of 
Heifer (10), which are also consistent with the conclusions 
of Normann et ai. (13), demonstrate unequivocally that DUI 
arrestees in the absorptive state are at a significantly greater 
disadvantage than postabsorptive arrestees when undergoing 
breath-alcohol analysis. Furthermore, this conclusion rein-
forces similar arguments put forth by Dubowski (2) and 
Simpson (14-16). 
An additional point for consideration involving 
Thompsons assumption of postabsorption for DUI arrestees 
is his determination that, based on the calculated postab-
sorptive blood/breath ratio of 2350:1 (SD: 200) cited above, 
11% of the drinking/driving population undergoing breath-
alcohol analysis would be characterized by overestimated 
BACs. Thompson appropriately based this determination on 
a one-tailed, normal error analysis because, in this case, those 
DUI arrestees whose blood/breath ratios are below 2100:1 
constitute the sole consideration. They would comprise that 
portion of the postabsorptive drinking/driving population 
whose BACs would be overestimated by breath testing. 
Thompson's 11% estimate, however, is in contrast to the per-
centage arrived at by Simpson (15, 17), who, using the same 
straightforward statistical approach employed by Thompson, 
showed that 23% of postabsorptive subjects would have actual 
BACs overestimated by breath testing, based on Dubowski's 
postabsorptive blood/breath ratio data (2). 
It is interesting in this regard that, at the time Simpson 
documented his conclusions, members of the forensic science 
community were critical of his mathematical approach to 
calculating the percentage of overestimates for test subjects 
in the postabsorptive state (18, 19). I would hasten to add, 
however, that it is particularly noteworthy that, in addition 
to Simpson's sound scientific rebuttals of these criticisms (20, 
21), Thompson independently applied the same mathematical 
approach in his work. This situation suggests that published 
work focusing on forensic alcohol analysis must be carefully 
scrutinized to ensure that proper scientific methodology was 
used to arrive at the documented conclusions. Some examples 
in this regard are addressed below within the context of 
Thompson's work. 
Questionable Scientific Methodology 
Apparently, Thompson was unaware of instances of 
inappropriate scientific methodology involving certain of the 
peer-reviewed literature he cited. One instance involves the 
work of Jones and Andersson (22), who reported a mean 
time-adjusted blood/breath ratio ± SD of 2407 ±213, based 
on a study of 799 DUI arrestees assumed to be postabsorptive. 
A fundamental flaw of this work is that the single evidential 
breath test for each subject was aborted for unexplained reasons. 
The possibility cannot be ruled out, therefore, that the 
aborted breath tests generated artificially low data, so that 
the reported blood/breath ratios are falsely high. 
In addition, Jones and Andersson's claim that the use of 
modern breath-alcohol analyzers may account, in part, for post-
absorptive blood/breath ratio data differing from correspond-
ing data obtained with older instruments, is unsupportable 
because instrumental and calibration errors are insignificant 
compared to blood/breath ratio variability and other sources 
of error (16, 17, 23). 
The single evidential breath test characterizing Jones 
and Andersson's work (22) is also problematic because it is 
inconsistent with Jones' own recommendation for duplicate 
sampling (5, 24) and with the recognized quality assurance 
practice of duplicate sampling endorsed by the National 
Safety Council Committee on Alcohol and Other Drugs (6). 
Timing of Blood and Breath Sampling 
Another questionable aspect of the experimental protocol 
of Jones and Andersson (22) is that venous blood was sampled 
an average of 30 min (range: 6 to 60 min) after the single 
exhalation breath test in each case. Given that BAC «= BrAC 
and that the proportionality constant at any given time is 
the blood/breath ratio, denoted by BBR, then in order for 
the equation BAC = BBR X BrAC to accurately reflect the 
relationship between BrAC and coexisting BAC, the latter 
two concentrations must be measured essentially simulta-
neously (8, 10, 12, 25). 
Rates of Alcohol Elimination and Absorption 
Jones and Andersson's use of a mean rate of alcohol elimi-
nation of 0.019%/h (22) to correct for the time difference 
between breath and blood sampling is also questionable. This 
mean (SD: 0.0049%/h) is based on the analyses of two blood 
samples taken from more than 1000 individuals (26). Samples 
were taken an average of 68 min apart (range: 30 to 120 min), 
with 75% of the double samples taken between 47 and 84 min 
apart. Such protocol is in contrast to the pioneering work of 
Widmark with alcohol elimination rates, which involved both 
the analysis of at least nine blood samples taken over a 230-
min postabsorptive period and the application of the method 
of least squares to the data (27). Moreover, broader elimina-
tion rate ranges and greater SDs than those of Jones and 
Andersson (26) were cited by Dubowski (2) for studies also 
involving the testing of two samples. One of these studies, for 
example, reported a range of elimination rates of 0.001%/h 
to 0.08%/h for 1512 subjects, with a mean and SD of nearly 
0.02%/h and 0.01%/h, respectively. 
The assumption of postabsorption by Jones and 
Andersson (22) for the DUI suspects they evaluated is another 
of the problems they failed to address (22, 26). If a DUI 
suspect is in the absorptive phase of alcohol metabolism, then 
the hourly rate of elimination used by Jones and Andersson 
(26) fails to take into account substantial changes in BAC 
that can occur during active alcohol absorption. On an empty 
stomach, for example, Jones et al. (28) found the rise in BAC 
to average 0.10%/h (range: 0.03%/h to 0.30%/h). Moreover, 
analysis of data reported by Dubowski (2) shows a range of 
absorption rates of about 0.05%/h to as high as 0.60%/h and 
an average of about 0.15%/h, the latter having also been 
determined by Simpson (29). 
Rates of alcohol absorption on a full stomach, on the 
other hand, tend to be lower but are, nevertheless, significant. 
Analysis of the data of Jones and Neri (30), derived from their 
study of subjects who ingested mixed drinks with a meal, 
reveals absorption rates ranging from approximately 0.02%/h 
to 0.08%/h, with a mean of about 0.05%/h. 
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Conclusion 
It must be emphasized that Thompsons work is a step 
in the right direction. Of particular significance, however, is 
that any discussion of error in breath-alcohol tests cannot be 
restricted solely to a consideration of postabsorptive error; 
all sources of error must be considered. Certainly, with 
regard to a key source of error addressed in this article (the 
variability of the blood/breath ratio), it is typically not known 
in a D U I case if equilibrium, and therefore postabsorption, 
exists at the time of the breath test. Unless the existence of 
equilibrium can be established by objective means for each 
test subject, it can only be assumed that the subject is still 
absorbing alcohol. That assumption is required if strict ad-
herence to a fundamental tenet of American jurisprudence 
is to be maintained, namely, that defendants must be afforded 
the benefit of the doubt in criminal proceedings. This means 
that the correction factor for 99% confidence limits is 46% (7) 
rather than the 18% consistent with the use of the lower limit 
blood/breath ratio of 1720:1 stemming from Dubowski s 
postabsorptive data (2) and cited by Thompson (7), or the 
2 1 % associated with the corresponding adjusted blood/breath 
ratio of 1660:1 stemming from the two-tailed analysis de-
scribed previously. 
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LANDS W E M A review of alcohol clearance in humans ALCOHOL 15(2) 147-160,1998 —The level ot blood or brain 
alcohol is considered to influence alcohol ingestion by causing subjective perceptions or neural activations that are reinforc-
ing or rewarding Alcohol-dependent people may try to maintain some desired tissue level drinking to replace the millimolar 
levels that were cleared from the blood by metabolism rhe biomedical literature describes many approaches to understand 
ing the role of blood alcohol levels in human physiology and behavior, and this review examines some of the published re-
sults rhev include the general kinetics of intake and removal of beverage alcohol as well as the characteristics of many differ 
ent catalysts that can interact with alcohol Because ingested alcohol creates blood levels that are a 1000 fold greater than 
those normall) experienced during abstinence, ethanol may impose itself as an alternate substrate for the many oxidoreduc-
tascs that act physiologically on other endogenous alcohols Many enzymes that can act on millimolar ethanol have been iso-
lated and their structural genes are sequenced Unfortunately the genetic sequence does not indicate thcphysiological mate-
rial upon which the translated gene product may act In a sense the set of enzymes with catalytic sites occupied bv millimolar 
ethanol during alcohol drinking might constructively be regarded as 'orphan gene products" whose physiological role re-
mains to be clarified This review is designed to indicate some of what is known, what is not known, and what needs to be 
known to impro\e the interpretations regarding adaptations to beverage alcohol and the ability of millimolar levels of alcohol 
to dimmish dysphoria The dysphoria may be influenced by ethanol, by ethanol metabolites, or by altered metabolism of cur 
rentlv unspecified endogenous substrates A major challenge is to evaluate the multiple alternative variables within a context 
that stimulates curiosity and encourages quantitative tests of the relative contribution of each variable to the overall physiol-
og\ of an individual Published by Elsevier Science Inc 
Acetate Adenosine Alcohol clearance Alcohol dehydrogenase Alcohol dependence Binding site 
Blood alcohol level Catalytic site Enzyme kinetics Millimolar alcohol Orphan genes Withdrawal 
THIS review ot alcohol metabolism was stimulated by a puz-
zling comment in the literature In evaluating a report by 
Craft et al (19) on the successful use of intravenous ethanol 
during alcohol detoxification, McMilIen (83) asked "why 
would trivial blood levels of alcohol rapidly eliminate the 
signs and symptoms of alcohol withdrawal7" Clearly, a conun-
drum evolved from the authors' description of the desired 
goal for blood alcohol levels (BAL) during treatment as "non-
detectable " and a paradox evolved from the reported clinical 
efficacy of a BAL below the range commonly regarded to af-
tect recognized neurotransmitter-receptor systems, such as 
glutamatergic receptors (74) What receptor(s) could have de 
tected and mediated the reported clinically beneficial action 
of alcohol in this situation9 At what BAL do people with 
physical dependency upon alcohol begin to sense (and exhibit 
to their physicians) forms of dysphoria during abstinence, and 
what BAL do they attain when they dimmish that dysphona 
by drinking m the morning9 In moderate drinkers who do not 
develop dependency, does some threshold BAL initiate a "sa-
tiety" signal9 In approaching this area of uncertainty about 
the effects of low BAL, several aspects of alcohol pharmaco-
kinetics need to be assembled to validate the apparent evi-
dence for effective low BAL values 
This review examines whether the BAL predicted from 
current pharmacokinetic concepts and data fits the limited de 
scnption provided by Craft et al (19) What were the proba-
ble ("nondelegable") BAL values in that study, and what 
metabolic factors maintain them9 Do BAL kinetics for in-
fused alcohol differ from those for ingested alcohol9 The m 
fused 50 ml/h of 10% (v/v) ethanol in a 24-h penod compares 
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of Health, Willco Building Suite 400,6000 Executive Boulevard MSC 7003, Bethesda,MD 20892 7003 Tel (301) 443-0276, Fax (301)594-0673 
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with eight drinks, but the BAL was very much lower than ex-
pected when eight drinks were consumed orally. Why was it 
necessary for the treatment duration to average more than 3 
days? Is the presence of ethanol or of ethano! metabolites 
more important in peoples' perception of alcohol effects? In 
preparing to examine eventually the pharmacodynamics of in-
fused millimolar alcohol, the following review summarizes 
some of what we currently know about the the cellular and 
molecular mediators of ethanol clearance. Hopefully, readers 
can begin to evaluate the quantitative evidence needed to de-
velop a consensus on the main cofactors and enzymes in-
volved in alcohol clearance. 
ETHANOL CLEARANCE: THE KINETICS OF CHANGE 
Infusing alcohol at rates of 40-80 mg per minute main-
tained steady-state BAL values in the range of 15-45 mg/1 
(67). Those results indicate that the 10% (v/v) ethanol infusion 
at 50 ml/h used by Craft et al. (19) (4 g/h or 67 mg/min) might 
provide a steady BAL of approximately 30 mg per liter or 3 mg% 
(0.65 mM) blood ethanol, a relatively low value compared to 
the legal limit of 100 mg% (22 mM) set for automobile safety. 
The level is also low compared to the 10-50 mM levels com-
monly used in studies of alcohol perturbation of neural recep-
tor signaling [e.g., as noted by Lovinger et al. (74)]. On this 
basis, McMillan may be justified in using the term "trivial." 
Nevertheless, the reported success of intravenous interven-
tion (19) argues for some physiological relevance of millimo-
lar BAL and for pursuit of further understanding of its im-
pact. In further interpreting the situation, consideration of the 
dynamics of BAL values should include how the situation of 
constant infusion and constant BAL differs from that of drink-
ing alcoholic beverages, which creates rising and falling blood 
alcohol levels. The ways in which the results of infusion differ 
from the results of ingestion (with its derived measure of "first-
pass" metabolism) represent a continuing area of uncertainty 
and inquiry in alcohol research (1,27,40). Time-dependent 
events that occur during customary alcohol drinking as well as 
during the infusion process are discussed below so that read-
ers can begin to assess the possible physiological impact of dif-
ferent BAL values and the factors influencing those levels. 
INTAKE AND REMOVAL 
Ingested alcohol distributes rapidly among the various tis-
sues of the body, eventually approximating a uniform distri-
bution in the total body water. Any large increase in BAL de-
creases first by a rapid dilution into tissue water and then by a 
slower metabolic removal. The rapid initial distribution/dilu-
tion process appeared to be first order among men and was not 
evident in women (for whom average total body water is near 
two-thirds that of men) (101). The major metabolic removal 
appeared to be a linear (pseudo-zero order) process in both 
men and women, ranging from 0.05 to 0.08 mM/min for differ-
ent individuals. This linear metabolic removal has been ob-
served consistently, and it underlies the ability of long-estab-
lished Widmark equations (A = rXpX C0; and C0 = Q + pf) 
to predict changes in blood alcohol levels from information on 
alcohol intake (127). In the Widmark equations, A = total al-
cohol ingested, p = the total body mass, r = fraction of body 
mass in which alcohol could be present, 0 = the rate of de-
crease in blood alcohol level (C,), and C0 = the blood alcohol 
level extrapolated to zero time. Widmark (127) assigned 
mean values for r: 0.68 ± 0.085 for men and 0.55 ± 0.055 for 
women. In general, total body water (TBW) tends to average 
about 60 I for men and 40 1 for women. Using anthropomor-
phic data, Watson (126) circumvented using r and improved 
the accuracy in determining C0. In this approach, C0 = 0.80 X 
/4/TBW,andTBWis: 
TBW = 20.03 + 0.3626 x weight (kg) - 0.1183 x age (yr) for men 
TBW = 14.46 4 0.2549 x weight (kg) for women. 
The literature of the past 50 years consistently described 
time-dependent changes in BAL following ingestion or infu-
sion. Generally, oral ingestion gives an initial rise in BAL that 
represents absorption from the intestine, peaking usually 
within 1 h. Then there follows an approximately linear decline 
in BAL with time (zero order kinetics) equivalent to about 
3 mmol per minute for people with about 501 of body water [see 
Fig. 1, which is based on data from Jones et al. (53) and resem-
bles results in other reports (27,124,128)]. The apparently linear 
metabolic clearance rate (p) is about 0.015%/h or 15 mg%/h 
(101,122), ranging from 13 to 21 mg%/h (i.e., 3 to 5 mM/h, 0.05 
to 0.08 mM/min, or 2 to 4 mmol/min for people with about 501 
of body water). Average clearance rate values were 0.06 ± 0.01 
mM/min for control abstinent women, 0.078 ± 0.013 for women 
misusers of alcohol, and 0.05 ± 0.016 mM/min for control and 
alcoholic men (101,122). Thus, there is some evidence for an al-
cohol-induced increase in metabolic clearance with women, but 
not men. This difference is discussed further below. 
The decrease in BAL with time eventually curves (mixed 
zero and first-order kinetics) as the half-maximal rate of alco-
hol removal (Vmax/2) is evident near an alcohol concentration 
approaching 1 mM, the apparent Km value (i.e., Km is the eth-
anol concentration at Vmx/1)H a value that has been observed in 
many different studies. The shifting patterns in alcohol clear-
ance are approximated by the hyperbolic Michaelis-Menten 
relationship: 
rate of alcohol removal = Vmax/(1 + ATm/BAL). 
In this simple relationship, a maximal rate of removal (Vmax) 
is observed when BAL is much greater than the apparent Km, 
making the denominator (1 + KmIBAL) have a value near 1 
[i.e., rate = (3mmoles/min)/(l + ImM/lOmM)]. The results of 
Larsen (67) also approximate this simple relationship, (138 
mg/min)/(l+0.46mgL-l/BAL). Representation of alcohol re-
moval with a single apparent Vmax and apparent Km is a useful 
simplification of the overall process. However, ethanol removal 
is actually catalyzed by a variety of enzymes that have differ-
ent kinetic constants, and simple estimates may occasionally 
lead to oversimplified interpretations. The subsequent discus-
sion illustrates some aspects of alcohol clearance in humans 
that need careful quantitative assessment to gain alternate in-
sights and avoid misunderstandings. 
Overall, a need remains for further inquiry into how the in-
fused ethanol achieved the apparent benefits described by Craft 
et al. (19). Could receptor systems detect and respond to 3 mg% 
BAL values, as the diminished withdrawal symptoms suggest? 
If so, what are the receptors and their resultant signals, and 
what is their threshold BAL? Similarly, is there a BAL value 
that triggers the phenomenon of morning drinking by individ-
uals with physical dependence on alcohol? A useful recent 
noninvasive monitoring method (106,107) provides detailed 
information (almost minute by minute) on BAL. This sensi-
tive transdermal detector may permit continuous monitoring 
over days of BAL values and clearance rates (for BAL from 
1 to 200 mg%) and give information useful in testing hypothe-
ses about the relation between BAL and spontaneous drinking 
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FIG. 1. Food and blood alcohol levels. The BAL profiles for apparently healthy volunteer men after drinking (in 30 
mm) 0.80 g ethanol per kg body weight following an overnight fast (•) or immediately after breakfast (O). [Derived 
from Jones and Jonsson (53) with permission of the authors.] 
behavior. Questions about the possible pivotal role of a BAL 
threshold might be approached in 5- to 14-day ethological 
studies with such a noninvasive monitor. Most importantly, if 
BAL becomes recognized as not a determining factor for dys-
phoria or for voluntary alcohol ingestion, researchers may 
want to redirect efforts to identify and understand alternate 
signals in the future. Some of those alternate signals may be 
initiated by metabolites of ethanol ratheT than by ethanol per 
se or by metabolites of alternate physiological substrates that 
have adapted to the presence of beverage alcohol. Those al-
ternate metabolites may change human physiology with slower 
kinetics than seen for BAL clearance. 
CONSEQUENCES OF METABOLISM 
Metabolic Acetate 
Nearly all of the alcohol metabolized by the liver appears 
quickly as acetate in the blood (76,77) before it eventually be-
comes carbon dioxide (C02). During the pseudo-zero order 
decrease of BAL noted in customary drinking episodes, ace-
tate produced from hepatic ethanol metabolism appears in 
the blood at a fairly constant level near 1 mM compared to a 
customary level near 0.05 mM. Infusing 4 g ethanol/h would 
produce about 5 g acetic acid per hour or 460 g in the 4-day in-
fusion—equivalent to 9 1 of vinegar—a considerable amount 
to be accommodated! The extended exposure of tissues to 
such abnormal levels of acetate might cause important adap-
tive changes as various tissues convert the acetate to its coen-
zyme A ester with formation of appreciable amounts of cyto-
solic 5'AMP, subsequent release of extracellular adenosine, 
and activation of important adenosine receptors. Chronic stim-
ulation of adenosine A| receptors may mediate myocardial 
adaptations that diminish risk of ischemic injury (84) and 
might participate in the widely discussed possible benefit of 
moderate drinking. Adenosine can influence motor coordina-
tion (13), and its strong vasodilator action on adenosine A2 re-
ceptors in splanchnic blood vessels (52,91) may alter a per-
son's sense of well-being. In such a situation, the ambient value 
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of BAL may not adequately reflect all of the alcohol-initiated 
signals that influence human behavior and health Further re-
search is needed to resolve the question of whether some sub-
jective perceptions during intoxication are also mediated by 
the indirect actions of acetate and adenosine rather than by a 
direct action of ethanol (73) 
Adenosine release is relevant to increased excretion of uric 
acid observed in heavy drinkers (109) and also to alcohol's well-
known exacerbation of tendencies for gout Such effects of 
ethanol ingestion upon adenosine metabolism represent "hid-
den" aspects that may occur even when BAL values from in-
fusion seem to be "trivial" or "nondetectable " Nitrogen loss and 
"tissue wasting" is a characteristic feature of chronic alcohol 
ingestion [noted 90 years ago by Atwater and Benedict (4) 
and reviewed recently by Lands (65)] This loss needs better 
understanding as researchers consider the benefits and risks 
of alcohol drinking and evaluate alcohol's contribution to body 
mass maintenance and calorie balance [e g, (59,98)] Further 
attention to protocols examining the actions of adenosine and 
acetate may be productive in developing new interpretations 
of human adaptations to beverage alcohol 
Another clue to adaptive shifts in physiology due to some 
en/yme induction or altered cofactor and metabolite abundances, 
is that chronic alcoholics have a more rapid elevation of blood 
acetate after drinking (42 89) After ingesting 0 8 g ethanol/kg 
body weight in 25 min, the antecubital venous blood of alco-
holics had 0 91 ± 0 08 mM acetate, whereas it was 0 52 ± 0 05 
in controls (89) The fact that such adaptations occur has not 
yet been integrated into explanations of metabolic changes that 
subsequently occur during abstinence by a physically depen-
dent alcoholic The experiment above did not collect data to 
address whether some metabolic adaptation had occurred with 
chronic alcohol oi whether the alcoholics were initially predis-
posed to faster alcohol metabolism However, such results may 
reflect adaptations that occurred in the alcohol-dependent pa-
tients of Craft et al (19) 
NADH Reoxidatwn and Binding 
Adapting to ingested ethanol can give transient elevations 
in the ratio of reduced to oxidized forms of NADH and 
NADPH in tissues and increase the ratio of alcohol to carbo-
nyl forms fot various metabolic intermediates For example, 
the ratios of plasma lactate/pyruvate and 3-hydroxv butyrate/ 
3 keto butyrate rise in a way that reflects a shift m redox po 
tential of the tissue metabolizing ethanol (64) Similarly the 
ratio of 17-(3-hydroxy to 17 keto-steroids in plasma was 6-10 
times greater during ethanol metabolism than in control plasma 
samples (2) Also ethanol stimulated reduction of 17-
p hydroxy-5a androstane-3 one to the 3-hvdroxy form in iso-
lated Leydig cells, decreasing the formation of testosterone 
(2) Other adaptations include diminished retinoic acid for-
mation and epithelial differentiation (28,132) and decreased 
estiadiol clearance (37,38) A marker of alcohol ingestion 
(with its increased NADH/NAD+ ratios) is urinary 5 hydroxy-
tryptophol (117), which is formed by reduction of 5-hydroxyin-
dole aldehyde The aldehyde is readily formed from serotonin 
(5 hydroxytryptamme) by the action of monoamine oxidase 
(MAO) Presumably, similar alcohol denvatives may be formed 
from other biogenic amines after they are oxidized by MAO 
to the aldehyde form [(26,81), see also the Aldehyde Dehy-
drogenase Activity below] Accumulation and excretion of 
5 hydroxytryptophol may be due to greater reduction of the 
aldehyde by increased NADH levels or to competitive inter-
ference with oxidation of the tryptophol by ingested ethanol 
(15) These adaptations in metabolite flux illustrate the im-
pact of sharing either substrates or coenzymes among the dif-
ferent metabolic systems—all of which may then be influ-
enced when ingested ethanol is metabolized Because the 
various oxidoreductase systems may adapt through either 
NADH or ethanol interactions, researchers need careful con-
trols to distinguish between cofactor competitions and sub-
strate competitions. 
Competition by accumulated NADH at the NAD+ bind-
ing site of alcohol dehydrogenase (ADH) is a form of product 
inhibition that can inhibit ethanol oxidation and slow clear-
ance rates For example, NADH at 56 \xM causes 50% com-
petitive inhibition ( l e , K, is about 56 \xM) of the rate of 
NAD+ oxidation of ethanol by p,prADH2*3 (12), whereas 
it has a fivefold higher Km value (260 u,M) for reduction of ac-
etaldehyde The complexity of the NADH/NAD+ interactions 
seems formidable to approach, but they might be handled in 
part bv computerized simulations that approximate the inte-
grated in vivo system (17) The alcohol dehydrogenase system 
of rats was successfully fitted to ethanol clearance (16,17) with 
a complex steady state ordered bi-bi kinetic expression that is 
characteristic of ADH action (130) Computer modeling of al-
cohol oxidation in the liver showed that Class I and Class II 
ADH isoenzymes may not function in vivo at their maximal 
activities The human ADH forms can be limited by product 
inhibition and equilibrium effects ot NADH and acetaldehyde 
and by incomplete saturation with NAD+ (eg , P-, ADH) or 
ethanol (e g, p^  and IT ADH) (17) Thus, the complex multi 
vanant ADH system in human liver constitutes a remaining 
unresolved challenge in understanding BAL clearance (27 92) 
Extension of the successful modeling of alcohol clearance in 
rats (16 17) to the kinetic system in humans (see Table 1) in a 
physiologically based pharmacokinetic (PBPK) model would 
be a valuable next step 
Quantitative assessment of clearance rates in vivo needs to 
account for the fact that increasing the NADH/NAD+ ratio 
creates conditions favoring the reverse reaction (I e» reduc-
tion of acetaldehyde) (20-22) Cronholm (23) estimated for 
humans that acetaldehyde exchange and reduction by the NADH 
bound to ADH was about 4 5-fold greater than the net rate of 
ethanol oxidation (and more rapid than transfer to aldehyde 
dehydrogenase) Each variable has limits within which it influ-
ences overall clearanc e and careful quantitative treatment of 
data is needed to indicate the degree of influence expected for 
each interaction Metabolism of deuterated ethanol permitted 
estimates of the degree of participation of various metabolites 
interacting with the NADH derived from ethanol oxidation 
and with the systems that shuttle electrons into mitochondria 
(20,21) Kinetic aspects of the reverse reaction also were de-
scribed in detail by Deetz (25), who noted that the p}p,« 
isozyme catalyzes both directions at rates lower than those of 
the other class I enzymes An additional aspect of the ability 
of ADH action to both reduce and oxidize acetaldehyde (43) 
may be a fundamental property of the dehydrogenase reaction 
(see also the Aldehyde Dehydrogenase Activity section) That 
property extends beyond previously expected roles of ADH 
into new alternate interpretations not yet widely discussed 
Transient shifts in redox potential after drinking alcohol 
also help emphasize that the electrons (reduction potential) 
from early steps in alcohol clearance move through one type 
of path toward oxygen while the acetate formed in those early 
steps moves separately to other tissues for eventual oxidation 
to CO<> These separate routes involve many variables that may 
affect the yield of useful energy for growth and work More 
quantitative assignment of the effect of different BAL values 
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TABLE 1 
liNZYMES CATALYZING ETHANOL OXIDATION IN HUMAN LIVER 
Form of Enzyme 
Class 1 ADH 
ADH1 (ma) 
aP, 
<*7i 
«72 
ADH2 0131) 
Pi-Yt 
P.7' 
ADH2(p2p2) 
ADH2 (P£,) 
ADH3(«yl7,) 
ADH3(-»iTfi) 
Class 11 ADH 
ADH4 (irir) 
Class 111 ADH 
ADH5(xx) 
Class IV ADH 
ADH6 (aa) 
CYP2E1 
CYP1A2 
Catalase 
^(n ,M) 
Ethanol 
0.4 
4.2 
1 
0.32 
0.16 
0.55 
0.049/0.1 
1.1 
0.2 
0.94 
34 
1 
0.63 
34 
» 2 0 0 0 
37 
16 
24 
77 
KM(nM) 
NAD+ 
13 
7.4 
180 
530/710 
7.9 
8.7 
14 
25 (pH 10) 
180 
Km(fwd) 
mm"1 (U/mg) 
11 
27 
39 
11 
10 
9.1 
9.2 (0.085) 
30 
14 
400(8.6) 
300(7.9) 
87 
35 
20 
(mM"1 min""1) 
1510 
23 
50 
(mM-1 min'1) 
K«, (rev) 
min'1 (U/mg) 
350 
630 
1100 
890 
380 
6 
860 
1100 
98 
64 
650 
Km(ixM) Km(mM) 
NADH Acctal 
2 
11? 4.3? 
0.15 
1.3 
0.7 
6.4 0.076 
0.085 
1.1 
0.28 
105 0.24 
260 3.4 
7.0? 0.3? 
16 30 
8.3 
2.5(pH10) 
K,0*M) 
NADII 
?0.9? 
Content 
jimol/kg 
8 
??? 
777 
777 
??? 
977 
777 
??? 
777 
777 
777 
777 
777 
777 
777 
2 
2 
777 
Reference 
115 
25,80 
9 
9,25,80 
9,25,80 
9,25,80 
25,80 
9 
9,25,80 
9.25,80 
9 
12 
9,25 
9 
9 
25,59 
121 
25,35 
3 
3 
upon the participation of the different metabolic paths will 
permit a better assessment of the possible energy available from 
ingested alcohol (65,66). Shifts in redox potential can also af-
fect the phosphorylation potential, the availability of inor-
ganic phosphate, and the amount of free magnesium ion in the 
tissue (60,99) in ways that influence the metabolic flux and 
that need more quantitative interpretation by the research 
community. 
To understand the degree of control that can be exerted by 
a selected catalytic step, it may be necessary also to under-
stand the integrated system as an assembly rather than to fo-
cus narrowly on one enzyme within the overall system. Can 
we identify from the multiple enzymes present the major cata-
lysts for ethanol clearance and allocate quantitatively their 
proportional contribution? One approach to the question could 
be by systematic assembly of data on enzyme abundance and 
the known kinetic constants in a multivariant computerized 
simulation system in ways that permit tests of the various hy-
potheses regarding which catalysts play a major role at vari-
ous designated B AL values (many new user-friendly software 
systems are available to help achieve this goal; e.g., ANA-
LYTICA by Lumina Decision Systems, Inc. or STELLA by 
High Performance Systems). The systematic use of mullivari-
ant quantitative relationships facilitated by computer-assisted 
models [e.g., (27,69)] may help move toward more precise fu-
ture interpretations and more successful future predictions. 
Such calculations involve identifying the catalysts whose ac-
tive sites are occupied by ethanol during clearance. 
Feast and Famine 
A confounding feature of alcohol metabolism is the wide 
variance in patterns of frequency and amount ingested by in-
dividuals. The question of "Why do some people drink so 
much?" has an important corollary, "Why do most people drink 
so little?" Describing "average" bouts of drinking by an "av-
erage" American can mislead when the median intake of 1 to 
2 drinks per week is below the mean intake of 14 drinks per 
week and far below the over 100 drinks per week that occur 
among those in the upper 5% of the USA population. Actual 
patterns of alcohol intake may be cyclical (100), with heavier 
intake on weekends and frequent intermittent days of absti-
nence (87). Such patterns of drinking make it inevitable that 
aggregate values of average intakes would greatly underesti-
mate BAL values attained during actual drinking conditions, 
and would lead to a greatly underestimated involvement of 
enzymes with Km values over 10 mM. For example, portal 
blood may carry 50 mM alcohol to the liver in individuals con-
suming several drinks in an hour, whereas there would be lit-
tle exposure after 12 h of abstinence permitted metabolic re-
moval of the circulating alcohol. This wide range of alcohol 
concentrations entering the liver matches or exceeds the half-
saturation concentrations for nearly all of the liver enzymes 
known to metabolize ethanol. As a result, any of them might 
have their catalytic site occupied by ethanol at some time dur-
ing this period. Supplementing the somewhat intrusive self-
reporting method (87,100) with a hopefully less intrusive 
transdermal monitor, as noted in Intake and Removal 
(106,107), might provide valuable new insights into the actual 
relationship of BAL to spontaneous alcohol drinking behav-
ior. The data can give useful clues to which translated gene 
products are occupied by alcohol when certain behaviors or 
sensations occur. 
Another often-discussed confounding feature of alcohol me-
tabolism is the effect of meals on BAL values, clearance rates 
(53,128), and first-pass metabolism (1,27,40,69). Meals may 
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increase rates of reoxidation of NADH as the metabolism of 
ingested food increases the intermediates participating in re-
dox reactions (41), and systematic, quantitative measurements 
are needed to assess carefully their importance in BAL clear-
ance kinetics. For example, the curves in Fig. 1 indicate an ap-
parent slower absorption and faster metabolism of ingested 
alcohol immediately after a meal. To separate the two oppos-
ing processes, the clearance of intravenous infused alcohol 
was measured (41). Food intake increased the apparent zero-
order clearance from 0.14 ± 0.03 to 0.15 ± 0.02 g/l/h (break-
fast) or 0.13 ± 0.03 to 0.17 ± 0.03 g/l/h (lunch). Such rates are 
equivalent to the often reported 3.0 mmol/min for individuals 
with 50 1 of body water (i.e., 0.06 mM/min). The authors also 
noted that ethanol clearance is not continually constant, and it 
changes as a nonlinear function of BAL. 
The more comprehensive management of multiple vari-
ables in a computerized simulation system like a physiologi-
cally based pharmacokinetic (PBPK) model (27,69) can per-
mit more comprehensive evaluations and estimations of these 
effects than is provided by simple rule-of-thumb estimates. 
Such quantitative treatments (27) have indicated a significant 
contribution by the 7-ADH variant and a relatively small con-
tribution to clearance by gastric and hepatic first-pass metab-
olism. That treatment, allocating a minor status to first-pass 
metabolism, was confirmed by a careful isotope experiment in 
which gastric first-pass was only 6 ± 5% of the ethanol metab-
olism in men and women (1). Combining such a comprehen-
sive quantitative pharmacokinetic approach with what we know 
of the physiological actions of the enzymes that metabolize 
millimolar alcohol will help include all important variables 
during discussions of how humans adapt to beverage alcohol. 
Such an approach may help avoid erroneous oversimplifica-
tions as occurred with [J-ADH isozymes (see discussion in Al-
cohol Dehydrogenase Activities below). 
IDENTIFYING THE AGENTS OF CHANGE 
Many different oxidoreductases share nucleotide cosubstrates, 
and those that also interact with millimolar levels of ethanol are 
noted in Table 1. Any of the latter enzymes may participate in 
adapting to beverage alcohol. Quantitative information on the 
relative abundances of the different catalysts could permit the 
kinetic data to be useful in estimating relative contributions of 
dehydrogenases (ADH, which are NADH and ATP generat-
ing), cytochromes P450 (CYP, which are NADPH consuming 
and non-ATP generating), and catalase (non-ATP generat-
ing) to the overall BAL clearance. Assembling such quantita-
tive information seems worthwhile. The shape of BAL curves 
also gives clues to the major catalysts involved, and the ob-
served curvature suggests a dominance of catalysts with ap-
parent Km values near 1 mM. Each catalyst participating in 
clearance presumably has its catalytic site occupied by ethanol 
and therefore is unable to act at that moment on any alternate 
physiological substrate (26). Designating the differing degrees 
of occupancy of the many different catalytic sites during alco-
hol clearance may help indicate those most diverted. As a re-
sult, assembling more information on the specificities of these 
enzymes may help the scientific community consider alternate 
metabolites that may be perturbed by drinking alcohol, and 
thereby expand awareness of possible physiological impacts 
of ingesting alcohol. 
Although kinetic reports often describe enzyme properties 
at various pH values, information collected under conditions 
near 7.5 is needed to give reliable estimates of physiological 
importance. Kinetic reports also employ the convenient ratio 
" of kcJKm (6) as a comparative index for selectivities that can 
occur in a test tube with unlimited substrates or cofactors. The 
rate constant, fccal, defines the maximal rate, Vmax, as the prod-
uct of kat and enzyme abundance. The ratio of k^xIKm needs to 
be employed with caution, and each constant needs indepen-
dent interpretation in the context of physiological conditions. 
Physiological limits of materials in vivo make the kcJKm ratio 
of limited utility compared to the ratio of /ccal to the observed 
flux of metabolite and the ratio of Km relative to the abundance 
of substrate (5). Nature does not always provide in vivo what 
kinelicists study in vitro, and the absolute speed of forming 
nanomoles of product may not be a suitable index to physio-
logical impact and survival when alternate substrates link to 
alternate physiological mediators. Perhaps of major impor-
tance is a comparison of KJS for the different alternate sub-
strates that compete with ethanol at the catalytic site. 
Alcohol Dehydrogenase Activities 
Alcohol dehydrogenase (ADH) activity in liver is widely 
regarded to be the principal process by which ethanol is re-
moved from circulation (16,72). Human liver has many differ-
ent types or classes of ADH (119), some of which form ran-
dom aUmeric associations of different gene products (95,96,102-
104). The overall liver metabolism that regulates alcohol clear-
ance results from the sum of the individual fccat values times 
the millimoles of each catalytic form as modified by appropri-
ate terms for cofactor interactions. Considerable evidence shows 
that human liver has abundant amounts of the different ADH * 
forms with an overall activity of 0.05-0.10 u,mol/min/mg solu-
ble protein (71). One report noted that over 200 mg mixed 
ADH was isolated from 600 g of human liver (115), and the 
mix of dehydrogenases may account for about 1% of liver 
protein. Interestingly, all human livers with high specific activ-
ity for metabolizing ethanol contained a more anodic ADH 
form (71), subsequently named ir-ADH. This early recogni-
tion of more than one class of ADH acting on ethanol pro-
vides a useful context for the following discussion. Early ki-
netic characterizations of the many individual dimers done at 
pH 10.0-10.5 (71,115,120) were hard to interpret in terms of 
physiological metabolism of ethanol, but more recent work 
with the various isozymes gave values measured at pH 7.4-7.5 
(9,10,80,81), which are noted in Table 1. Now a task remains 
to relate the in vitro results to in vivo clearance data. 
Many homodimer and heterodimer forms of ADH have Km 
values near 1 mM for ethanol and average kCAi values near 20 
min"1 (see Table 1). The abundance of these ADH subunits in 
human liver (ca. 330 mg ADH/kg liver; 8 u,mol/kg) (115) ap-
pears to provide not enough activity for 1 kg liver to remove 
10 mM ethanol at the well-recognized rate of 3 mmol/min 
(53,127): 
rate = (*cal)(enzymeamt.)/(l + Km/S) = 
(20)(8)/(l + 1/10) = 160 umoles/min. 
Also, the reverse reaction catalyzed by ADH isozymes 
might proceed similarly, with Km values near 1 mM for acetal-
dehyde and ATca, values near 100 to 1000 min"1 (25): 
rate = (*cal)(enzymeamt.)/(l +Km/S) = 
(1000)(8)/( 1 + 1 /0.01) = 80umol/min. 
In this regard, Cronholm et al. (23) reported that humans 
(and also rats) (20-22) form alcohol from acetaldehyde in vivo 
nearly as fast as they oxidize alcohol to acetaldehyde. Thus, 
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the rate at which energy is made available from ethanol needs 
careful evaluation. Quantitative data of the abundance of each 
type of enzyme [e.g., quantitation of the many resolved bands 
noted earlier (e.g., (71,115) by a broadly selective immunoblot 
method] might improve estimates of the participation of the 
different enzymes in alcohol clearance (27). Also, because the 
abundance of each subunit per kilogram of human liver is in-
fluenced by the expression of the different genes for these en-
zymes (9,28,56,79), the regulatory sites involved in activating 
transcription of these genes have importance in the ability of 
each tissue to participate in ethanol clearance or to metabo-
lize alternate substrates (see Upstream Regulators: Altering 
the Flow). 
The class I ADH (aa-isozyme; ADH1) occurs in human 
liver, and it has a Km value (either 0.4 or 4 mM) that is near 
that observed in clearance studies. Unfortunately, it is seldom 
discussed in detail, and little information is available regard-
ing its abundance or participation in BAL clearance in hu-
mans. The ct-subunit was cloned, and its protein structure was 
described (118). Information regarding this subunit, its abun-
dance, its characteristics, and its participation in clearance 
needs to be assembled and put in the overall context of etha-
noFs impact on humans. 
The class I ADH (pp-isozyme; ADH2) has three known 
alleles with strikingly different kinetic constants (see Table 1), 
and the different frequencies of allele occurrence among dif-
ferent ethnic groups has attracted appreciable curiosity. Be-
cause the ADH2 isoenzymes differ widely, they were the sub-
ject of focussed effort (7,11,18). These isoforms are extensively 
described (8-10,30,31), and recent reports indicated that they 
might play only a minor role in alcohol clearance (9,110-112). 
p^ , (ADH2*1). The apparent overall Km value of 1 mM 
that has been repeatedly reported for BAL clearance is much 
greater than the 0.05 mM Km for the piPj isoform of liver 
ADH (ADH2*1) in Caucasians (133). This 0.05 mM /Rvalue 
for ADH2*1 would predict that the nearly linear pattern of 
BAL kinetics would extend well below 1 mM for Caucasians 
and would contrast with a predicted curvilinear pattern for 
Africans (11,110) (see p3p3 below). Such results are not re-
ported, and the evidence opens the suggestion that this iso-
form may not be the rate-limiting catalyst for clearance of 
blood alcohol in Caucasians—even though overall ADH ac-
tivity of liver is still regarded to be the major agent in alcohol 
clearance. As noted by Bosron et al. (9) and Thomasson et al. 
(110,111) and confirmed by the unique computer simulations 
of Derr (27). ADH2 is only one of many ADH activities that 
can act to remove ethanol. Its contribution to overall clear-
ance might be appreciably overestimated relative to that of 
ADH1, ADH4, and especially ADH3. 
P2P2 (ADH2*2). The large reported differences among 
kcM values for the Pjp, isoform (9 min"1)* the P2P2 isoform 
(400 min ') found in Asians, and the p3p3 isoform (300 min'1) 
found in Africans suggest that clearance rates might differ 
greatly among different ethnic groups (11). Two studies of al-
cohol clearance rates for Chinese subjects in whom the pt and 
p2 alleles were identified noted no statistical difference in 
elimination rates (111,131) for subjects with the different 
isozymes—even though p2 has a 40-fold greater k^ than p,. A 
part of the explanation for the lack of difference may be that 
ADH2 accounts for only a small fraction of the overall rate of 
alcohol elimination (133). 
p ^ (ADH2*3). This allelic form has a Km 1600 times that 
of the p,prADH2*l and a km 90 times that of the p t p r 
ADH2*1 (12). Similar to results for individuals with the p2p2 
genotype, clearance rates of 13.1 ± 0.6 seen for African-
Americans with a p3p3 genotype compared to 11.3 ± 0.2 for 
p!p! genotypes (110) hardly reflect the large differences in the 
kat values for these genotypes or the fourfold different rates 
predicted from the kinetic constants (9,11,12). Also, the ap-
parently linear kinetics observed in African-Americans with 
BAL values of 5-10 mM (110) suggests a saturated catalyst, 
does not reflect the curvature predicted earlier (12), and 
seems incompatible with the major catalyst having a /Cmvalue 
of 34 mM. Again, the authors noted that ADH2 (as either pt, 
P2,or p3) constitutes only a fraction of the enzymes contribut-
ing to alcohol clearance (110), making clearance independent 
of whatever allelic form of ADH2 is present in the mixture 
along with the other ADH activities. A rigorous, quantitative 
reconciliation of observed clearance rates with protein quanti-
tation of the various ADH isozymes could be helpful in inter-
preting other clearance studies. 
The class I ADH (77-isozyme; ADH3) has two known alle-
les (y} and y2) with relatively similar kinetic features, and its 
occurrence in human liver has been noted with little recent dis-
cussion of its probable contribution to overall ethanol disposal 
(7,8). Ironically, the reported Km values near 1 mM fit closely 
to that so frequently reported for ethanol clearance in humans. 
Homo- and heterodimers containing the 7-subunit exhibit neg-
ative cooperativity for ethanol oxidation (8) and can be allos-
terically regulated by testosterone (79). The Class I ADH 
isozymes that contain -y-subunits can catalyze oxidation of 3p-
hydroxy-5p-sterols with kal/Km ratios 4- to 10-fold greater than 
the kcJKm value for ethanol (82). Isoflavones (at submicromo-
lar levels) can inhibit ethanol oxidation by 72P2-ADH (62), 
leading to further questions on physiological substrates and the 
regulation of activity by dietary soy constituents. The cDNA 
and peptide primary sequences for the two isozymes are 
known (47), and possible fiiture studies of this isozyme may be 
helpful in interpreting adaptation to ethanol. Further charac-
terization of the subunit abundance, the endogenous sub-
strates, and the contribution to ethanol removal seems very de-
sirable since pharmacokinetic calculations (27) indicate that 
this isozyme may significantly interact with beverage alcohol. 
The class II ADH (irir-isozyme; ADH4) also occurs in 
liver, and its action with a Km value of 34 mM could be ex-
pected to impart curvature to BAL clearance curves similar to 
those predicted for p3-isoform- and cytochrome-catalyzed clear-
ance. It was once estimated that an intoxicating level of etha-
nol (60 mM) might be 40% removed by ir-ADH. Although iden-
tified 20 years ago as significant in human liver samples that 
had a high ability to metabolize ethanol (71), this form of ADH 
has received comparatively limited recent attention. When 
ethanol is present at levels produced by "social" drinking, the 
endogenous substrate(s) of this enzyme (such as steroids, bile 
acids, etc.) can be expected to have an altered metabolic fate, 
and its selective action upon catecholamine derivatives may 
have physiological significance (78,81). The structure of this form 
of ADH was shown (46) to have 147 positions different from 
ADH2, and these changes can be interpreted in terms of al-
tered catalytic function that would include altered specificity 
for various physiological substrates. 
The class III ADH (xx-isozyme; ADH5) activity has di-
verse distribution in nearly all tissues that needs further quan-
titation to determine its role. Interestingly, xx-ADH appeared 
to be the only ADH isozyme in brain (5), and its apparent 
uniqueness in placenta and testis provokes a series of ques-
tions regarding its physiological role. Its catalytic activity in 
handling ethanol has an apparent first-order rate constant 
rather than the customary pseudo-zero order kal, and it can-
not be saturated with ethanol (even at 2.5 M) (59). More in-
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formation on the first-order rate constant and the millimoles 
of enzyme per kilogram liver would help estimate the possible 
role of this catalyst, which can be particularly activated by 
long-chain carboxylates (e.g., octanoate or deoxycholate) to 
act on ethanol (86,121). Whether a pathophysiological abun-
dance of nonesterified fatty acids or bile acids would enhance 
ethanol oxidation by ADH5 in vivo merits consideration (sec 
also Active Sites and "Pockets"). Is it possible that under 
some conditions the high concentration of the isoforms of this 
enzyme (xi plus X2) in human liver might be sufficient to per-
mit some BAL clearance to be catalyzed by this enzyme? Al-
ternatively, the x-ADH may have an important physiological 
action in catalyzing the reduction of formaldehyde deriva-
tives—an action not readily indicated by its name. 
The class IV ADH (ac-isozyme; ADH7) is characteristi-
cally found to be most abundant in the mucosa of the upper 
digestive tract and stomach (59,93). It has the highest kcJKm 
value for retinoids of all human classes of ADH (132), and it 
is very active with other long-chain alcohols and aldehydes 
(34,35). Although not known to be appreciably expressed in 
liver, it may aid in the removal of ethanol from the digestive 
tract in accord with its abundance in the tissue, its fccat, and its 
Km value. 
Finally, class V ADH (ADH6) is recognized at a genomic 
level and as mRNA expressed in human liver, and class VI 
ADH (ADH8) is known to occur in deermice and rats—and 
may occur in humans. More kinetic information and information 
on abundance is needed to help define a role for these activities. 
Cytochrome P450 Activities 
Two of the many enzymes of this type, cytochromes 
P4502E1 (CYP2E1) and P4501A2 (CYP1A2), interact with 
ethanol at levels encountered after drinking beverage alcohol. 
In doing so, they provide an additional route for oxidation of 
ethanol, which can operate without using nucleotide coen-
zymes in the manner that ADH does. Rather, these catalysts 
transfer reducing equivalents from ethanol to oxygen with the 
coordinated action of a reduced flavoprotein and a heme pro-
tein. Paradoxically, this pathway consumes reduced coen-
zymes. As a result, it causes a significant loss of available en-
ergy for each molecule of ethanol that moves along this 
pathway (66). The Km values for these enzymes (16 and 24 
mM) (3) fit a concept that energy wasting might occur when 
portal BAL was 10 to 50 mM, and these enzymes participate 
to a greater degree in alcohol removal. Participation of such 
non-ADH systems remains uncertain in the face of estimates 
that they may account for less than 10% of the total ethanol 
oxidation by liver [reviewed by Cornell et al. (16)]. Such par-
ticipation (like that of the high-/Cm class II, class III, and class 
IV ADH) will depend on values of BAL as well as the nano-
moles of each catalyst per gram of liver—values that need 
more widespread discussion and quantitative evaluation. 
The reported abundance of specific cytochrome P450 
isozymes in human liver (3) (CYP2E1 and CYP1A2 each 
about 10-30 pmol/mg microsomal protein; ca. 2 jxmol/kg 
liver) predicts that these catalysts operating at 10 mM BAL 
with published values of kCA, and Km could provide: 
CYP2E1 rate = (23)(2)/(I + 16/10) = 18 umol/min 
CYPlA2rate = (50)(2)/(1 + 24/10) = 29 umol/min. 
Such estimates illustrate that cytochromes might be minor 
in an overall metabolism of 3 mmol ethanol/min. although 
their combined contribution may be one fourth of that esti-
mated for ADH. Such estimates help emphasize the impor-
tance of identifying credible data that clearly indicate how 
much CYP2E1 activity is actually present in human liver. Im-
proved data might also help evaluate the report that women 
alcoholics have faster clearance than women nonalcoholics 
[(101,122); see Intake and Removal). Because men did not 
show such a difference, there may be gender differences in the 
induction of CYP2E1. Quantitative tests of the contribution 
of the cytochrome pathway in cycling of ethanol and acctalde-
hyde would be valuable also in resolving the uncertainty 
about energy "wasting" during alcohol clearance. Recogniz-
ing that a highly variant daily intake of ethanol is the custom-
ary pattern (87,100) means that the aggregate epidemiological 
information on alcohol calories and body mass [reviewed re-
cently (65)] may need reevaluation in a new kinetic context 
that includes careful pharmacokinetic calculations. A rigorous 
reconciliation of immunoblot quantitation of the various CYP 
and ADH isozymes with observed clearance rates and known 
kinetic constants could be helpful in future interpretations of 
clearance studies. 
The consistently reported induction of increased CYP2E1 
activity by ingested ethanol keeps attention on this enzyme in 
adaptations by chronic drinkers. Immunoblot analysis of hu-
man liver microsomes showed fourfold higher CYP2E1 in re-
cently drinking alcoholics than in nondrinkers (113), although 
the absolute amount of CYP2E1 or its activity was not re-
ported. Also, alcohol-fed baboons had 34% faster metabolism 
of alcohol and 23% greater liver size (88). However, earlier 
published clearance values indicated little difference in clear-
ance for individuals with different alcohol exposure (39). This 
result was confirmed in part by a recent report (114) describ-
ing clearance in patients vs. controls with cl/cl CYP2E1 geno-
types (0.19 vs. 0.17 mg/ml/h) and cl/c2 genotypes (0.17 vs. 0.14 
mg/ml/h). A 400% increase in CYP2E1 giving only a 10-20% 
increase in ethanol removal might suggest that this path may 
account for only 3-7% of ethanol removal in normal tissue. 
This evidence on the net removal of ethanol might lead to a 
suggestion that the energy wasting action of cytochrome P450 
action has only a limited role. However, the possibility of 
CYP2E1 oxidation being followed by reduction of acetalde-
hyde by ADH [see Cronholm results (20-23) noted in N ADH 
Reoxidation and Binding) could dissipate considerable en-
ergy with little net loss of ethanol (66). When the rapid flux of 
ethanol/acetaldehyde carbons does not equal a rapid clear-
ance or disappearance of ethanol, interpretations of clearance 
and energy balance need carefully controlled information. 
Even though induction of CYP2E1 has little effect on ethanol 
net clearance rates, it may have major importance in increas-
ing the dissipation of energy and in increasing the toxicity of 
some xenobiotics (e.g., acetaminophen). Interestingly, when 
CYP2E1 knock-out mice were challenged with acetami-
nophen, considerably less liver injury was noted (68), illustrat-
ing a valuable experimental test for the role of this enzyme 
(see also Knock-Out and Knock-In Effects: Searching for Rel-
evance). 
Catalase 
Catalase also can catalyze the oxidation of ethanol using 
hydrogen peroxide as a cosubstrate. It is often listed as a third 
pathway for ethanol removal, and it might act in brain where 
no other enzyme is known to convert appreciable amounts of 
ethanol to acetaldehyde. This review accepts that viewpoint 
for the present, and will not burden the reader with further as-
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pects. If we successfully arrange quantitative estimates of the 
contributions of the many other above-mentioned enzymes, 
there will then be an appropriate context for later evaluation 
of the contribution of catalase. 
THE FINAL TRACES-AND OTHER BEGINNINGS 
Everyone metabolizes ethanol, and elhanol levels of 5-15 
\xM occur in blood and urine of alcohol abstainers (54). This 
low ethanol concentration, possibly derived from fermenta-
tion by intestinal flora in the lower gul, could be regarded as 
being "kept under control" by ADH2*1, which can effectively 
act on very low concentrations of ethanol because of its very 
low Km value (0.05 mM) for ethanol (9). Clearance of ingested 
alcohol described in Intake and Removal fit the general ap-
proximation: rate = 3 mmol/min/(l + 1 mM/BAL). On this 
basis, a steady-state level of 15 u,M ethanol in the plasma of 
abstinent individuals might reflect an ethanol influx of about 
0.05 mmol/min, or 2 mg/min. Further refinement of this esti-
mate seems likely as the amounts of the various enzymes par-
ticipating in clearance (sec Table 1) become better known. 
The ADH2*1 isozyme in Caucasian populations has been 
tclcologically regarded to prevent harmful accumulation of 
blood alcohol and thereby provide a needed benefit. How-
ever, this optimistic rationale of a "fitness for survival" is not 
derivable for other ethnic populations that have ADH2 
isozymes with much higher Km values [Asians with ADH2*2 
(Km = 1 mM) and Africans with ADH2*3 (Km « 34 mM)]. 
The ADH isozyme in those people would not be predicted to 
keep blood alcohol as low. even though the traditional high-
fiber diets of these people might produce more gut ethanol 
and provide an even more vigorous "selection pressure" than 
seems evident for Caucasians. In the absence of any clear evi-
dence of "superiority" for survival of Caucasians, the Pip, al-
lele (ADH2*1) may not reliably indicate any evolutionary 
"superior fitness" for ethanol-related survival of humans. Se-
lection pressure can enrich the prevalence of genes whose 
translated products control a step needed for survival, but there 
is little evidence for selecting—or retaining—genes whose 
products control a step that does not appreciably influence a 
needed process. This topic leads to more curiosity regarding 
what evidence indicates any toxicity for submillimolar levels of 
alcohol. The reported success of a clinical "detoxification" by 
use of millimolar BAL (19) merits careful reevaluation. 
The name for a biological substance may indicate only one 
of several physiological or metabolic aspects of that substance. 
For example, the translated oxidoreduclase gene products 
that interact with NAD+/NADH are called dehydrogenases 
(55-58), and this review examines the subset of dehydrogena-
ses that also interact with millimolar ethanol. Many investiga-
tors have noted the improbability of the many different ADH 
genes being retained in humans for thousands of years solely 
to protect against ethanol-related risks (75,122-124), and the 
many different dehydrogenase activities that are called ADH 
may have their major biological impact via other alcohols 
(26). Many questions remain unanswered regarding the most 
likely endogenous substrates for which evolutionary selection 
pressures maintained the presence of enzymes. Were ethanol-
metabolizing oxidoreductases retained through evolution 
(55,57,58,115) for their interaction with ethanol or with other 
endogenous substrates? If not ethanol, what are the custom-
ary endogenous substrates, and how does ingested ethanol af-
fect their fate? Do the low levels of ethanol that moderated 
dysphoria in the Craft study (19) influence neural mediators 
by acting on the oxidoreductases described above? Do those 
neural mediators also mediate dysphoria experienced by 
some people during ingestion and metabolism of alcohol? 
ENDOGENOUS SUBSTRATES: PATHS TO EXPLORE 
The complexity of the many alcohol dehydrogenase forms 
suggests that the system is involved in more specific physiolog-
ical roles than removing ethanol (6). Because the translated 
gene products may not normally handle ethanol, the intrusion 
of ingested ethanol and its metabolites may divert those gene 
products from reacting with their customary physiological sub-
strates (6). Such diversions or perturbations could induce 
important adaptations or maladaptations to alcohol that ex-
tend beyond the brief transient change in cellular redox poten-
tial. The earlier description of the dehydrogenases in Alcohol 
Dehydrogenase Activities noted some results from testing 
possible physiological substrates for these catalysts. Such test-
ing is the most direct way to examine alternate substrates. Fur-
ther characterization of possible endogenous substrates seems 
desirable. For example, a number of sterols are substrates for 
human liver ADH (95), and the -Y-subunits of ADH appear to 
be essential in the metabolism of 3|3- and 170-hydroxy steroids 
(61,82). In addition, ADH may have a physiological role in 
degrading circulating epinephrine and norepinephrine (78). 
Screening physiological materials for reactivity with the vari-
ous ADH isozymes is a valuable direct approach to identifying 
alternative endogenous systems that may be adapting to alco-
hol. In addition, several types of experimental design noted 
below give results that may help indicate possible endogenous 
substrates. These indirect approaches have potential, but may 
not yet be characterized as heavily traveled paths to under-
standing how humans adapt to beverage alcohol. 
Active Sites and "Pockets" 
Spatial characteristics of possible endogenous substrates of 
the various liver dehydrogenases that interact with ethanol 
can be partially defined by conformational models (31,56, 
118). Although a crystallographic analysis of all human alco-
hol dehydrogenases would permit the most thorough inter-
pretations, X-ray data are obtained for the p , ^ form (49), 
and model building using data from horse ADH crystals also 
provides useful estimates (11,30,31,55,57,58). For example, 
three different aspects of amino acid placement were identi-
fied (31): 1) changing the phenylalanine residue at position 93 
alters coenzyme binding and restricts space at the inner part 
of the substrate pocket; 2) alterations in positions 140 and 141 
influence binding at the inner part of the cleft and may cause 
the a-subunit to be more effective with secondary alcohols; 3) 
exchanges at positions 48 and 51 may have important effects 
on substrate and coenzyme binding as well as affecting the kCAi 
value. Identifying the characteristics and understanding the 
possible major endogenous substrates for the various ADH 
enzymes may evolve from a better understanding of the three 
dimensional structure at the active site of the different dehy-
drogenases in liver (30,31,49). For example, X-ray studies in-
dicate the degree to which retinol and other hydrophobic al-
cohols can fit to the active site (24), and studies with bile acid 
oxidation (90) point to other endogenous molecules that 
might be substrates (132) for the different liver dehydrogena-
ses. Also, site-directed mutagenesis studies provide valuable 
insights (50,51) to the spatial dimensions of the substrate bind-
ing site and to dimensions of alternate endogenous substrates. 
Further information on the specific peptide domain at 
which ethanol binds with millimolar affinities may give valu-
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able insights to possible peptide domains in other targets for 
alcohol action on physiology and behavior, such as neu-
rotransmitter receptors or ion channels. Considerations of a 
binding "pocket" or "barrel" within which ethanol might bind 
have been expressed for NMDA receptors (94) and for the 
XX-ADH (86). In the latter case, octanoate and deoxycholate 
activated the oxidation of ethanol, presumably by Filling the 
"barrer with sufficient hydrophobic carbon atoms not sup-
plied by the 2-carbon substrate. In fact, the report emphasized 
that probable endogenous substrates for the xx~ADH had an 
anionic group at a distance equivalent to 8-10 carbons, and 
that a 20-hydroxy-leukotriene is an excellent substrate (86). 
Characterization of the substrate binding preferences of the 
many enzymes able to metabolize ethanol and acetaldehyde is 
an important future topic in developing a broader context for 
assessing the roles of different ADH and ALDH activities in 
adapting to beverage alcohol. Further attention to possible 
endogenous substrates seems inevitable, and some additional 
topics that will need quantitative examination in the future are 
briefly noted below. 
Aldehyde Dehydrogenase Activity 
Two forms of aldehyde dehydrogenase (ALDH) activity 
can catalyze oxidation of acetaldehyde; ALDH1 in cytosol 
with a Km of 30 jxM and ALDH2 in mitochondria with a Km of 
3 |iM. In liver cells metabolizing ethanol, various ADH activi-
ties employ NADH to catalyze rapidly the reduction of ace-
taldehyde to ethanol (20-23), keeping the steady-state level of 
acetaldehyde rather low. As a result, the low-J^ ALDH2 that 
is predominantly in mitochondria is regarded as principally 
responsible for oxidation of ethanol-derived acetaldehyde to 
acetate (133). It thereby is expected to be a dominant catalyst 
in conversion of alcohol to acetate. This ALDH2 isozyme has 
two allelic forms: the active ALDH2*1 and the relatively inac-
tive ALDH2*2. People with the inactive ALDH2*2 form of 
low-tfm mitochondrial ALDH2 had slightly lower alcohol 
clearance rates than people with the active ALDH2*1 form 
(0.24 vs. 0.27 mg/dl/min, 111; 0.13 vs. 0.14 mg/ml/h) (131).The 
limited difference in clearance observed for these genotypes 
(85,110-112) appears to indicate that ALDH2 activity may 
have a limited influence on the pharmacokinetics of ethanol 
clearance in humans. The recent awareness that acetaldehyde 
can be dehydrogenated also by alcohol dehydrogenase (43) may 
stimulate a needed reappraisal of the expected metabolic 
roles of ADH and ALDH in different tissues. Perhaps a more 
rigorous kinetic analysis or quantitative simulation will indi-
cate which type of new, controlled data could lead to more de-
finitive interpretations of how much acetaldehyde actually oc-
curs during clearance of beverage alcohol in humans. 
The frequency of the homozygous ALDH2*2 genotype 
was very low in Japanese alcoholic patients compared to con-
trols (0.06 vs. 0.30) (44,111), supporting a concept that this al-
lele may act in some way that protects individuals against al-
coholism. One proposal is that acetaldehyde may accumulate 
and cause aversive sensations in people with the ALDH2*2 
allele. In evaluating the analytical evidence for circulating ac-
etaldehyde, Eriksson and Fukunaga (33) concluded that there 
was no valid demonstration of released acetaldehyde in hu-
man venous blood before, during, or after normal ethanol in-
toxication. Also, Hunt (48) summarized that the formation of 
acetaldehyde in the brain in vivo after ethanol ingestion has 
not been clearly established. Recently, Higuchi et al. (45) re-
ported a careful test of the hypothesis that more active ADH 
isozymes cause accumulated acetaldehyde in persons with in-
active ALDH2, finding that variations in ADH2, ADH3, and 
CYP2E1 are not specific in alcoholics with inactive ALDH2. 
More controlled studies will hopefully resolve whether he-
patic-derived acetaldehyde moves to the brain to create the 
proposed aversive events. 
Alternatively, Zimatkin et al. (134) considered that the 
most important physiological role for ALDH-2 may be to cat-
alyze the oxidation of the biogenic aldehydes formed from 
dopamine, norepinephrine, and other biogenic amines via the 
mitochondrial monoamine oxidase (MAO) deamination {see 
also Tank (108)]. Researchers might constructively consider 
ALDH2 to be an "orphan gene product" for which endoge-
nous substrates remain to be identified. An intriguing feature 
of the histological distribution of the mitochondrial low-ATm 
ALDH-2 is its presence in brain tissue (with intense staining 
in cerebellum) (134), in addition to its presence in liver and 
other tissues. Although liver contains many different ethanol-
oxidizing enzymes, brain does not. This finding opens the pos-
sibility that ALDH2 in brain may act on some endogenous 
substrate other than acetaldehyde, such as aldehydes from 
monoamine oxidation by mitochondrial MAO [see also (125)]. 
Future research may clarify whether the ALDH2 gene prod-
uct can influence neural actions (such as by disposition of 
dopamine in the nucleus accumbens) and whether such influ-
ence can aller the reinforcement associated with drinking eth-
anol. Such a paradigm might offer an alternative interpreta-
tion for the well-demonstrated low incidence of the ALDH2*2 
genotype among Japanese alcoholics. 
Recently, Keung et al. (63) showed that giving an ALDH2 
inhibitor to hamsters caused a decrease in voluntary alcohol in-
gestion without accumulating appreciable levels of acetalde-
hyde. Also, a comprehensive review of the status of flushing 
phenomenon (14) noted the inadequate documentation of 
mechanisms whereby accumulated acetaldehyde may mediate 
decreased ethanol intakes. In fact, a recent authoritative report 
on ALDH (105) noted that the widely used prescription drug. 
Antabuse or disulfiram, is a nonspecific alkylating agent that 
can inhibit virtually any enzyme with an active site cysteine, 
leading to undesirable side effects. Thus, unresolved aspects of 
the ethanol-induced flushing phenomenon still include, along 
with uncertain levels of plasma acetaldehyde, fluctuations in 
autonomic tone (70) and a variety of alternate mediators that 
may be producing the flushing and the decreased preference 
for ethanol. Finding other phenotypes for an ALDH2 defi-
ciency might give valuable new insights to possible mechanisms 
for the lower alcohol intakes. Furthermore, human class I 
ADH isozymes of liver can act on norepinephrine (80) and 
dopamine (81) metabolites, and many possible new concepts 
remain to be explored as alternate physiological substrates 
(6,43) of the various ADH and ALDH enzymes are examined. 
Knock-Out and Knock-In Effects: Searching for Relevance 
Deleting or inhibiting a step in a metabolic pathway causes 
precursor accumulation and/or pathway diversions that help 
interpret complex flux interactions [reviewed by Kashiwaya et 
al. (60)], One naturally occurring knock-out experiment is the 
"inactive" form of ALDH2 noted above, and some evidence 
indicates an altered ethanol flux. Perhaps more controlled 
data on blood and tissue levels of other physiological metabo-
lites in people with different genotypes can help identify phys-
iologically relevant endogenous substrates for the ALDH2 
gene product. Other examples for studying altered flow con-
trol were expected in individuals with p2p2 anc* p3?3 alleles of 
ADH2. but a formal analysis of those results in terms of the 
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control of the rate of flux by an individual step in a metabolic 
pathway remains a continuing challenge. Similarly, the Adh-
deficient deer mouse represents another naturally occurring 
t4knock-out" model in which further studies may give useful 
insights. Boleda et al. (6) noted that the lack of obvious physi-
ological abnormality in this strain of mouse lacking class I 
ADH suggests that alternative systems in liver metabolize xe-
nobiotics and endogenous alcohols, and there is evidence for 
appreciable extrahepatic ADH activity in these animals (32). 
These "natural experiments" illustrate the new opportuni-
ties that might follow the creation of a series of specific tar-
geted mutants. For example, development of the CYP2E1 
knock-out mouse noted in Cytochrome P450 Activities sets 
the stage for a series of useful studies on alcohol clearance 
and adaptations to beverage alcohol. The growing experience 
with knock-out mutants includes many surprising examples in 
which expected results did not occur and some very unex-
pected results did occur. Such results illustrate extensive 
adaptive capacity in nature as alternate redundant pathways 
are mobilized. Further studies that insert or delete genes par-
ticipating in alcohol metabolism will probably give both ex-
pected and unexpected results, but they may help define the 
limits of influence of the various dehydrogenases on elhanol 
metabolism—and of ingested ethanol on the metabolism of 
endogenous substrates. 
Upstream Regulators: Altering the Flow 
Although there is no certainty in the following hypothesis, 
a useful heuristic concept is that the intracellular signaling 
that influences the activation of upstream regulatory sites of 
genes may have origins and consequences lelated to impor-
tant physiological roles of the genes. From this viewpoint, the 
naturally occurring activation of expression of specific genes 
gives clues to physiologically important priorities and Ideo-
logic rationales. Thus, the signals that influence selective ex-
pression and abundance of enzymes that metabolize millimo-
lar ethanol (in addition to endogenous substrates) are important 
topics for future research (28). Curiosity is provoked regard-
ing whether or not the signals and the newly formed mRNA 
from these genes do actually play an important role in adapt-
ing to beverage alcohol. For example, adrenals and liver had 
the highest content of Adh-1 mRNA (36). Is there a convinc-
ing argument that ethanol removal is the raison d'etre for ex-
pression of this gene in adrenals? Also, testosterone induced 
10-12-fold the transcription of Adh-1 mRNA in female mice. 
Such specific hormone action stimulates curiosity about the 
possible physiological importance of such an induction and 
the possible alternate substrates for this androgen-induced 
gene product. Clearly, hormonal steroids and many candi-
dates other than colonic ethanol could be considered in evalu-
ating how this ADH gene may have survival value for mice. 
Additional clues to the possible "purpose" of the various 
ethanol-metabolizing enzymes may open new insights into the 
way that humans adapt to chronic beverage alcohol. Aspects 
that could be examined further include: (a) A cDNA clone for 
the 0-subunit of human ADH2 hybridized to class I ADH 
mRNA of rat hybridoma cells, indicating a two- to fourfold 
increase of this mRNA within 24 h of treatment with dexa-
methasone (29). The human ADH2 gene contains upstream 
sequence motifs homologous with glucocorticoid response el-
ements, encouraging further consideration of some physiolog-
ical interaction of glucocorticoids and the human ADH2 gene 
in adapting to beverage alcohol. This concept was supported 
by the presence of three tandem glucocorticoid receptor bind-
ing sites in the 5'-flanking region of the human ADH2 gene, 
which appear to serve as a functional glucocorticoid response 
clement (129). (B) Recognizing that glucocorticoids, growth 
hormone, and insulin-like growth factor-1 can activate tran-
scription of the class I ADH gene, researchers searched for 
other factors regulating that expression. One such factor is an 
enhancer binding protein (97), which activates the promoter 
region in the 5'-flanking region of the ADH gene. Other tran-
scription factors act on different promoter elements in ways 
that provide a developmentally dependent temporal expres-
sion of ADH1, ADH2, and ADH3 (116). The complexity of 
this network of nuclear factors, DNA elements, and multiple 
isozymes again prompts questions about whether the system 
is involved in more specific physiological roles than removal 
of micromolar levels of ethanol formed by colonic fermenta-
tion. Information on the adaptations in these systems follow-
ing ingestion of alcohol might help interpret physiological 
changes in the patients of Craft et al. (19). 
CONCLUSIONS 
Metabolism of ingested ethanol is catalyzed by a variety of 
enzymes that may be diverted from acting on their normal 
physiological substrates. The presence of those many different 
enzymes in tissue-specific patterns and their activity in remov-
ing ingested ethanol is influenced by multiple factors and con-
ditions that remain to be fully characterized and need to be 
evaluated in an integrated manner. As the multiple catalysts 
and factors participating in adapting to ethanol and its metab-
olites become quantitatively defined, more sophisticated com-
puter modeling is needed to treat the assembled information 
on each catalyst in a more complete overall context. Open 
evaluation of the evidence about the actions of these trans-
lated gene products may help the research community develop 
and pursue fresh curiosity about alternate measurements and 
new interpretations that may lead away from entrenched or 
authoritatively enforced positions. In one sense, the set of en-
zymes with catalytic sites occupied by millimolar ethanol dur-
ing alcohol drinking might constructively be regarded as "or-
phan gene products'* whose physiological role remains to be 
clarified. This review was designed to stimulate further evalu-
ation of data from well-controlled experiments. It is important 
to encourage constructive curiosity and to decrease the risk 
that some alternate consideration may be suppressed in favor 
of an authoritarian position. Hopefully, this review stimulates 
considerations of alternate concepts about how human physi-
ology and behavior can adapt to beverage alcohol and how al-
cohol levels once regarded as trivial or undetectable might be 
interpreted more constructively. 
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Retrograde extrapolation is a mathematical process, based on sound scientific 
principles, that is used routinely in pharmacology, toxicology, and clinical medi-
cine. This process may be applied to the situation of ethyl alcohol consumption 
with reliability when reasonable assumptions are made concerning absorption 
rates, elimination rates, and patterns of alcohol consumption, including drinking 
duration and volume consumed. By utilizing an established range of values for the 
elimination rate of alcohol of 0.015-0.020 g/dllh, a relatively narrow range of extrap-
olated blood alcohol concentrations (BACs) can be determined in situations where 
the time frame in question is after peak alcohol absorption into the blood. A wider 
range of elimination rates of 0.01-0.03 gldllh may be applied and will satisfy the 
possibility of nonlinear kinetics within an individual; however, this wider range 
will have little practical effect on the predicted BACs. When the time point in 
question is prior to peak absorption, a wider range of predicted BAC values will 
result. The extent of this range will be influenced by the amount of information 
available concerning the temporal pattern of alcohol consumption. Reported 
drinking volumes are notoriously inaccurate and, in fact, are of little practical use. 
Given the parameters of body weight and time duration between initiation of 
drinking and determination of the BAC, the number of "drinks" consumed may be 
reliability calculated. Retrograde extrapolation is applicable in the forensic setting 
with scientific reliability when reasonable and justifiable assumptions are utilized. 
INTRODUCTION 
Ethyl alcohol may well be the most thoroughly studied chemical in 
the field of toxicology. From its simple molecular structure to its two-step 
catabolism, this two-carbon alcohol represents a triumph in our ability to 
investigate and understand toxicological actions. Even after more than a 
century of inquiry, interest in alcohol continues as evidenced by the 
weekly appearance of 5-10 new publications on this topic, ranging from 
animal-based studies to forensic situations. Surprisingly, in the face of 
this substantial literature, certain questions are difficult to answer when 
Requests for reprints should be sent to Dr. Mark R. Montgomery, University of South Florida, 
College of Public Health, 13201 Bruce B. Downs Boulevard, Tampa, FL 33612. 
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practical application of this information is needed. One explanation for 
this difficulty may lie in the fact that most of our published conclusions 
are obtained in the traditional scientific manner, that is, in a laboratory 
setting with control of variables. However, in the "real world" of human 
experiences with ethanol, many variables are uncontrolled, and there-
fore much of our painstakingly accumulated knowledge may be of lim-
ited value. When alcohol-related matters, such as driving under the influ-
ence (DUI) cases or civil matters related to possible alcohol-mediated 
impairment, are at issue, the most common toxicological question posed 
is: Given a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) at a specific time, can the 
BAC at an earlier time be predicted reliably? Or stated simply: Is retro-
grade extrapolation valid? Given the situation of an individual drinking 
multiple alcoholic beverages in an inconsistent temporal pattern over 
several hours, the scientific community is divided on the question of 
whether this pharmacokinetic calculation may be performed reliably. 
This commentary examines the basis for those divergent opinions. 
In extrapolation of any concentration-time data, the pharmacody-
namics of absorption and distribution of the chemical (in this case, ethyl 
alcohol) and its elimination from the blood are fundamental consider-
ations. Most studies on human pharmacodynamics of alcohol utilize a 
bolus design where individuals consume a single dose. Consideration is 
normally given, and appropriate control measures taken, to variables 
such as sex, age, body mass, form of alcohol consumed, food intake, and 
activity level. Periodic blood, breath, and/or urine samples are obtained, 
the data analyzed mathematically, and appropriate conclusions and for-
mulas developed (Holford, 1987; Lewis, 1986; Pieters et al., 1990; Wagner 
et al., 1990; Wedel et al., 1991). These elegant studies are certainly valu-
able in the context of experimental toxicology; however, they may have 
little in common, and may provide little of practical application, when 
predicting ethyl alcohol blood levels following normal human drinking 
behavior. This commentary also provides a reasonable, realistic, and sci-
entifically sound approach to addressing this important question. 
DISCUSSION 
No discussion of alcohol pharmacodynamics would be complete 
without mention of the resultant central nervous system toxicity. This 
broad topic is well covered in standard texts and need not be repeated 
here. However, particularly of interest in human toxicology are effects of 
alcohol on one aspect of central nervous system function, cognitive-
motor behavior. This behavior is the relevant consideration for such com-
plex activities as driving an automobile and flying an airplane. For auto-
mobile operation, a two-dimensional task, it is well established that 
impairment begins for all individuals at blood levels in excess of 0.05 g/dl 
(Committee on Medicolegal Problems, 1968; Ritchie, 1985). For operation 
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of an airplane, a three-dimensional task, the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion has recognized blood levels of 0.04 g/dl and above as not permissi-
ble (Modell and Modell, 1990). Recent research with flight simulators has 
indicated even a lower threshold for impairment of this complicated ac-
tivity, with all subjects showing impairment at the lowest blood level 
investigated, 0.025 g/dl (Billings et al., 1991). There is no doubt that, for 
both types of cognitive-motor behaviors, as little as two to three drinks, 
absorbed by an individual of average mass, will produce impairment of 
judgment, decisionmaking, and execution. Therefore, because of the 
practical importance of reliably predicting relatively low blood alcohol 
levels, any extrapolation process must be well justified and grounded in 
sound scientific principles. 
It is appropriate to clarify from the outset that extrapolation from 
concentration-time data is not an academic theory or a mathematical 
process that is unique to the consideration of ethyl alcohol. The same 
principles of pharmacokinetics and pharmacodynamics that relate blood 
levels of alcohol to time are applied clinically every time drug dosages 
are established for an individual. In these clinical situations, rate of ab-
sorption, rate of elimination, desired blood level, and body mass are 
considered in the same manner for calculation of the required dosing 
regimen, for example, once every 4 h or twice a day. Likewise, given the 
needed parameters of rates, body mass, and drug blood levels, the time 
at which a specific dose should be taken can be calculated. 
Three quantities common to blood alcohol data require comment: 
1. For ethyl alcohol, concentrations are expressed frequently in units of 
grams of alcohol per 100 ml of whole blood or blood serum. For exam-
ple, a "legal limit" of 0.10 may be expressed as 0.10 g alcohol per 
deciliter (g/dl), 100 mg/dl, 0.10 g/100 ml, or 0.10 g%. This type of quan-
titation is in contrast with conventional scientific designation where 
concentrations of chemicals are expressed in units of molarity, molal-
ity, or normality. 
2. In the public sector, concentrations are usually determined on either 
whole-blood samples or the isolated serum. The quantitative differ-
ence between the two may vary between 12 and 17% (serum > whole 
blood) (Baselt and Danhof, 1988), due to membrane diffusion limita-
tions for alcohol and protein osmotic pressure within the erythrocyte. 
Thus reducing a serum value by 15% to yield a whole-blood equiva-
lency is valid. 
3. The nonquantitative term "drink" is usually defined as 1 fluid ounce 
of 86-100 proof alcohol, that is, the alcohol content of a standard 
"mixed drink" containing 1 oz distilled spirits, 4 oz table wine (ap-
proximately 12% alcohol), or 12 oz regular-strength beer (approxi-
mately 4.5% alcohol) (Hunt, 1990). 
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With these explanations available, the procedure of retrograde ex-
trapolation of alcohol may be examined. This process considers the tim-
ing of alcohol absorption into, and elimination of alcohol from, the 
blood and the relationship of those kinetics to the time points of inter-
est. Relevant considerations include the following. 
Absorption of Alcohol from the Gastrointestinal Tract into the Blood-
stream The effect of food consumption on the rate of alcohol absorp-
tion has been addressed repeatedly with divergent conclusions. There is 
little doubt that stomach contents delay absorption following bolus alco-
hol consumption (Garriott, 1988). However, in the normal social environ-
ment with common drinking patterns, this delay may not occur 
(Gullberg, 1982). It is certainly reasonable to conclude that on an empty 
stomach, all alcohol is absorbed within 30-45 min after the last drink. 
With a small amount of gastric contents, absorption may be delayed an 
additional 30-45 min, making a conservative total time for complete ab-
sorption a maximum of 90 min after the last drink. 
Effects of Beverage Volume and Alcohol Concentration on the Rate of 
Alcohol Absorption Absorption rate is not linear; the rate decreases as 
the volume of alcoholic beverages consumed increases. This is due to 
volume effects on the stomach and the gradual inhibition of pyloric 
sphincter peristalsis with increasing alcohol quantities. A delayed pas-
sage from the stomach decreases absorption rate, since the majority of 
absorption occurs in the small intestine. The rate of absorption also is 
nonlinear at high BACs, due to the decreased concentration gradient 
between the gastric and intestinal alcohol contents and the alcohol con-
centration in the blood. 
Potential Influence of the Physical Form of the Drink In rigidly limited 
situations, such as consumption of a large volume in a short time span 
("chugging"), distilled spirits (liquors) are absorbed slightly faster than 
wine and in turn slightly faster than beer. However, in the normal drink-
ing context of consuming multiple drinks during a period of several 
hours, the form of the drink would have negligible influence upon the 
BAC. 
Rate of Alcohol Elimination from the Blood Metabolism in the liver 
and elimination by the kidneys remove 0.015-0.020 g/dl per hour by a 
zero-order process (Ritchie, 1985), which is constant within the range of 
BACs normally encountered in forensic considerations. This hourly de-
crease in the BAC is roughly equivalent to the BAC produced in a 70-kg 
individual by absorption of one drink. Hence, a practical "Rule of 
Thumb" provides that individuals of average mass eliminate one drink 
per hour. 
Possible Gender Differences Recent data have indicated a potential 
influence of gender upon alcohol pharmacodynamics and suggest that 
females may achieve higher peak BACs for a given alcohol consumption 
compared with males, even when adjusted for body mass (Frezza et al., 
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1990). Several explanations are provided for this potential difference, the 
discussion of which is beyond the scope of this commentary. However, 
there is no evidence of a sex-linked difference in the rate of alcohol 
elimination (Whitfield et alv 1990). Therefore, equal consideration of 
males and females in the pharmacodynamics of alcohol will error, if at 
all, by decreasing the predicted BACs for women. 
Influence of Body Mass on Pharmacodynamics Body mass consider-
ations are minimal, with the exception being individuals who are very 
obese or extremely thin. These individuals are relatively difficult to evalu-
ate not only because of the extremes of mass and body fat deposits, but 
also because of concomitant aberrations in metabolic processes that may 
accompany the extreme variances in physiognomy. However, body mass 
does become relevant when part of the desired prediction is estimation 
of the number of drinks consumed. Three parameters are interlinked: (1) 
body mass, (2) number of drinks absorbed, and (3) blood alcohol level. If 
any two are known, the third can be calculated based on standard phar-
macokinetic principles, where 
mass of alcohol consumed 
volume of distribution x body mass 
Alternatively, the desired parameter may be obtained from Table 1 based 
on these calculations (Sunshine, 1975). These combined principles and 
toxicological properties result in the absorption and elimination of alco-
hol from a hypothetical individual as shown in Figure 1. This curve, 
which has been reported widely and is presented here schematically, has 
been determined repeatedly following bolus consumption and illustrates 
the characteristics of nonlinear absorption, peak concentration at 30-90 
min following bolus consumption, and linear elimination at a rate of 0.02 
g/dl/h. 
TABLE 1 Approximate Ethanol Concentrations in Blood (mg Ethanol/100 ml Whole Blood) 
Body 
weight 
(lb) 
100 
120 
140 
150 
160 
180 
200 
220 
240 
1 
38 
31 
27 
25 
23 
21 
19 
17 
16 
2 
75 
63 
54 
51 
47 
42 
38 
34 
31 
3 
113 
94 
80 
75 
70 
63 
56 
51 
47 
N u m b e r of drinks absorbed 
4 
150 
125 
107 
101 
94 
83 
75 
68 
63 
5 
188 
156 
134 
126 
117 
104 
94 
85 
78 
6 
225 
188 
161 
151 
141 
125 
113 
102 
94 
7 
263 
219 
188 
176 
164 
146 
131 
119 
109 
8 
300 
250 
214 
201 
188 
167 
150 
136 
125 
9 
338 
281 
241 
226 
211 
188 
169 
153 
141 
10 
375 
313 
268 
251 
234 
208 
188 
170 
156 
Note Modified from Sunshine (1975) Reproduced with permission of CRC Press. 
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0.20 r-
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FIGURE 1. Schematic representation of blood alcohol concentrations after bolus consumption. 
These toxicological principles, as just presented, also may be used to 
describe blood alcohol kinetics in realistic situations. A hypothetical set 
of circumstances is presented for illustration: Ten drinks are consumed 
by a normal individual on a relatively empty stomach during a 3-h period, 
after which no additional alcohol is ingested. The expected BACs for 
three reasonable, but widely different, consumption patterns in the same 
individual are presented in Figure 2. 
- * 0,20 r 
o en 
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FIGURE 2. Schematic representation of blood alcohol concentrations after consumption of 10 
drinks during a 3-h period. Case A five drinks are consumed during the first hour, three drinks 
during the second hour, and two drinks during the third houn Case B. three drinks are consumed 
during the first hour, four drinks during the second hour, and three drinks during the third hour. 
Case C. two drinks are consumed during the first hour, three drinks during the second hour, and 
five drinks during the third hour. Calculations of BACs assume an individual of average mass (70 
kg) 
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Case A—five drinks are consumed during the first hour, three drinks 
during the second hour, and two drinks during the third hour. 
Case B—three drinks are consumed during the first hour, four drinks 
during the second hour, and three drinks during the third hour. 
Case C—two drinks are consumed during the first hour, three drinks 
during the second hour, and five drinks during the third hour. 
Considering a constant rate of removal of one drink per hour, which 
will occur simultaneously with absorption, all three situations will result 
in seven drinks remaining in the individual's body, but not necessarily 
absorbed into the blood, at the end of the 3-h drinking session. The 
differences among the three cases in resultant BACs at h 3 will reflect the 
number of those seven remaining drinks that have been absorbed. 
Figure 2 illustrates the differences between this "real life" situation 
and that situation resulting after bolus consumption (Fig. 1). The princi-
pal difference relevant to pharmacokinetics is that, in Figure 1, the peak 
absorption occurs 30-90 min after bolus administration. In Figure 2 the 
time of peak absorption varies, reflecting the differences in drinking pat-
terns during this absorptive state. However, in all three cases, a similar 
peak blood level is reached within 30-60 min after cessation of drinking 
(after h 3), and in all three cases the BACs are virtually identical thereaf-
ter. These drinking patterns reflect more realistically what is encountered 
in the normal social environment. In fact, allowing an additional 30-60 
min to complete absorption after the last drink may be overly conserva-
tive. The peak blood level most likely is reached simultaneously, or even 
before the last drink is consumed, in normal drinking situations 
(Gullberg, 1982; Jones, 1990). 
Figure 2 also illustrates the argument surrounding application of ex-
trapolation procedures. If one is presented only with the fact that an 
individual consumed 10 drinks within 3 h, then the range of resultant 
blood concentrations may be either quite small or quite large depending 
on the time frame in question. For example, if one is given a BAC at h 7 
and extrapolates to h 5, a narrow range for the predicted BAC would 
result. This is evident from the correct assumption that between h 5 and 
7 the subject is in the postabsorptive state (Fig. 2). The differences among 
curves A, B, and C during h 0-3 would be irrelevant. However, if one 
were given the same BAC at h 7, and extrapolated to h 3 (extrapolation 
from the postabsorptive to absorptive state), the range of values pre-
dicted must be relatively wide to reflect the differences among the possi-
ble consumption patterns. 
As shown above, retrograde extrapolation within the postabsorptive 
state is straightforward. However, critics will assert that extrapolation en-
compassing both the postabsorptive and absorptive states cannot be 
performed with scientific reliability. This commentary contends that the 
latter process can be accomplished when reasonable, realistic, and justi-
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fiable assumptions are made that are based on sound principles of phar-
macology, toxicology, and physiology. 
Three hypothetical cases of alcohol-related situations provide a 
mechanism to examine the application of this mathematical technique. 
The first two examples are designed to illustrate the wide differences in 
information that may be available and the effect of that information base 
on the range of extrapolated values that is predicted. 
Case 1 
A man, body weight 220 lb, is in a bar drinking beer from 7:30 P.M. 
until 11:30 P.M. He leaves the bar at 11:30 P.M. and is involved in an auto-
mobile accident at 2:10 A.M. The man claims to have drunk four beers in 
the bar and not to have consumed any additional alcohol after 11:30 P.M. 
A sample of whole blood is drawn at 2:45 A.M. and yields a BAC of 0.18 g/ 
dl. The two questions considered are: 
1. What was the BAC at the time of the accident? Since this individual 
stopped drinking 2 h and 40 min prior to the accident, it is reasonable 
to assume that all of the consumed alcohol was in his blood (i.e., he 
was in the postabsorptive state). The BAC would be decreasing at the 
rate of 0.015-0.020 g/dl/h during the 35 min between the accident (2:10 
A.M.) and the time the blood was drawn (2:45 A.M.). Therefore, during 
that 35 minutes, the BAC would have decreased approximately 0.009-
0.012 g/dl. When added to the value determined at 2:45 A.M. (0.18 g/ 
dl), this simple calculation indicates a BAC at 2:10 A.M. of 0.19 g/dl. If 
one wishes to use a wider range of possible elimination rates (0.01-
0.03 g/dl/h) to consider the possibility of a wider variance among indi-
viduals or the possibility of nonlinear kinetics within an individual 
(Lewis, 1986), the extrapolated value would differ from the previous 
calculation by yielding a range of 0.19-0.20 g/dl. Thus using a wider 
range of possible elimination rates under this circumstance is of little 
practical significance. This example illustrates the characteristically 
narrow range of values predicted when extrapolating in the postab-
sorptive state. 
2. Is the reported beer consumption accurate? By calculation or from 
Table 1, a BAC of 0.18 g/dl in a 220-lb individual results from having 
10-11 drinks in the blood (at 2:45 A.M.). This hypothetical individual 
stopped drinking at 11:30 P.M., a duration in slight excess of 3 h prior 
to 2:45 A.M. Based on a normal elimination rate, approximately three 
drinks would have been removed during those 3 h; hence 13-14 
drinks were in his body at 11:30 P.M. Since absorption and elimination 
are occurring simultaneously, one must also add one additional drink 
for each hour the individual was drinking, in this case four (7:30-11:30 
P.M.). 
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To summarize: There were 10-11 drinks absorbed at the time blood is 
drawn plus 3 drinks eliminated between accident and blood drawing 
plus 4 drinks eliminated while drinking. Therefore 17-18 drinks were 
consumed by this individual between 7:30 and 11:30 P.M., resulting in a 
BAC of 0.18 g/dl at 2:45 A.M. The number of drinks reportedly consumed 
(four) is clearly inaccurate. 
Case 2 
A woman, body weight 145 lb, arrives at a party at 9:30 P.M. and leaves 
at 1:45 A.M. She is involved in an accident at 1:55 A.M. No drinking history 
is available. A BAC of 0.13 g/dl is determined at a local hospital on blood 
drawn at 3:00 A.M. 
The same two questions of extrapolated BAC and consumption can 
be addressed simultaneously. The blood alcohol analysis was determined 
on blood serum, 0.13 g/dl. Therefore, the whole-blood equivalency 
would be 15% less or 0.11 g/dl. Since no information is available concern-
ing when this hypothetical lady started or stopped drinking, a relatively 
wide range of possible BACs at the time of the accident is calculated 
based on the two extreme possibilities of either complete absorption or 
very little absorption. 
Possibility 1. She stopped drinking at a time adequate to allow complete 
absorption (i.e., she was in the postabsorptive state) at the 
time of the accident. The maximum BAC would be calcu-
lated, as in Case 1, using a maximum rate of disappearance 
of 0.02 g/dl/h. Given approximately 1 h between the acci-
dent and the blood being drawn (1:55-3:00 A.M.), 0.02 g/dl is 
added to the whole-blood value of 0.11 g/dl. Therefore, her 
maximum BAC at the time of the accident (1:55 A.M.) was 
0.13 g/dl. 
Possibility 2. She did all of her drinking shortly before leaving the party 
and therefore was in the absorptive state at the time of the 
accident. To extrapolate from the postabsorptive value to 
the absorptive state, several additional factors must be eval-
uated in order to predict a realistic minimum BAC. These 
additional factors must be considered in a step-by-step 
fashion. To make a physiologically realistic prediction of the 
amount of alcohol absorbed, it is necessary at the outset to 
calculate the volume of drinks consumed. A BAC of 0.11 g/ 
dl (at 3:00 A.M.) in an individual of 145 lb results from ab-
sorption of four drinks (Table 1). An additional one drink 
was eliminated during the delay between the accident and 
the blood being drawn (1:55-3:00 A.M.), making a total of at 
least five drinks consumed at 1:55 A.M. Knowledge of the 
form of the drinks consumed is very helpful in arriving at a 
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reasonable estimation of the minimum time required to 
consume five drinks; that is, it is reasonable that a 145-lb 
individual would not drink five 12-oz beers in 5 mm. How-
ever, 5 min to consume a single mixed drink containing 5 
oz of distilled spirits is arguably possible. If the latter is 
assumed, then the BAC after 15 min of absorption (5 min to 
consume the drink and 10 min between leaving the party 
and the accident) would be quite low. Therefore, assump-
tion of absorption of one fifth of the total consumed within 
the 15-min period (complete absorption within 90 min) is a 
conservative, minimum estimate. One fluid ounce of alco-
hol produces a BAC of 0.03 g/dl in a 145-lb individual (Table 
1). Therefore, in this example with few details available, the 
predicted BAC at the time of the accident would fall within 
the relatively wide range of 0.03-0.13 g/dl. 
Cases 1 and 2 represent extremes both in information available and 
in ranges predicted. Case 3 is presented for analysis as a hypothetical, 
but typical, example of information available in an alcohol-related matter. 
Case 3 
A male, body weight 160 lb, drinks an unknown volume of beer over 
a 4-h period, 9:00 P.M. to 1:00 A.M. He leaves the bar and has an accident 
at 1:30 A.M.; a whole-blood sample is drawn at 2:30 A.M.; BAC - 0.19 g/dl. 
What is the predicted range for the BAC al 1:30 A.M.? 
As in the previous two examples, the maximum predicted value is 
calculated easily by assuming complete absorption at the time in ques-
tion. Hence, with 1 h elapsing between the accident and blood drawing 
(1:30-2:30 A.M.), and accepting the maximum elimination rate of 0.020 g/ 
dl/h, 0.020 g/dl is added to the determined value of 0.19 g/dl. Thus the 
maximum predicted BAC is 0.21 g/dl. 
As in Case 2, prediction of the minimum value assumes a relatively 
large proportion of the drinking was done shortly before the accident, 
placing the individual in the absorptive state at the time of the accident. 
Also, as in Case 2, this calculation requires examination of the volume 
consumed so that a physiologically realistic assumption can be made 
concerning the amount of time that would be required for that volume 
to be drunk. At 2:30 A.M., a BAC of 0.19 g/dl results from eight "drinks" 
(beers in this case) absorbed into an individual of 160 lb (Table 1). One 
additional beer was eliminated between the accident (1:30 A.M.) and the 
blood drawing (2:30 A.M.), making the minimum in the body at 1:30 A.M. 
of nine beers. The man drank over a 4-h period (9:00 P.M.-1:00 A.M.), 
during which time 4 additional drinks would be eliminated, making the 
minimum consumed be 13 beers. 
An extreme and probably unrealistic drinking pattern may be as-
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sumed initially: The individual sat in the bar and drank 1 beer per hour 
for 3 h and then drank 10 beers during the fourth hour. The first three 
beers, consumed at the rate of one per hour, would be eliminated at the 
rate of one per hour, thus making no contribution to the final BAC. The 
predicted minimum value after 30 min of absorption (from the end of 
drinking to the time of the accident) would be, conservatively, one third 
of the total for the remaining 10 beers, that is, BAC - 0.07 g/dl (Table 1). 
Hence, the extrapolated range would be very wide, 0.07-0.21 g/dl. 
However, with assumption of a more realistic and more probable 
drinking pattern, the predicted range narrows. If, for example, one as-
sumes three beers were consumed per hour for the first 3 h and four 
beers were consumed during the fourth hour, the minimum is calculated 
as follows: 
During the first 3 h nine beers are consumed and three are elimi-
nated, leaving six that will be fully absorbed by 1:30 A.M. These six ab-
sorbed will contribute 0.14 g/dl (Table 1) to the predicted minimum. Of 
the four remaining beers that are consumed during the last hour, one 
will be eliminated, leaving three to consider. If only one of these three is 
absorbed during the 30 min between leaving the bar and the accident, 
that one beer will contribute 0.02 g/dl to the minimum (Table 1). There-
fore the minimum predicted, using socially reasonable and physiologi-
cally realistic assumptions of the drinking pattern, will be 0.16 g/dl (0.14 
g/dl plus 0.02 g/dl). Thus, under these assumptions, the predicted range 
of BAC in this case is 0.16-0.21 g/dl. Other assumptions, arguments, or 
information for different drinking patterns would be treated similarly. 
As shown in these three hypothetical cases, the extent of an extrapo-
lated BAC range will depend on the information base available and the 
assumptions made. In most cases, it is clearly inappropriate to attempt 
extrapolation to a single value. It is equally clear, however, that extrapola-
tion within the postabsorptive state and extrapolation from the postab-
sorptive to the absorptive state can be accomplished in a straightforward 
manner. Both procedures will yield a range of BACs that is firmly sup-
ported by scientifically sound tenets of pharmacology, toxicology, and 
physiology. 
REFERENCES 
Baselt, R. C, and Danhof, I. E. 1988. Disposition of alcohol in man. In Medicolegal Aspects of 
Alcohol Determination in Biological Specimens, ed. J. C Garnott, p. 62. Littleton, Mass.: PSG 
Publishing. 
Billings, C. E., Demosthenes, T., White, T. R., and O'Hara, D. B. 1991. Effects of alcohol on pilot 
performance in simulated flight. Aviation Space Environ Med. 62:233-235. 
Committee on Medicolegal Problems. 1968. Alcohol and the Impaired Driver, p. 59. Chicago: Amer-
ican Medical Association. 
Frezza, J., Di Pavoda, C , Pozzato, C , Terpin, M., Barona, E., and Lieber, C S. 1990. Blood alcohol 
levels in women. The role of decreased gastric alcohol dehydrogenase activity and first-pass 
metabolism. N Engl J Med 322:95-99. 
292 M. R. MONTGOMERY AND M. J. REASOR 
Cullberg, R. C. 1982. Variation in blood alcohol concentration following the last drink. ]. Police Sci. 
Admm. 10:289-296. 
Holford, N. H. G. 1987. Clinical pharmacokinetics of ethanol. Clm. Pharmacokinet. 13:273-292. 
Hunt, W. A. 1990. Ethanol and other aliphatic alcohols. In Modern Pharmacology, eds. C. R. Craig 
and R. E. Stitzel, pp. 533-541. Boston: Little, Brown. 
Jones, A. W. 1990. Status of alcohol absorption among drinking drivers. J. Anal. Toxicol. 14:198-220. 
Lewis, M. J. 1986. Blood alcohol: The concentration-time curve and retrospective estimation of 
level. /. Forensic Sci. Soc. 26:95-113. 
Model), J. M., and Modell, J. C. 1990. Drinking and flying—The problem of alcohol use by pilots N 
Engl. J. Med. 323:455-461. 
Pieters, J. E., Wedel, M., and Schaafsma, G. 1990. Parameter estimation in a three-compartment 
model for blood alcohol curves. Alcohol Alcohol. 25:17-24. 
Ritchie, J. M. 1985. The aliphatic alcohols. In Goodman and G/7/man's The Pharmacological Basis of 
Therapeutics, eds. A. G. Gillman, L. S. Goodman, T. Rail, and F. Murad, pp. 372-386. New York-
Macmillan. 
Sunshine, 1.1975. Methodology for Analytical Toxicology, p. 152. West Palm Beach, Fla- CRC Press. 
Wagner, J. G., Wilkinson, P. K., and Ganes, D. A. 1990. Estimation of the amount of alcohol ingested 
from a single blood alcohol concentration. Alcohol Alcohol. 25:379-384. 
Wedel, M., Pieters, J. E., Pikaar, N. A., and Ockhuizen, T. 1991. Application of a three-compartment 
model to a study of the effects of sex, alcohol dose, and concentration, exercise and food 
consumption on the pharmacokinetics of ethanol in healthy volunteers. Alcohol Alcohol 
26-329-336. 
Whitfield, J B., Starmer, G. A., and Martin, N. G. 1990. Alcohol metabolism in men and women. 
Alcohol. Clin. Exper. Res. 14:785-786. 
Received December 13, 1991 
Accepted February 4, 7992 
A. R. Stowell,* Ph.D. and L. I. StowelV Ph.D. 
Estimation of Blood Alcohol Concentrations after Social 
Drinking 
REFERENCE: Stowell AR, Stowell LI. Estimation of blood alcohol 
concentrations after social drinking. J Forensic Sci 1998;43( I): 14-21. 
ABSTRACT: Requests for estimates of blood alcohol concentra-
tions (BACs) are often made when blood samples are taken some 
hours after the time of interest. Many believe that such estimates 
are not reliable because the subject's alcohol clearance rate is never 
known and often there is uncertainty as to whether the subject was 
postabsorptive at the time in question. 
In order to evaluate the potential errors associated with BAC 
estimates under these non-ideal conditions, BAC estimates were 
compared with empirical data obtained from 24 healthy males, 
ranging in age from 22 to 56 years, who took part in a three hour 
social drinking session. One blood sample for alcohol analysis was 
taken from each subject approximately 1 hour after drinking stopped 
and another was taken approximately 3.5 hours after drinking 
stopped. 
Estimations of BACs at the blood sampling time points were 
made assuming each person had a constant blood alcohol clearance 
rate in the range of 10 to 20 mg/dL/h (0.01 to 0.02 g/dL/h) over 
the whole of the experimental period. A variety of methods were 
used to estimate the volume of distribution for alcohol. All BAC 
estimations were made assuming complete absorption and full 
equilibration of the total alcohol dose. 
The results showed that actual BACs were usually within or very 
close to the range of ''forward" estimates based on the known 
alcohol doses. Furthermore, most BACs measured about an hour 
after cessation of drinking were within or very close to the predicted 
range based on back extrapolation from the actual 3.5 hour BAC 
result. 
KEYWORDS: forensic science, blood alcohol, social drinking, 
estimation 
Alcohol analysis is often performed on blood samples taken 
several hours after a person was involved in a motor vehicle 
accident or in some form of crime. In this situation a forensic 
scientist is sometimes asked to estimate the blood alcohol concen-
tration (BAC) of the person at the time of the accident or crime. 
Such estimates have been called "retrograde extrapolations" or 
"back estimations'* because they work back in time from a known 
to an unknown BAC (1). 
In other situations the forensic scientist is asked to estimate a 
BAC at the time of an accident or crime when no blood specimen 
has been taken. In this case supposedly reliable information con-
cerning the person's alcohol intake prior to the event in question 
is usually available. We will call such estimates "forward estima-
tions" because they work forward in time from a stated dose of 
'Toxicology Group, Institute of Environmental Science and Research 
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alcohol (2). Back estimations will be accurate under the following 
"ideal" conditions: (a) The person is postabsorptive with respect 
to alcohol between the time of the accident/crime and the time of 
blood sampling. Under these conditions any changes in the person's 
BAC are caused only by metabolism and excretion of alcohol, (b) 
The decrease in the person's BAC over the period in question is 
a known function of time. 
For practical purposes, the postabsorptive decay in BAC can 
be assumed to be a linear function of time, especially when back 
estimations are performed over just a few hours and the starting 
point for the calculation is a BAC above about 10 mg/dL (3,4). 
Therefore under the above conditions it is a simple matter to 
multiply the blood alcohol clearance rate [Widmark's P^ (5)] by 
the appropriate time period (t2 - tt) and add the known BAC at 
the time of blood sampling (BAC2) to give the BAC at the time 
in question (BAQ). 
i.e., B A d = BAC2 + £<*, X (t2 - t|) 
Forward estimations will be accurate under the following "ideal" 
conditions: (a) The person is post absorptive at the time of the 
accident/crime; (b) The person's (post absorptive) blood alcohol 
clearance rate is known; (c) The person's alcohol dose is known; 
(d) The person's volume of distribution (VD) for alcohol is known; 
and (e) From the time drinking starts, the person metabolizes 
alcohol at a constant rate, reflected by the person's post absorptive 
blood alcohol clearance rate. 
Because alcohol is distributed almost exclusively in the water 
phase of the body (2), the VD can be calculated if the total body 
water (TBW) volume is known. However, as the VD is a purely 
theoretical entity we prefer to use the TBW as the basis of our 
calculations. 
Therefore, under the above "ideal" conditions, the following 
equation applies: 
BAC = (D/TBW) X Blw X 100 - Pao X t 
where: BAC = Blood alcohol concentration in units of milli-
grams per 100 milliliters (mg/dL) at the time 
in question 
D = Dose of alcohol (grams) 
TBW = Total body water volume (liters) 
Blw = The fraction of water in the blood (v/v) 
Peo = Blood alcohol clearance rate (mg/dL/h) 
t = The time (hours) between the start of drinking 
and the event in question. 
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The above equation can be expressed in the following sim-
pler way: 
BAC, = BAC0 - Poo X t 
where BAC( is the BAC at time "t" and BAC0 is the theoretical 
BAC which would exist at time "zero" if the total alcohol dose 
was distributed instantaneously throughout the total body water at 
that time. It is equivalent to "C0" as defined by Widmark (5). In 
this context, time "zero" is the time drinking starts. 
Unfortunately, in forensic science practice, the ideal conditions 
listed above are not likely to exist and back and forward estimations 
of BAC can be subject to large errors for the following reasons: 
(1) The person's fi^ is never known, p ^ values vary greatly from 
person to person and values ranging from as low as 8 to more 
than 30 mg/dL/hr have been reported (6). Furthermore, over a 
period of many hours, it may be inappropriate to assume that p ^ 
is constant (4,7); (2) It is very difficult to predict when a drinker 
will become postabsorptive with respect to alcohol. The rate of 
absorption of alcohol into the blood is dependent on a number of 
variables such as the amount and type of food consumption prior 
to and during drinking, the type of beverage, and drinking history 
(8-10); and (3) VD and TBW values are not known in most forensic 
situations. VD and TBW can vary greatly between lean and obese 
subjects (11,12). 
For these reasons some forensic scientists refuse to perform 
either back or forward estimations of BAC, regarding the potential 
for serious error as far too high. 
Our approach to this problem has been to make the estimates 
but to clearly state all the major assumptions on which the 
results depend. 
For back estimations our assumptions have usually been listed 
as follows: (1) At the time in question **X" had already absorbed, 
into his/her bloodstream, all the alcohol (s)he had consumed prior 
to the accident/alleged crime; (2) At the time in question "X" 
cleared alcohol from his/her blood at a rate within the approximate 
range of 10 to 20 mg per 100 mL per hour; and (3) "X" did not 
consume any alcohol between the time of the accident/crime and 
the time the blood sample was taken for alcohol analysis. 
For forward estimations assumptions 1 and 2 are the same and 
assumption 3 is unnecessary. However the subject's height, weight, 
and age is stated because this information is used to estimate the 
subject's TBW, using the equations developed by Watson et al. 
(2). The alcohol dose is also stated, along with any assumptions 
made in determining this dose, e.g., the alcohol content of a given 
beverage said to have been consumed. 
Our results are usually presented in the following way: "If the 
listed information and assumptions are correct, "X" would have 
had a blood alcohol concentration within the approximate range 
of "x" to "y" mg per 100 mL at the time of the accident/alleged 
crime." If we have good reasons to suspect that any of the assump-
tions could be wrong, the relevant consequences are explained. 
There is a large amount of published data relating to rapid bolus 
consumption of alcohol under controlled laboratory conditions 
(6,13-16). This data strongly suggests that the most important 
factor affecting the validity of both forward and back estimations 
of BAC is the rate of absorption of alcohol into the bloodstream 
immediately after drinking. If absorption is very slow, both forward 
and back estimations of BAC will tend to be too high until the 
total dose has been absorbed. If absorption is very rapid a BAC 
"overshoot" can occur. Under these conditions, both forward and 
back estimations can be too low until the total dose has been 
absorbed and equilibrated throughout the body water. 
However the rapid bolus consumption of alcohol is uncommon 
under normal social drinking conditions. It seems likely that most 
people who develop BACs sufficiently high to be of forensic 
relevance, attain them by drinking over a number of hours, possibly 
a whole evening or afternoon. Drinking binges lasting for one or 
more days may also occur. In these situations the amount of alcohol 
consumed near the end of the drinking session is likely to be 
only a small proportion of that already consumed, absorbed and 
equilibrated over the preceding hours. Therefore any rapid or 
delayed absorption of the last few drinks is not likely to have a 
large influence on an already high BAC. 
Although there are some published studies of social drinking 
(17-20) there are very few dealing with drinking over a period of 
several hours (20). Therefore in order to better understand the 
errors associated with back and forward estimations of BAC under 
these conditions, we carried out our own study in which the results 
of BAC estimations were compared with accurate BAC data 
obtained from healthy males who took part in a social drinking 
session lasting approximately three hours. 
Experimental 
Subjects 
Twenty four healthy male volunteers took part in a simulated 
social drinking session in which they consumed alcoholic bever-
ages of their choice. Immediately prior to drinking, the heights 
and weights of the subjects were measured. A summary of anthro-
pometric data for the subjects is given in Table 1. 
Each volunteer recorded his daily alcohol consumption for a 
total of 15 days prior to the simulated social drinking session. This 
drinking "diary" was used to estimate each volunteer's mean daily 
alcohol consumption. The estimates ranged from 1 to 112 g of 
absolute alcohol per day (mean = 32, SD = 27). 
In the discussion of the results of this study, the subjects have 
been identified by 24 letters, "Z" through to "C." 
Alcohol and Food Consumption 
For each subject, drinking started between 13:20 and 14:41 
hours. All subjects ate lunch at least an hour before drinking 
started but no attempt was made to control the type or quantity 
of food consumed. 
TABLE I—Anthropometric data for experimental subjects. 
Mean 
SD 
Min 
Max 
Height 
(cm) 
178 
9 
162 
203 
Wgt 
(kg) 
85 
16 
58 
116 
Age 
(Years) 
41 
10 
22 
56 
TBW* 
(L) 
46.3 
6.1 
35.8 
56.9 
TBW** 
(L) 
46.6 
6.0 
34.8 
57.5 
TBW§ 
(L) 
52.0 
7.5 
38.5 
66.7 
TBW§§ 
(L) 
46.7 
8.8 
31.8 
63.6 
Calculated using the equation of Watson et al. (2), using the height, 
weight and age data. 
* Calculated using the method of Forest (22), using the height and 
weight data only. 
§Calculated from the specific volume of distribution determined as 
described by Lewis (12). 
§§CalcuIated using a mean Widmark Factor of 0.68. 
n = 24 for all variables. 
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Alcoholic drinks were consumed by each volunteer for a penod 
ranging from 2.33 to 3.92 hours (mean = 3.01, SD = 0.36), during 
which they sat and talked, watched television and consumed (ad 
lib) a variety of snack food (e.g., salted peanuts, potato crisps, 
and pretzels). 
In an attempt to mimic a normal social drinking situation, each 
subject was allowed to drink at a rate they found comfortable and 
no attempt was made to control the number or type of beverages 
consumed. However the volume of liquor consumed by each subject 
was accurately recorded in order to calculate his total alcohol dose. 
Each separate beverage (beer, wine, gin, whisky, brandy) was sam-
pled for analysis of its alcohol content. Alcohol dose rates ranged 
from 0.61 to 2.07 g/kg body weight (mean = 1.20, SD = 0.3). 
Approximately 1 to 1.5 hours after drinking stopped, a two course 
dinner was served to the volunteers together with coffee or tea. 
Blood Sampling 
During the experiment, three blood samples were taken from 
an antecubital vein of each volunteer. Each sample was analyzed 
for alcohol by head space gas chromatography (21). The same 
technique was used to determine the alcohol content of the alco-
holic beverages. The coefficient of variation for the analysis 
method was 1%. 
Blood sample 1 was a blank sample taken immediately prior 
to the drinking session. Sample 2 was taken between 0.78 and 
1.38 hours (mean = 1.04) after drinking stopped, i.e., before 
the meal, and sample 3 was taken between 2.13 and 4.27 hours 
(mean = 3.26) after drinking stopped, i.e., after the meal. The 
results obtained upon analysis of these samples were called 
BAC1, BAC2 and BAC3. 
For the purposes of a forward estimation of BAC, blood sam-
pling time 2 was considered to be a potentially unreliable "target 
time" because the post absorptive state could not be guaranteed 
such a short time (0.78 to 1.38 hours) after cessation of drinking. 
For this reason, forward estimation to sampling time 2 was consid-
ered a good test of the forward estimation methodology under 
social drinking conditions. However blood sampling time 3 was 
regarded as a more reliable target time for a forward estimation, 
more time being available for absorption and distribution of the 
total alcohol dose. 
Back Estimations 
These were performed using the following equation: 
BAC2esl « BAC3 + p w X t 
where 
BAC2est is the estimated BAC at blood sampling time 2. 
BAC3 is the measured BAC at blood sampling time 3. 
T ' was the elapsed time between the taking of blood sample 
2 and blood sample 3. 
Forward Estimations 
Forward estimations of BAC at blood sampling times 2 and 3 
were made so that the estimates could be compared with the two 
measured BAC values. 
The main method used for forward calculation was that described 
by Watson et al. (2). This is the method we use routinely for 
general casework and it involves use of the following equation 
described in the introduction: 
BAC = (D/TBW) X Blw X 100 - $m X t 
where 
(D/TBW) X Blw X 100 = BAC0 
The TB W value for each individual was estimated using the follow-
ing equation, the derivation of which is also described by Watson 
et al. (2): 
TBW = 2.447 - 0.09516(age) + 0.1074(height) 
+ 0.3362(weight) 
where TBW is in liters, age is in years, height is in cm and weight 
is in kg. This formula relates specifically to males. 
The water content of blood was taken to be 80% v/v, as used 
by Watson et al. (2), although 85% v/v has been used by others (12). 
Three other methods of forward calculation were also used, the 
only difference between the methods being the way in which the 
BAC0 was determined. Two of the other methods involved use of 
the following equations: 
The Widmark method (5): BAC0 = 100 X 1.055* X D/(0.68** 
X body wgt) 
The method of Lewis (12): BAC0 = 100 X D/(Vs§ X body wgt) 
With the dose (D) expressed in grams, and body weight in kilo-
grams, the factor of 100 was necessary to give BAC units of 
milligrams per 100 milliliters (mg/dL), the units used in New 
Zealand road transport law. 
The method of Forrest (22) was the fourth method used. It is 
the same as that of Watson et al. (2) except that a different method 
of determining total body water is used. 
For the purpose of the forward estimations, it was initially 
assumed that the fiw for each of the volunteers could have been 
as low as 10 and as high as 20 mg/dL/h. This range was chosen 
as being representative of most social drinkers, based on reviews 
of "normal" blood alcohol clearance rates (6,23). It was felt that 
Peo values below this range would be most unlikely in healthy 
people and values above this range would be relevant mainly to 
chronic heavy drinkers (6). 
In this context it must be noted that Lewis (12) does not recom-
mend use of a constant P^ but suggests that the choice of P^ 
should be based on the relevant BAC range over which a forward 
or back estimation is made. Therefore when referring to Lewis's 
method of forward estimation we are referring only to his method 
of determining the volume of distribution for alcohol and BAC0. 
Results and Discussion 
BAC Results 
No detectable alcohol was found in sample 1 from any of the 
volunteers. Therefore the results obtained for samples 2 and 3 
(BAC2 and BAC3) were due entirely to the alcohol consumed 
during the experiment. 
•Average density of blood (g/mL). 
**The mean Widmark factor for males. 
§Specific volume of distribution for alcohol (L/kg). 
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BAC2 ranged from 32 to 200 mg/dL (mean = 108) and BAC3 
ranged from 16 to 130 mg/dL (mean = 66). The wide ranges in 
the BAC values reflect the wide range in total alcohol dose taken 
by the volunteers. The mean time delay between the taking of 
blood samples 2 and 3 was 2.22 hours (range: 1.30 to 3.13). 
Back Estimations 
The results for three subjects are shown in Fig. 1. These results 
are representative of all others in this study. 
Where BAC2 was estimated from BAC3, 67%, 92% and 100% 
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FIG. I—Back estimations of BAC2 from BAC3 for subjects "U," "C" and "Z" The two open circles in each graph represent the measured BAC2 
and BAC3 values. The range of BAC2 estimates is illustrated by the lines radiating from BAC3 at the different blood alcohol clearance rates used. 
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of the experimentally measured BAC2 values were within the 
range expected, assuming $m elimination rates of 10-20, 10-25 
and 8-28 mg/dL/h respectively. 
In the case of subject "IT B AC2 lies within the predicted range, 
if 5^0 is assumed to be in the 10 to 20 mg/dL/h range. Very similar 
results were obtained for another 15 of the 24 subjects. 
In the case of subject "C" BAC2 is overestimated although it 
is only 2 mg/dL outside the predicted range. This was the only 
case where BAC2 was overestimated. 
In the case of subject "Z" BAC2 is underestimated if P^ is 
assumed to be in the 10 to 20 mg/dL/h range. There were six other 
similar cases but in no case was BAC2 more than 14 mg/dL above 
the upper limit of the predicted range. 
Considering that BAC2 was measured approximately one hour 
after drinking stopped, when absorption and equilibration of alco-
hol may not have been complete, these results are surprising. They 
suggest that back estimations up to a relatively short time after 
cessation of drinking, may not be subject to gross errors after a 
period of social drinking. This conclusion is supported by other 
studies involving even shorter periods of social drinking (17-19). 
Reliable estimations of post absorptive blood alcohol clearance 
rates could not be made in this study because the BAC for each 
subject was not followed for a sufficiently long period. Even at 
sampling time 3, full absorption and equilibration of the alcohol 
dose could not be guaranteed because of the unknown effect of 
the large meal. Therefore we cannot be sure whether post drinking 
absorption effects, or p ^ values outside the "normal" range were 
the main cause of the few apparently inaccurate back estimations 
for BAC2. 
It is the practice of some forensic scientists to use a P&Q value 
of 15 mg/dL/h when performing back estimations. This is widely 
regarded as an average value for "normal" social drinkers (16). 
The errors associated with the use of this average value are shown 
in Table 2. In general these errors were not large. The likely reason 
for this is that the back estimations in this study related to a 
relatively short time period (1.30 to 3.13 hours). Over longer time 
periods greater errors would be expected if a fiw range is not 
used (16). 
Forward Estimations 
The results for three of the volunteers are shown in Fig.- 2. 
Again these are representative of all other results. The forward 
estimations shown in this figure were made using the method of 
Watson et al. (2). 
In the case of subject "X" BAC2 and BAC3 are within the 
predicted range, assuming a $& of 10 to 20 mg/dL/h. Another 15 
of the 24 volunteers gave similar results. This result was also 
somewhat surprising given the non-ideal conditions under which 
the estimates were made. 
TABLE 2—Errors associated with BAC2 back estimates when the 
blood alcohol clearance rate was assumed to be 15 mgldUh. 
Mean 
Range 
Differences Between Estimated BAC2 Values and 
Measured BAC2 Values (n = 24) 
Actual Differences 
(mg/dL) 
- 9 
- 2 8 to +10 
% 
Differences§ 
~7 
- 2 6 to +18 
§Actual differences as a percentage of measured BAC2 values. 
In the case of subject "T" BAC2 and BAC3 are outside the 
predicted range, assuming a P^ of 10 to 20 mg/dL/h. However 
when the forward estimation for subject "T" was based on a slightly 
extended $m range of 10 to 25 mg/dL/h BAC3 fell within the 
predicted range and BAC2 was only just outside the predicted 
range (by 1 mg/dL). Subject "T" represents the worst overestimate 
seen although there were five other similar cases. 
In the case of subject "H" BAC2 was underestimated although 
BAC3 fell within the predicted range. There was only one other 
subject in this category (Subject "L"). BAC2 was outside the 
predicted range by 16 mg/dL in the case of subject UH" and by 
12 mg/dL in the case of subject "L"). These are respectively 14% 
and 12% deviations from the higher prediction limit. 
The apparent underestimation of BAC2 in these two cases is 
unlikely to have been caused by a genuinely low p^. If this was 
the case BAC3 would have been underestimated as well. The 
underestimation was almost certainly caused by a post drinking 
BAC "overshoot" prior to equilibration. This phenomenon is com-
monly observed after rapid bolus consumption of alcohol, espe-
cially on an empty stomach (6,24) but our results and those of 
others (20) suggest that it may not be common in a social drink-
ing situation. 
Table 3 summarizes the forward estimations made using all 
four methods. 
Because of the small sample number, no rigorous statistical 
analysis of these results has been carried out. However, they suggest 
that the forward estimation methods of Watson et al. (2), Lewis 
(12) and Forrest (22), have a similar degree of accuracy, at least 
under the conditions of our study. Widmark's method may be less 
accurate than the other three methods. This would be expected 
given that this method is the only one of the four methods that does 
not take into account differences in body build when estimating the 
TBW or the VD for alcohol. 
The mean TBW value calculated for the 24 volunteers by the 
method of Watson et al. (46.3 L) was very close to that determined 
by the method described by Forrest (46.6 L). However TBW values 
determined for each subject by the two methods differed by up to 
7%. Such differences accounted for the apparent differences in 
prediction accuracy between these two methods. 
Although the mean blood water content is 85% v/v (25), the 
BAC predictions based on the methods of Forrest (22), and Watson 
et al. (2) were more accurate if a value of 80% v/v was used, as 
recommended by these authors. Use of the lower value lowered 
the estimate of BAC0 by about 6%. Therefore it always lowered 
predicted BAC results by more than 6%. Although in our experi-
ments the bulk of the BAC2 and BAC3 results fell within or close 
to the predicted range, there was a tendency for the predicted range 
to be too high. Therefore any factor which slightly lowered the 
predicted range increased the apparent prediction accuracy. It is 
possible that use of an erroneous blood water fraction helps com-
pensate for small errors resulting from failure to take any account 
of first-pass effects and non-linear alcohol clearance. 
In this context it should be noted that Lewis's method generally 
gave higher TBW estimates than the other three methods (see 
Table 1). Therefore, regardless of which blood water fraction was 
used, Lewis's method generally gave lower BAQ values than 
the other methods. This is the reason for the apparently superior 
accuracy of Lewis's method in estimating BAC2 and BAC3 using 
the narrowest of the p^, ranges (see Table 3). 
We can only speculate as to why some authors have used 80% 
v/v for the blood water content. However one possibility is that 
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the volume per weight value (approximately 80%) has been con-
fused with the volume per volume value 
It would be of interest to repeat this study, following blood 
alcohol concentrations for several more hours to ensure that full 
absorption and equilibiation oi the alcohol dose has occurred 
STOWELL AND STOWELL • BLOOD ALCOHOL ESTIMATION 1 9 
Comparing predicted BAC ranges with actual BAC results under 
these conditions would give more reliable information on the accu-
racy of the various forward and back estimation methods 
We cannot rule out the possibility that some of the volunteers 
had Pe»o values above 20 mg/dL/h and that this was the cause of 
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TABLE 3—Summary' of forward estimation results for BAC2 and 
BAC3. 
Method of 
Estimation 
Watson et al. 
Lewis 
Forrest 
Widmark 
Percentage of BAC2 and BAC3 Results Which Were 
J.WJ1 
BAC2 
63 
67 
63 
50 
Within the Estimated Range 
10-20* 
BAC3 
79 
92 
79 
58 
h*Z 
BAC2 
88 
79 
83 
79 
10-25 
BAC3 
100 
100 
100 
96 
(« = 24) 
P W L = 
BAC2 
92 
92 
96 
96 
8-28 
BAC3 
100 
100 
100 
100 
*Uniis for ft* * mg/dL/h. 
one or more of the apparent discrepancies between actual and 
predicted results. 
Table 4 shows the magnitude of the errors associated with for-
ward estimates made using a fixed p^ of 15 mg/dL/h. The results 
in this table suggest that gross errors are likely if a reasonably 
wide 6^0 range is not used. 
When the results in Table 4 are compared with those in Table 
2, it is clear that while the back estimates tended to underestimate 
actual B AC values, the forward estimates tended to do the opposite. 
Similar results have been reported by Shajani and Dinn (20). BAC 
"overshoot" conditions or conditions of incomplete absorption and 
equilibration do not account for these results. Although there may 
be more than one factor responsible for this apparent anomaly 
there are two potential causes which by themselves or in combina-
tion could explain the observed results. 
The first is the possibility that the average $& for the subjects 
in our study was above 15 mg/dL/h. Others have found this to be 
the case in their studies (16,20). Unfortunately, the experimental 
design of our study did not allow accurate determinations of p ^ 
values. 
Some of the volunteers in this study would not be regarded as 
moderate drinkers on the basis of their estimated daily alcohol 
intake. For example, six of them were consuming more than 40 
g per day and four of them were consuming more than 60 g per 
day on average. These dose rates in men are regarded respectively 
as "hazardous*' and "harmful" by some health professionals (26). 
Because there appears to be a positive correlation between mean 
daily alcohol intake and the rate of alcohol metabolism (10), some 
of our subjects might have had blood alcohol clearance rates well 
above average. However there was no clear correlation between 
those subjects whose BAC results fell outside the estimated ranges 
and high mean daily alcohol intakes. 
TABLE 4—Errors associated with BAC forward estimates when the 
blood alcohol clearance rate was assumed to be 15 mgldUh. 
Method of 
Estimation 
Watson et al. 
Lewis 
Forrest 
Widmark 
Differences Between 
Estimated BAC2 
Values and Actual 
BAC2 Values (as a 
percentage of Actual 
BAC2 Values) (n = 24) 
Mean 
+ 10 
+ 1 
+9 
+21 
Range 
-28 to +61 
-37 to +8 
-30 to +64 
-31 to +111 
Differences Between 
Estimated BAC3 
Values and Actual 
BAC3 Values (as a 
Percentage of Actual 
BAC3 Values) (n = 24) 
Mean 
+30 
+ 14 
+61 
+48 
Range 
-31 to +93 
-47 to +99 
-34 to +92 
-32 to +125 
The second possibility is overestimation of BAC0. This could 
occur as a result of underestimation of TBW, or as a result of first-
pass effects, or both. 
First pass effects appear to be negligible with alcohol dosages 
much lower than those used in this study (27,28). Our experimental 
data does not allow us to say whether they might be more significant 
when higher doses of alcohol are taken together with food. 
It seems unlikely that the TBW values are the only cause of 
the above anomaly. TBW values estimated by the methods of 
Watson et al., and Forrest, gave mean body water contents of 54 
and 55% respectively for the 24 volunteers. The method of Lewis 
gave a corresponding value of 62%. As the average body water 
content for males is 59-60% (29) Lewis's method might have 
been expected to underestimate BAC0, especially since we did not 
have a majority of very lean males in our study. Although this 
method appeared to be slightly more accurate than the other meth-
ods of forward estimation, it still tended to overestimate both 
BAC2 and BAC3 (see Table 4). 
Conclusion 
Our results support the view that back and forward estimations 
of BAC can seldom be performed with great accuracy. However 
they suggest that such estimates are unlikely to be subject to gross 
errors if the person in question has been in a normal social drinking 
situation, a $w range of about 10 to 20 mg/dL/h is used, and 
accurate dose and anthropometric data sufficient to calculate a VD 
or TBW value specific to the individual in question, is available. 
If there is reason to believe that the subject in question might 
be a chronic heavy drinker, it may be prudent to use a p ^ range 
with a maximum of 30 mg/dL/h in any back or forward estimations. 
The results of this study do not show any of the four forward 
calculation methods as clearly superior to all the others. All are 
useful as long as their limitations are understood. 
In any particular case, the formula available for BAC estimations 
should be used only as a starting point. The results given by 
the formula must be interpreted according to the circumstances 
surrounding the drinking situation. Good interpretation is unlikely 
to be made unless the forensic scientist has a thorough knowledge 
of the many factors which influence the absorption, distribution 
and metabolism of alcohol. 
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Computing a BAC Estimate 
According to a recent survey, most Americans think that drivers should not drink alcohol and then drive. 
^' Nonetheless, our legal system generally relates certain offenses to the amount of alcohol detected in a 
driver's body. The amount of alcohol is usually referred to as BAC — blood alcohol concentration — 
although it is often measured in the breath where the alcohol level in the water vapor of the breath 
follows the alcohol level in the blood.^ 
BAC is highly related to the amount of alcohol consumed over time. However, BAC is also influenced 
by other factors and the complex relationship makes it difficult for people to easily estimate BACs. For 
example, what is the BAC of a 125 pound woman, who is not an experienced drinker, who has four 
beers over two hours? 
When legislators debate bills that reference particular BACs, statements are often made regarding how 
much drinking would be, and would not be, permitted prior to driving. Until now, expert testimony 
would be required to confirm or deny such statements. 
Recent work, conducted as a part of a report to Congress on alcohol limits for drivers^, provided the 
basis for a useful tool that enables anyone with access to a personal computer to look up an estimate of 
BAC based on a person's weight, gender, number of drinks consumed, and time for which one is asking 
that the estimate be made. It should be understood that what results is an estimate because we calculate 
the BAC based on average values, for example, the amount of water in the body and in the blood, the 
average metabolism rate for a population, etc. The value estimated will certainly be correct for most 
individuals sharing characteristics placed into the computation, but may be greater or lesser depending 
on individual factors of which we do not have knowledge. 
The estimate of BAC should not be used by individuals to decide whether or not to drive after drinking -
- impairment can result from any amount of alcohol. However, it does provide the best available 
approximation of the number of drinks it takes for individuals to reach specific BACs. 
Basis for Calculating the BAC Estimate^ 
The basic formula for estimating a person's blood alcohol concentration derives from the work done by 
Widmark in the early 1930s^. Advancements in this technical area have lead to refinements in 
Widmark's basic calculation formula. The particular formula used here incorporates a BAC calculation 
procedure provided to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration courtesy of Herbert 
Moskowitz, Ph.D., a noted alcohol researcher. 
The basis for the calculations are the established physiological facts that alcohol distributes itself in the 
total water of the body, and that it is disposed of primarily by metabolism in the liver. The procedure 
takes into account the amount of body water in males and females, and the range of metabolic rates to be 
found in the population. The procedure, along with a work example, is presented below. 
Alcohol concentration is defined in terms of the weight of ethanol (Ethyl alcohol) in a volume of blood 
or breath. In the United States the typical measure is grams of ethanol in 100 milliliters of blood or in 
210 liters of breath and is reported as, for example, .10 percent or .10 .^ 
The procedure by which one calculates how to convert a dose of alcohol into a probable blood alcohol 
concentration proceeds in several steps: 
1) After absorption, alcohol is eventually distributed in the total water in the body. Begin by calculating 
the amount of water in the subject. On average, males have 58 percent of their body weight as water and 
females have 49 percent of their weight as water. To find the amount of water in an individual of given 
weight, one multiplies the body weight in kilograms by the gender percentage and obtains the amount of 
weight of the water in kilograms (one kilogram equals 2.2046 pounds). A kilogram of water occupies 
one liter, one can easily convert from weight to volume of water. For example, consider a 128-pound 
male of age 25. One hundred and twenty eight pounds divided by 2.2046 converts pounds into 58.06 
kilograms, which is his kilogram weight. (The BAC Estimator program makes the conversion 
automatically.) 
2) To find the total body water, multiply the 58.06 kilograms times .58 (58% of body weight). This 
equals 33.675 kilograms of water, which occupies a volume of 33.675 liters or 33,675 milliliters. 
3) The next step is to inquire what concentration in water will occur when a given dose of alcohol is 
administered. Assume that the dose is one ounce of pure alcohol (i.e., 200 proof). One ounce of alcohol 
equals 29.57 milliliters. Since alcohol has a specific gravity of .79, the 29.57 milliliters will weigh 23.36 
grams. 
One ounce of alcohol (i.e., 23.36 grams), absorbed into a 128-pound male's total body water, produces 
an alcohol concentration in water of 23.36 grams divided by 33,675 milliliters, i.e., .0006937 grams 
alcohol per milliliter of body water. 
4) We now find the alcohol concentration in the blood. On average, blood is composed of 80.6 percent 
water. Therefore, the .0006937 grams alcohol per milliliter of water is multiplied by .806. This results 
in .000559 grams alcohol per milliliter of blood (this is because each milliliter of blood only has .806 
milliliters of water). 
5) The result, 0.000559 grams alcohol per milliliter blood, equals 0.0559 grams alcohol per 100 
milliliters blood. This is also described as grams per deciliter (i.e., per 1/10 liter of blood), or also 
as .0559. It should be noted that our calculations are based on average characteristics for individuals. 
While .58 is the mean water body weight percentage of males and .49 is the mean water weight 
percentage of females, individuals vary with respect to this figure. Younger people have a higher 
proportion of body water as a fraction of their total weight, and older people have less. Overweight 
individuals have a smaller proportion of their body weight as water, and lean people have a larger 
fraction of their body weight as water. In most cases, this variability will produce a small fraction as 
error in calculating BAC. Another source of variation is the amount of water in the blood which we have 
estimated as averaging 80.6%, but it varies as a function of several factors including the red blood cell 
concentration measured by the hemocrit. But again, .806 is the average value, and deviations typically 
are small. 
Water body weight percentage is the percentage of total body weight composed of water. This is not the 
same as Widmark's "R" factor. The "R" factor is a complex empirical measure that takes into account 
both body water percentage and water concentration in blood. 
6) We have calculated the theoretical instantaneous BAC for one ounce of alcohol. To adjust this 
calculation for the actual content of alcohol in a drink, one multiplies the number of ounces of alcohol in 
the drink by the figure for BAC per one ounce alcohol. An example might be a 12-ounce can of beer 
drunk by the 128-pound male. Assuming that the concentration of alcohol in the beverage is 4.5 percent 
by volume, one multiplies the 12 ounces in the beer can times .045 and determines that the can 
contains .54 ounces of alcohol. Therefore, the theoretically peak instantaneous BAC produced by a 
single can of beer in our 128-pound male would be .54 times .0559 (the BAC produced by one ounce of 
alcohol) equalling .0302. 
7) The final factor to take into account is the metabolism or burnoff. Alcohol is metabolized from the 
time that ingestion begins. It takes but a few seconds for alcohol to reach the liver and for metabolism to 
commence after drinking. Thus, metabolism is occurring during the period that alcohol is being 
absorbed and distributed throughout the body. To determine the actual blood alcohol level at any given 
time, we must decrease the theoretical instantaneous peak BAC by the amount of alcohol metabolized 
from the beginning of drinking. As an example, let us take the 128-pound male who has consumed one 
can of beer and determine what his likely BAC level would be at the end of one hour. We have already 
determined that if all the alcohol that he consumed were instantaneously distributed throughout the 
body, he would have a blood alcohol level of .0302. Now, however, one hour has passed, during which 
metabolism has occurred. There is considerable variation in metabolism rate. While there are several 
factors that determine metabolism rate, the prime factor is the recent drinking history since the 
metabolism rate is determined by the production of an enzyme in the liver which generates more 
enzymes if over a period of time (usually several months) it is called upon to process frequent/large 
quantities of alcohol. 
Although the average metabolism rate for moderate drinkers produces a .017 per hour decline in BAC 
level (here termed "Average"), and the average metabolism rate for heavy drinkers (who consume 60 
drinks or more in one month) produces a .02 per hour decline (here termed "Above Average"), the range 
of metabolism rate in the population can go above .040 and below .010. One can either utilize in the 
calculation the average (.017 per hour decline) metabolism rate, or if one wished to use a very 
conservative figure, (which less than 20 percent of the population would exhibit), one could use .012 per 
hour decline (here termed "Below Average") [Note: the BAC Estimator program provides BAC 
estimates for above average, average, and below average metabolism rates automatically. These three 
categories of metabolism rate closely approximate a drinker's recent drinking pattern, i.e., frequency and 
quantity of consumption.] 
If we wish to be sure that we can determine when our blood alcohol concentration level has returned to 
zero, it might be well to use this very conservative (below average) figure. Thus we take the .0302 BAC 
and subtract .012 for one hour of metabolism and calculate that the estimated BAC at the end of one 
hour is .0182 for a 128 pound male who has drunk a 12 ounce can of beer containing 4.5 percent alcohol 
by volume, assuming a conservative metabolic rate of .012 per hour. (The BAC Estimator program 
rounds-off BAC estimates to two decimal places, thus it would report a calculated BAC of .0182 as .02.) 
Example: 
Find the BAC for 128 lb. male drinking 12 oz. beer (4.5 percent alcohol by volume) in one hour's time. 
A. Convert pounds to kilograms: 1281bs - 2.2046 = 58.06 kg. 
B. Find total body water: 58.06 kg. X .58 = 33.675 liters or 33,675 milliliters water 
C. Determine the weight in grams of 1 oz. alcohol: 
29.57 ml/oz X .79 g/ml - 23.36 grams/oz 
D. If we put 1 oz. of alcohol into the subject's total body water, we would have grams of alcohol/ml. of 
water, e.g., 
23.36 grams + 33,675 milliliter = .0006937 grams alcohol/ml of water 
E. We now want to find the alcohol concentration in the blood. Blood is composed of 80.6 percent 
water; therefore, .0006937 X .806 = .000559 grams alcohol/milliliter blood. 
F. Instead of grams alcohol per milliliter blood, we need the figure in terms of grams per 100 milliliter, 
also known as grams percent. Multiply the .000559 grams alcohol/ milliliter blood by 100, i.e., .000559 
grams per milliliter X 100 = .0559 grams alcohol per 100 milliliters, or .0559. 
(This is the BAC which 1 oz. of alcohol would produce in a 128 lb male if there were instantaneous 
consumption, absorption, and distribution of the alcohol throughout the body.) 
G. To adjust for the actual amount consumed, one multiplies the above figure by the amount of alcohol 
in the beverage consumed. Thus, if the 128 lb. male described above consumed a single 12 oz. can of 
beer containing 4.5 percent alcohol by volume, he would have consumed 12 oz. X .045 = .54 oz. of 
alcohol. Since 1 oz. of alcohol would produce a BAC of .0559 and .54 oz. of alcohol has been 
consumed, the actual alcohol level would be .0559 x .54 = .030 BAC for one can of beer. 
H. In real life, time must pass for the consumption, absorption, and distribution of alcohol throughout 
the body. Therefore, we calculate what the actual BAC level would be at the end of one hour after 
consuming the single can of beer. During this period, the body would have disposed of alcohol through 
metabolism at a rate characteristic of that individual, primarily his recent frequency and quantity of 
drinking. Utilizing a conservative (below average) metabolism rate of .012 per hour, we can calculate 
the BAC level as .0302 - .012 per hour X 1 hour = .0182 BAC at the end of one hour for our 128 lb. 
male who drank 1 can of beer. (As noted above, the BAC Estimator program rounds-off BAC estimates 
to two decimal places, thus it would report a calculated BAC of .0182 as .02.) Note that the time of 
metabolism is calculated from the beginning of drinking, not when the consumption is completed. 
1. National Survey of Drinking and Driving Attitudes and Behavior, draft report, Department of 
Transportation, 1993. 
2. "BAC" refers to either blood alcohol concentration, stated as grams per 100 milliliters of blood, or 
breath alcohol concentration, stated as grams per 210 liters of breath. 
3. Driving under the Influence: A Report to Congress on Alcohol Limits. October, 1992. U.S. 
Department of Transportation. 
4. This procedure was published in Appendix I of Driving under the Influence: A Report to Congress on 
alcohol limits. October, 1992. U.S. Department of Transportation. 
5. Widmark, E. Die theoretischen grundiagen und die praktische verwendbarkeit der geriehtlich-
medizinishen alkoholbestimmung. 1932. Berlin: Urgan and Schwarzenberg. 
6. "Percent" in U.S. toxicological circles means grams per 100 milliliter; this is a weight per volume 
measure and does not carry the usual meaning of percentage. In this report, BAC is defined as either 
blood alcohol concentration, stated as grams per 100 milliliters of blood or as breath alcohol 
concentration, stated as grams per 210 liters of breath, and is reported without a "%" sign. 
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Summary 
The rate and kinetic order of ethanol elimination was evaluated in human volunteers. 
Part I of the study involved dosing individuals with alcoholic beverages on two separate 
occasions. Breathalyzer tests were performed at 15-min intervals for a period of 6 h. 
Attention was focused on values obtained after peak blood ethanol levels had been 
reached. The second part of the study included having samples drawn from alcoholics 
at predetermined intervals during recovery from alcoholic intoxication, Blood ethanol 
concentration data was analyzed for kinetic order and a comparison of ethanol elimina-
tion rates of alcoholics and non-alcoholics was made. The predicative capability of 
estimating a BAC from both the zero and first order theories was also investigated. 
It was concluded that ethanoi elimination is a zero order process. For subjects classi-
fied as non-drinkers (consume less than 6 ounces of ethanol/month), the mean ethanol 
elimination rate as determined in the study was 1 2 * 4 mg/h. For subjects classified as 
social drinkers (consume more than 6 ounces but less than 30 ounces of ethanol/month), 
the mean ethanol elimination rate was 16 * 4 mg%/h, and for alcoholics, the mean 
ethanol elimination rate was 30 ± 9 mg%/h. These results indicate that the rate of ethanol 
elimination increases with drinking experience. 
Key words: Blood alcohol concentration; Ethanol; Breathalyzer; Zero order kinetics; 
First order kinetics 
Introduction 
It is common practice to perform a back calculation for estimating a 
blood alcohol concentration (BAC) when there is a delay between the time 
of an alleged offense and the time of withdrawal of a blood sample. This 
back calculation is based on the theory that ethanol elimination is zero 
order [1] . Mellanby, Widmark and numerous others [2] have concluded 
that ethanol elimination is a zero order process. However, many other 
theories have also been proposed. Haggard and Greenberg [2] claim ethanol 
elimination is a first order process, Lunquist and Wolthers postulated 
Michaelis-Menton enzyme kinetics, and Marshall and Fritz describe the 
ethanol elimination curve as a combination of zero order and first order 
kinetics [2] . In a study performed by Bogosz et al [3], it was concluded 
that ethanol elimination is not linear, and great individual variability in the 
0379-0738/84/$03.00 
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rate of ethanol elimination was noted. One of the most recent studies 
involving the kinetics of ethanol elimination was performed by Bruno et al 
[4]. They characterized the elimination curve by dividing it into three 
distinct regions: A fast initial phase which corresponds to the involvement 
of an initial amount of free enzyme, a subsequent linear phase reflecting the 
saturation of metabolic processes at high doses, and a terminal first order 
phase. It was also determined that the half-life was independent of dose and 
characteristic for the subject. 
This study is an attempt to determine the rate of ethanol elimination and 
whether ethanol elimination is more accurately described by zero order 
kinetics. This information will allow for a more accurate prediction of a 
BAC in medicolegal situations. 
Methodology 
Analysis of ethanol concentration over time 
Twenty individuals, ten classified as non-drinkers (less than 6 ounces of 
ethanoi/month), and ten classified as social drinkers (those consuming 
greater than 6 ounces of ethanol/month) were selected for this study. 
Subjects were instructed to fast for a period of at least 3 h prior to initiation 
of testing. Subjects were dosed on two separate occasions. On both occasions 
the entire dose of ethanol was to be consumed within a 40-min drinking 
period. The first Breathalyzer analysis of blood ethanol concentration was 
performed 20 min after the end of the drinking period, and every 15 min 
thereafter for a period of 5 h. 
Five individuals classified as alcoholics participated in this study. The 
subjects were patients in the detoxification unit of an alcoholic rehabilita-
tion hospital. Patient consent for participation in this study was obtained 
upon admittance to the hospital emergency room. A total of five blood 
samples were collected from each participant at approximately 1-h intervals. 
The exact time of withdrawal of each blood sample was recorded along with 
a brief patient medical history. Blood samples were analyzed by gas liquid 
chromatography, employing the direct injection techniques. 
Breathalyzer (chromic acid/photoelectric device) 
A Breathalyzer Model 1000 equipped with Breathalyzer ampules (Smith-
Wesson, Springfield, Massachusetts) was used for experimental work in this 
study. A breath sample was collected by having the subject blow into a 
heated plastic tube connected to the device. The breath sample was bubbled 
through a potassium dichromate solution. In the ensuing reaction ethanol 
is oxidized to acetic apid while the yellow dichromate is reduced to a blue-
green chromic sulfate compound. The color change is directly proportional 
to the amount of ethanol in the sample. A direct reading of ethanol concen-
tration is provided. 
A major objective of this study was to obtain the most accurate ethanol 
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elimination curve possible for each individual tested. Use of the Breathalyzer 
Model 1000 in Part I of the study allowed more frequent sampling than 
would have been possible if blood samples had to be drawn. 
Gas liquid chromatography 
A Perkin Elmer Sigma 4B gas chromatograph equipped with a flame 
ionization detector was used for determination of blood ethanol concen-
trations. The column was a 6 foot by 1/8 inch stainless steel column packed 
with 0.2% Carbowax 1500 on 80/100 mesh Carbopack C. The column is 
well suited for separation of the lower alcohols. The operating conditions 
were as follows: 
Oven temperature: 97°C 
Injection and detection temperature: 225°C 
Flow rate (helium): 32 ml/min 
Hydrogen pressure: 21 psi 
Attenuation: 10 X 32 
Gas chromatography data analysis was performed by a Perkin Elmer 
Sigma 10 console. Quantitation was achieved by an internal standard ana-
lysis, The amount of component of interest is related to the amount of the 
internal standard component by the ratio of peak areas. 
Quantitative analysis of ethanol in body fluids by the direct injection 
technique 
With an automatic pipette 500 /xl of the internal standard solution (n-
propanol) and 500 pi of deionized water were added to a 5-ml test tube. 
With a clean pipette tip, 500 fi\ of water were added to the same test tube. 
The tube was stoppered and Vortex-mixed to insure complete mixing of 
the sample. 
Regression analysis/comparison of zero and first order correlation coeffi-
cients 
In both parts of the study ethanol elimination curves were constructed 
from ethanol concentration over time data. In Part I approximately 20 
breath samples were analyzed by the Breathalyzer over a 5-h period. In 
Part II, blood samples were collected from alcoholics over a 5-h period. 
The samples were analyzed by gas chromatography. For the evaluation of 
the kinetic order of ethanol elimination, the concentrations were calculated 
and recorded in both milligrams percent and natural logarithms of milli-
grams percent. 
Regression analysis of the ethanol concentration over time data for each 
individual tested yielded correlation coefficients which indicated the degree 
to which the experimental ethanol elimination data followed zero order 
(linear) elimination kinetics. For a first order (exponential) kinetic process, 
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the natural log of the ethanol concentration over time data represents a 
linear relationship. Regression analysis of the natural log of the ethanol 
concentration over time data for each individual tested yielded correlation 
coefficients which indicated the degree to which the experimental ethanol 
elimination data followed first order kinetics. 
Half-life determination 
For first order kinetics, the rate of ethanol elimination depends on the 
blood ethanol concentration at any given time. Since half-life is a function 
of the elimination rate, this first order kinetic parameter was calculated for 
all subjects. Twenty subjects were tested on two separate occasions, identi-
fied as Trial 1 and Trial 2. In this way it was assured that two different 
peak ethanol concentrations would be obtained for each subject. If ethanol 
elimination obeyed first order kinetics, the half-life values for a given indivi-
dual for Trials 1 and 2 should be the same. 
Predictive capability of zero and first order elimination theories 
The predictive capability of both the zero and first order elimination 
theories was investigated. The rate equation describing zero order kinetics 
{{d[A]/dt)= —K} was integrated to give an equation which describes a 
linear relationship between the concentration of ethanol and time ([A] = 
a—kt). In the above equations a equals the initial concentration, A equals 
the ethanol concentration at time t, and k is the zero order rate constant. 
For each subject a comparison was made using zero order kinetics between 
the actual and predicted ethanol concentrations at 2 h and 3 h after the peak 
ethanol concentration was reached. 
The rate equation which describes first order kinetics ((d[A]/d£) = 
—k[A]} was integrated to give an equation which describes an exponential 
relationship between the concentration of ethanol and time ([A] = ae~ki). 
By taking the natural log of both sides of the equation, a linear relationship 
is achieved between the natural log of the ethanol concentrations and time 
(In[A] = In a — kt). In the above equations a equals the initial concentration, 
A equals the concentration at time t and k is the first order constant. For 
each subject a comparison was made using first order kinetics between the 
actual and predicted ethanol concentrations at 2 h and 3 h after peak ethanol 
concentration was reached. 
Evaluation of zero order elimination rate 
The zero order elimination rate is equivalent to the slope of the ethanol 
concentration over time curve. The zero order elimination rate was calcu-
lated for all subjects tested. 
Breathalyzer versus gas chromatographic analysis (of simultaneous blood 
breath samples) 
In order to justify the use of the Breathalyzer for ethanol quantitations, 
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a direct comparison of the two methods was performed. Simultaneous 
blood and breath samples were obtained from willing subjects. Samples 
were analyzed by the gas chromatographic and Breathalyzer methods, 
respectively. 
Determination of time required to complete absorbtion ofethanol 
The time required to reach peak ethanol concentrations from completion 
of last drink was recorded for each individual participating in the study. 
Results 
Regression analysis/comparison of zero and first order correlation coeffi-
cients 
The mean of the correlation coefficients testing the zero order elimination 
theory was 0.9496 ± 0.0783. The mean of the correlation coefficients testing 
the first order elimination theory was 0.9270 ± 0.0841. For 69% of the 
trials, the zero order correlation coefficients were greater than the first 
order correlation coefficients. However, both the zero and first order correla-
tion coefficients indicate close agreement with the respective theories. A 
definite answer to the kinetic order of ethanol elimination cannot be made 
from the regression analysis alone, 
Half-life determination 
For the 20 subjects tested, the average absolute difference between the 
half-life calculated for Tri^l 1 and Trial 2 was 96.3 min. The mean percent 
TABLE 1 
BREATHALYZER VERSUS GAS CHROMATOGRAPH ANALYSIS OF BLOOD 
ETHANOL CONCENTRATIONS 
Sample No. Breathalyzer 
value (mg%) 
Gas chromato-
graph value 
(mg%) 
Percent 
difference 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
0 
0 
24 
38 
62 
70 
80 
85 
89 
114 
123 
130 
0 
0 
27 
41 
66 
78 
88 
91 
94 
120 
128 
138 
0.0 
0.0 
-11.1 
-7.3 
-4.6 
-4,1 
-9.0 
-6.6 
-6.3 
-5.0 
-3.9 
-5.8 
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difference was 33 ± 26%. The degree of discrepancy between ethanol half-
life values obtained for the same individual indicates that ethanol elimination 
is not a first order process. 
Predictive capability of the zero and first order elimination theories 
For the zero order theory the average percent difference between the 
actual and predicted ethanol concentration at 2 h was 11.2 ± 17.9% (range 
— 49 to 47%). The average percent difference at 3 h was 17.9 ±21.1% (range 
— 60 to 54%). For the first order theory the average percent difference 
between the actual and predicted ethanol concentration at 2 h was 24.7 ± 
21.0% (range — 73 to 30%). Eighty-four percent of the time, the concentra-
tion predicted by the zero order theory was closer to the actual experi-
mentally derived concentration than the concentration predicted by the first 
order theory. 
Evaluation of zero order elimination 
For subjects classified as non-drinkers the mean ethanol elimination rate, 
as determined in this study, was 12 ± 4 mg%/h. For subjects classified as 
social drinkers the mean ethanol elimination rate was 15 ± 4 rng%/h, and for 
alcoholics, the mean ethanol elimination rate was 30 ± 9 mg%/h. These 
results indicate that the rate of ethanol elimination increases with drinking 
experience. (Table 2). 
Breathalyzer versus gas chromatographic analysis of simultaneous blood 
and breath samples 
The average difference in results obtained was 5.2 ± 3,2% (Table 1). 
Determination of the time required for complete absorbtion of ethanol 
In this study, after a single dose of ethanol, 63% of the subjects attained 
their peak ethanol concentrations 20 min after comsumption of the dose. 
After 35 min, 85% of the subjects had reached their peak and after 65 min, 
96% of the subjects had reached their peak ethanol concentration. 
Discussion 
Based on the data presented in this study, ethanol elimination is more 
accurately described as a zero order process over the concentration range 
of interest. This conclusion is in agreement with the generally accepted 
position. This study also demonstrated that variance in ethanol elimination 
rates exists among individuals. 
More accurate predictions of blood ethanol concentrations could be 
made if two breath samples were collected over a specific spaced time 
period. Analysis of two spaced samples would allow a calculation of elimina-
t ion rate and a determination of an individual's position on the blood 
ethanol curve. 
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Another factor which often enters into the prediction of a BAC is the 
time required after drinking for an individual to reach his peak ethanol 
concentration. In contrast to the absorbtion rate values reported in this 
study, Goodman and'Gillman indicate that ethanol absorption may require 
2—6 h [5]. The absorption data in this study are in agreement with the 
values of 30—60 min reported elsewhere [1,6]. 
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